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Introduction
Worldly Realism
He . . . was driven by intellectual fervour, a burning belief in 
abstract nouns such as ‘sovereignty’ and ‘freedom’. Those ideas 
are noble in themselves, of course they are. But not when they are 
peeled away from the rough texture of the real world. For when 
doctrine is kept distilled, pure and fervently uncontaminated by 
reality, it turns into zealotry.
Jonathan Freedland, 
The Guardian, 2 July 2016
Jacob Flanders’ room in Cambridge contains the works of only one 
woman writer among all the many male-authored texts scattered 
about; that writer is Jane Austen. Even so, her presence is there by 
default, in ‘deference, perhaps, to someone else’s standard’.1 It is as 
if Woolf pays a quietly humorous tribute here, across the space of 
a hundred years, to her most important literary progenitor. Yet had 
Jacob availed himself of the pleasure of reading Northanger Abbey 
(1st drafts c.1798–9; pub. 1816), he might well have been struck 
by the similarities between its narrative, initiating Austen’s mature 
style, and his own, in which Woolf, too, establishes her mature artis-
tic form. In those two works, respectively, Northanger Abbey and 
Jacob’s Room, both writers fi nd the means and the voice to articu-
late the sceptical irreverence which constitutes the distinctive force of 
their artistic sensibilities and vision, a scepticism that is their shared 
inheritance from the tradition of Scottish Enlightenment.
In these early novels, both writers are consciously challenging 
the authority of previous representational modes. Jacob’s Room, 
appearing in 1922, the same year as Ulysses and The Waste Land, 
has, not surprisingly, been largely considered as part of the mod-
ernist rejection of traditional literary forms. Yet, Alex Zwerdling is 
surely right when he suggests that critical commentary on the novel 
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can only illuminate if it moves beyond a mere inventory of innova-
tive techniques. Also required is consideration of why Woolf felt the 
need for a new kind of narrative.2 Slotting writers into their generic 
pigeon hole can close off wider recognition of their artistic aims 
and achievements. Discussion of Northanger Abbey tends also to 
focus upon generic convention, especially Austen’s debunking of the 
gothic novel. For some critics, like Alistair Duckworth, the novel 
ultimately fails because, while it makes fun of gothic form, the narra-
tive remains too indebted to it to achieve its proposed moral vision.3 
By contrast, Claudia Johnson, among others, sees Austen’s complex 
ironies as ultimately reinstating the value of the gothic imagination 
as a means of illuminating ‘the ambiguous distresses, dangers, and 
betrayals of ordinary life’.4 As with discussion of Jacob’s Room, there 
is perhaps need to read the novel in broader terms than the generic, 
asking why Austen is challenging popular novelistic forms and what 
is the social perspective that informs her need to fi nd a new mode of 
representation.
Despite the hundred odd years that separate them, both novels 
are centrally concerned to overturn concepts of heroic exceptional-
ism as portrayed in the protagonists of traditional literature. Both 
Catherine Morland and Jacob Flanders defy artistic convention in 
being resolutely ordinary. Despite her romantic response to gothic 
tales, Catherine lacks sensibility or even complicated interiority. 
Like most children she had enjoyed physical movement and games 
more than sentiment. Austen has been criticised for failing to pro-
vide convincing and sustained presentation of Catherine’s growth 
in moral self-awareness. Yet, perhaps this is part of a deliberate, 
sceptical refusal of the heroic, a radical writerly commitment to 
people and things so normal as to remain beneath aesthetic notice. 
Jacob Flanders also lacks interiority. As has been recognised, Woolf 
writes not only against the form of the Bildungsroman but also 
against the traditional conventions of biography.5 The narrative 
remains wholly external to Jacob’s consciousness and lacks linear 
coherence. Given Jacob’s death in the First World War, Woolf’s 
totally unsentimental treatment sets itself provocatively against the 
prevailing reverence accorded the heroic dead. Before going up to 
Cambridge, Jacob accepts a present of Byron’s writing and in his 
study he has the work of Thomas Carlyle (pp. 24, 49). The implica-
tion is that young men should be wary of the spurious attraction to 
heroes and hero-worship.
The title of the essay Jacob is writing, ‘Does History Consist 
of the Biographies of Great Men?’, with its obvious reference to 
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Carlyle’s On Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroic in History, 
is darkly ironic given the premature, pointless deaths of so many 
young men in trench warfare. The title of the essay also forms part 
of Woolf’s pervasive attack upon gender hierarchy throughout the 
text. Women are treated contemptuously by Jacob and his friends, 
regarded as lesser beings, lacking spirituality and necessary mainly 
for sexual pleasure. This presumption of masculine superiority is 
fostered by the cult of Hellenism that young men of Jacob’s gen-
eration were immersed in at the public schools and Cambridge as 
part of a more general enthusiasm, in the early part of the century, 
for idealist philosophy. The effect was the elevation of the mind 
(invariably masculine) above the body (usually female). Woolf 
starkly ironises this idealising of disembodied rationality in her 
chilling account of death dehumanised by distance: ‘Like blocks 
of tin soldiers the army covers the cornfi eld, moves up the hillside, 
stops [. . .] and falls fl at, save that, through fi eld glasses, it can be 
seen that one or two pieces still agitate up and down like fragments 
of broken match-stick’ (p. 216). A hundred years earlier, Henry 
Tilney would fi nd much common ground with Jacob as to women’s 
lack of rationality and capacity for serious knowledge. Catherine’s 
view of the history of great men as written by great men, however, 
is as sceptical as Woolf’s: women are absent from their accounts 
and the male heroes all ‘good for nothing’ (p. 79). Henry Tilney’s 
confi dence in his capacity to educate and correct the female mind is 
ironically demoted by his serious failure of insight into his father’s 
motives and conduct.
It is surprising to recognise how easily Woolf’s representation of 
Betty Flanders, Captain Barfoot, Mr Floyd and most others in that 
circle of Jacob’s childhood could be slipped unnoticed into Austen’s 
village of Fullerton along with Mrs Morland and the Allens. There is 
a sense, moreover, that these rather complacent but respectable folk 
all belong to a way of life becoming outmoded and share a perspec-
tive that is no longer adequate, and this is so despite the hundred 
years between the two publications. The sceptical mockery of heroic 
endeavour, of individualist exceptionalism, and of gender hierarchy 
along with the ironic rejection of established literary forms are part 
of a larger agenda that Austen and Woolf share. Both writers are 
situated, at different historical points, within a continuing struggle 
of representation that constitutes the realms of art and of politics.
They both sense that a different possible world is struggling for 
perceptibility, a process engaging a new language and new forms. 
This is most obviously so for Woolf, writing in the aftermath of the 
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First World War that had thrown into disarray all the traditional 
certainties structuring social and political life: class and gender sub-
ordination, reverence for religion, national honour and law. It is the 
crisis of this ordered and authorised hierarchical perception of social 
reality that Woolf’s narrative techniques aim to convey. Similarly, 
in Northanger Abbey, Austen interrogates and fi nds inadequate the 
available conventions of language and form. Failures of expression 
and understanding are characterised by a confl ict between gothic and 
rational perceptions of realities. The occasions, moreover, involve 
reference to the forces of radical social change characterising the era 
of the French Revolution. When Catherine speaks enthusiastically of 
fresh horrors issuing from London, Eleanor Tilney mistakenly takes 
her to have news of political violence in the capital. Henry Tilney 
uses the opportunity to mock both women, informing his sister that 
any rational creature would relate Catherine’s words to the circu-
lating library not to ‘a mob of three thousand men assembling in 
St George’s Fields [. . .] the streets of London fl owing with blood’ 
(p. 82). But the unspoken challenge of the passage is that neither 
gothic melodrama nor pure rationality is adequate means to rep-
resent such actual social horror and turmoil as had indeed been 
recently experienced in London. Austen is in line, here, with British 
sceptical Enlightenment: pure rationality cannot fully comprehend 
the complexity of embodied experience.
The same irresolvable question of representation arises with 
Henry’s lecture to Catherine as to the ungothic, law-abiding, Chris-
tian nature of England where atrocity would never be connived at 
or tolerated. Yet his moral and rational vision of English normality 
is overturned by the vicious brutality of his own father, General 
Tilney, whom he had rebuked Catherine for depicting as a gothic vil-
lain. Henry’s rational picture of England leaves too much unnoticed 
and unspoken for. Yet to see the General’s behaviour as vindication 
of the gothic mode is equally limiting. The General is not the excep-
tionalist villain of gothic horror. In his pursuit of greed and petty 
dictatorship he is all too ordinary; he represents the mundanity of 
secular evil. His competitive consumerism, his greed and concern 
with social status, moreover, typifi es the powerful emergent force 
of aggressive individualism in British society and politics from the 
end of the eighteenth century onwards. As with Woolf, Austen’s was 
a world in which the consensus was fracturing. The scepticism and 
lack of reverence that typify both writers facilitated a dissensual way 
of perceiving their changing worlds and forging the representational 
means adequate to their vision. I am terming that representational 
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mode worldly realism, as distinct from psychological and social real-
ism. As the words suggest, worldly realism conveys a materialist, 
non-hierarchical and encompassing perception of existence, a hori-
zontal continuity of self, social world and physical universe.
It may seem surprising to suggest an artistic continuity between 
Austen, often seen as the originator of the British tradition of real-
ism, and Woolf, who is generally understood to herald its end. Both, 
however, are the direct literary heirs of the sceptical tradition of 
British empiricism, and both are writing at moments of public debate 
as to the confl icting claims of materialism versus idealism. Derek 
Ryan, one of the few critics to recognise that ‘throughout her writing 
Woolf theorises the materiality of human and non-human life’ asso-
ciates this artistic perspective with her wariness of the ‘philosophical, 
ethical and political pitfalls of individualism’.6 Austen similarly 
stresses the materiality of the self and regards with suspicion the con-
sensual consolidation of an ideology of individualism.
In considering the work of both writers as constituted by a shared, 
dissensual perspective, albeit mediated by their very different worlds, 
the work of Jacques Rancière offers an insightful conceptual frame-
work. Rancière challenges the poststructuralist orthodoxy, espoused 
by critics like Roland Barthes, that modernism marks a radical break 
with the foundational belief of realism that words can provide an 
account of the world. Modernism, such anti-realists assert, initiates 
an aesthetic practice of conscious self-referentiality, a disengaging of 
word from world. In opposing this view, Rancière argues that the 
radical break occurs around the end of the eighteenth century, when 
a new dissensual aesthetic regime came into confl ict with the exist-
ing consensual regime of classical verisimilitude.7 It is perhaps not 
coincidental that this is the moment at which Austen inaugurates 
her experimental novelistic practice, even though the British context 
of her work is different from that of the continental writers whom 
Rancière discusses.
The terms ‘consensus’ and ‘dissensus’ are central to Rancière’s 
thinking both on art and on politics, which he sees as two facets of 
the same site of struggle, the struggle of representation. Consensus, 
for Rancière, is an order regulated by the logic of the proper. It con-
stitutes a naturalised artistic and political hierarchy in which every-
one has a proper place which defi nes the terms and domain of their 
speech and action. This classical order of representation systema-
tises a facade of verisimilitude into a hierarchical totality comprising 
‘an affi nity between characters, situations and forms of expression’ 
(Politics of Literature, p. 153). Within this vertical hierarchy only 
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certain people’s speech is deemed signifi cant and noteworthy and 
their actions rationally understandable in terms of values like honour, 
trust, ambition. These classical conventions constitute universal man 
as ‘realistic’ in the rational verisimilitude of congruous, meaning-
ful speech, action and interpretation. This congruity of what is said, 
done and meant is held in place by the implicit guarantee of interi-
ority, of the presence of capacity for mental willing. What is other 
to this proper realm of the classical regime is rendered unnoticed, 
unheard, without sense.
Politics and art, Rancière suggests, comprise a struggle over what 
is deemed deliberative, meaningful speech and what can be dismissed 
as mere expression of sensation, non-sense: ‘Politics, before all else, 
is an intervention upon the visible and sayable.’8 The cracking apart 
of the naturalised facade of the proper requires a writing practice 
as dissensus. This is the destructive/productive egalitarianism of the 
new aesthetic regime of representation that arises around the end of 
the eighteenth century. It produces a redistribution of the perceptible, 
bringing into visibility and audibility all that had been excluded as 
unworthy, improper and of no account. As opposed to the static, 
vertical hierarchy regulating the regime of the proper, the aesthetic 
regime is driven by the horizontal force of democratic energy. It is the 
‘tide of beings and things, a tide of superfl uous bodies’ that surges 
through the text of Madame Bovary (Politics of Literature, p. 39).
It is not the separation of the word from the world that typi-
fi es the aesthetic regime but its inclusivity. It redistributes ‘space and 
time, place and identity, speech and noise, the visible and the invis-
ible’ (Politics of Literature, p. 4). Literary language is not a special 
elevated mode of poetics defi ning modernist writing, therefore, it is 
a new horizontal ‘way of linking the sayable and the visible, word 
and things’ (Politics of Literature, p. 9). It creates an egalitarian rep-
resentational space in which anyone can say anything in any style 
of language whatsoever. Rather than textuality, the aesthetic regime 
replaces the idealism underpinning the classical regime by bringing 
into perceptibility the material continuity of ‘the world-at-large that 
anyone can grab hold of’ (Politics of Literature, p. 13). The useful-
ness of Rancière’s concept of the perceptible lies equally in its materi-
alism and its inclusivity. What is perceptible is that which is afforded 
by impressions gained through both the senses and the intellect but 
with a reversal of idealist emphasis from mind to what is physically 
present to ear, eye and hand. All the stuff of the world in which we 
have existence is thus comprehended within the struggle of represen-
tation that constitutes the political and aesthetic regimes.
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Rancière sets out three relations of equality operating within the 
new dissensual regime of the perceptible. The fi rst is that of ‘the 
equality of subjects and the availability of any word and phrase to 
build the fabric of any life whatever’ (Politics of Literature, p. 26). 
The second is the equality of mute things that are more eloquent than 
the most heroic orator. Finally, there is the ‘molecular democracy 
of the states of things with no rhyme or reason’ (Politics of Litera-
ture, p. 26). To illustrate this third equality he refers to Flaubert’s 
claim that he was less interested in an individual beggar than in the 
mass of undifferentiated lice that lived off him (Politics of Literature, 
p. 25). Rancière claims that within the new aesthetic regime these 
three politics of equality are in tension, even confl ict. Yet, what needs 
affi rming as positive and productive in his account is the insistence 
upon things, upon the egalitarian tide of materiality that constitutes 
physical existence and the concomitant dethroning of human excep-
tionalism this necessarily entails. In a new regime of the perceptible, 
subjects and things and molecules are all equally noteworthy. It is 
this equality and inclusive horizontality that characterises the mode 
of writing I am terming worldly realism.
The confl ict between a classical, vertical regime of the perceptible 
and the redistribution of what is visible and sayable within a new 
horizontal, egalitarian regime of representation has signifi cant paral-
lels with the central debate within Enlightenment thinking between 
the rational universalism of continental idealism and the material 
particularism of British empiricism. Classical verisimilitude under-
writes the timeless values of universal man and erases from notice 
the embodied existence that renders humanity part of the chang-
ing physical world rather than the rational exception to it. British 
empiricism is sceptical of universal systems of knowledge, divorced 
from empirical particularity, and recognises the limitations of reason 
under the impress of habit and desires. It is, indeed, the promise of 
transcendence from an inconclusive, contingent everyday reality that 
constitutes the persuasive power of idealism as much as the rational-
ity of its systems of thought.
The Hellenism fl ourishing among the young men of Jacob’s gener-
ation in Woolf’s text and in her actual world beyond fi ction was part 
of a larger idealist reaction against what was seen as the spiritual arid-
ity of nineteenth-century materialism. The smallness, ignoble detail 
and conventionalism of this way of thinking is the cause of Jacob’s 
passionate rejection of H. G. Wells whose novels are exemplary, for 
him, of this narrow, provincial realism. Woolf, too, was critical of 
the writing of Wells, along with that of Arnold Bennett whom she 
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accuses of aiming at such factual, empirical particularity that there 
is a stifl ing ‘air of probability embalming the whole’, so that there 
seems no possible alternative to the familiarity within which we live.9
This is the criticism still brought against realism by anti-realist crit-
ics from Roland Barthes to, more recently, Gabriel Josipovici. Realism 
as a genre, anti-realists claim, functions ideologically to consolidate 
the status quo; the seamless verisimilitude, in form and content, that 
insists there is no alternative, that this is just, naturally, how things 
are. In Whatever Happened to Modernism, Josipovici makes the same 
accusation as Woolf arguing that realist novels ‘create a world and 
characters to inhabit that world that do not fl out the laws of prob-
ability [. . .] Such narratives are easy to read [. . .] the smooth chain of 
sentences gives us a sense of security, of comfort even.’10 Novels like 
this, Josipovici claims, make the world seem smaller and meaner. We 
could say that their consensual regime of the perceptible constitutes 
a meticulous facade that regulates too narrowly what and who can 
be seen and heard. It operates comfortingly rather like Henry Tilney’s 
view of England.
Nevertheless, in a recent review article on J. Hillis Miller in the 
London Review of Books, Rachel Bowlby complains that in this kind 
of critique, as made by Hillis Miller and Josipovici, among others, 
‘realism tends to get identifi ed with a demoted, simplifi ed theory of 
language – a word for everything and everything consistently called 
by its name’.11 As this suggests, underlying the attacks upon real-
ism there is frequently a positivist correspondence theory of truth, 
a belief that words can offer a one-to-one match with things in the 
world. Anti-realists, like Josipovici and Hillis Miller, disdain such an 
over-simple view but, they imply, realist writers do not, or, at least, 
realists sell that reassuring belief to their readers. Realism, according 
to this view, perpetrates a naive sense of language of which Witt-
genstein says, ‘a picture held us captive’.12 This comforting sense of 
identity between word and world is at odds with the epistemologi-
cal scepticism that underpins David Hume’s empiricism and equally 
with a view of language as inherently dialogic and communicative.13 
Such a narrowly referential view of representation, valorising accu-
racy and facts, is more usefully understood as actualist, as distinct 
from realist.
Georg Lukács makes a very clear distinction between realism and 
the reassuring consensual convention of actualism. ‘But the more 
closely Balzacian method approaches objective reality,’ he argues, 
‘the more it diverges from the accustomed, the average [. . .] Bal-
zac’s method transcends the narrow, habitual, accepted limits of 
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this immediacy and because it thus runs counter to the comfortable, 
familiar, usual way of looking at things, it is regarded by many as 
“exaggerated”’.14 Balzac’s art, Lukács continues, moves completely 
beyond ‘photographic reproduction’ (p. 60). What Lukács is describ-
ing here seems very similar to what Rancière advocates as writing as 
dissensus, a shattering of consensual verisimilitude. Lukács’ subse-
quent over-partisan defence of realism and attack upon modernism 
belongs to the Stalinist era, but the polarised controversies of that 
time initiated an unproductive, often misleading, binary opposition 
between realism and modernism that can too easily lead to an over-
simplifi ed, even caricatured version of one or the other, of which 
Josipovici’s account of realism is an unfortunate example.
Modernism and realism are, in fact, far from incompatible; both 
are experimental and both can offer an open sense of the possibili-
ties, as opposed to the factual probabilities, of human life. In his 
argument with Lukács, Bertold Brecht refuses to accept the polari-
sation of modernist experimentalism versus realist conventionalism: 
‘Formalism on the one side – contentism on the other. That is surely 
too primitive.’15 Realism cannot be embalmed in any one form or 
style, he argues,
Were we to copy the style of these [nineteenth-century] realists, 
we would no longer be realists. For time fl ows on [. . .] Methods 
become exhausted; stimuli no longer work. New problems appear 
and demand new methods. Reality changes; in order to represent 
it, modes of representation must also change. Nothing comes from 
nothing; the new comes from the old, but that is why it is new. (p. 82)
Conventional histories of the novel, such as Ian Watt’s The Rise of the 
Novel (1957), have certainly associated its development closely with 
the infl uence of eighteenth-century empiricism.16 Yet, anti-realists 
would be on fi rmer ground in recognising realist fi ction’s affi liation 
with and constitution of idealist conceptions of reality. It is in their 
underpinning of idealist values that many nineteenth- and twentieth-
century realist novels are most open to criticism as serving a conser-
vative consensus. Psychological realism has undoubtedly contributed 
in no small measure to the ideology of individualism, especially the 
elitist individualism that privileges interiority, intelligence and sensi-
bility as indexes of moral, even human worth. Within this ideology, 
the acquirements resulting from cultural capital are taken as naturally 
endowed spiritual superiority. Literary criticism, too, has tended to 
prize fi ctions depicting the sustained and complex inner struggles, the 
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confl icts of hope, doubt and suffering experienced by intensely indi-
vidualised characters. Narrative trajectories, frequently tragic, show 
heroic protagonists crushed by the crass forces of materialism or their 
own failures of moral sensibility or by some combination of the two.17 
This common narrative pattern works against the democratic impulse 
that Erich Auerbach, in Mimesis, associated with the development of 
realism as a genre.18 The main protagonists undeniably come from 
lower down the social scale than did earlier heroes and heroines, 
but novelists compensate by endowing them with exceptional inner 
nobility. The distinctive sensibility of a Dorothea Brooke, for exam-
ple, elevates her as much above the mass of human kind as wealth and 
power separated earlier high-born protagonists. It is salutary to note 
that in all of Austen’s fi ction there is no Dorothea. Austen is always 
sceptical of exceptionalism.
Social realism, in addition, with its representations of detailed, 
particularised social worlds, frequently functions as the powerful, 
material ‘other’, against which the privileged interiority or ‘soul’ of 
the individual main character is defi ned. In this respect, it could be 
argued, realist fi ction, in both its social and psychological forms, has 
frequently been inherently idealist rather than materialist, with plot 
structures maintaining the absolutism of the mind-matter hierarchi-
cal division. Moreover, plot structure, in conjunction with narra-
tive technique, also functions as a model of universal knowledge in 
which mastery of particularity is brought intellectually into a uni-
fi ed systematised whole. Readers are interpellated into this fi ctitious 
position of panoptic omniscience and rewarded by the plenitude of 
certainty, justice and transcendence at the conclusion of even the 
most harrowing of stories.
It is not surprising this should be so. The modern novel takes its 
shape during the Enlightenment era. The struggles of representation 
that constitute that historical moment inevitably form part of the 
novel’s generic DNA. From Austen through to Woolf and beyond 
novels play a major role in the ideological confl ict between material-
ism and idealism. The consensual perception that came to dominate 
by the end of the nineteenth century was idealist, elevating mind over 
gross matter; bodily life retained visibility largely as the troublesome 
otherness of labouring people or alien races. A notable exception to 
this literary regime of the proper is Thomas Hardy’s worldly realist 
fi ction which explicitly thematises the continuity of human life with 
the physical world.
In 1918, just after Hardy gave up novel writing and before Woolf 
began writing Jacob’s Room, in which young men aspire to Hellenistic 
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ideals, scorning the materialism represented by writers such as H. G. 
Wells, Bertrand Russell published Mysticism and Logic. In this work, 
he argues that the greatest achievements in human creative thinking 
have been the result of a fusion of two contrary impulses driving a 
pursuit of knowledge, namely idealism and empiricism. The ‘true 
union’ of these, he says, produces the ‘highest eminence’ possible in 
the world of thought.19 This understanding of two, often confl icting, 
forces shaping the comprehension of reality plays a key role in Woolf’s 
view of the ‘highest eminence’ in literary art. She sets this out most 
explicitly in her essay on Ivan Turgenev where she claims the great-
est novelistic achievement is to hold in balance the contrary truths 
of vision and fact, allowing neither to subordinate the other (Essays, 
6.11). In the political worlds of her novels, however, those pursuing 
visions are frequently practitioners of a coercive will to dominate. In 
Austen’s fi ction, characters have to learn that their vision or wishes 
need to be subjected to empirical facts.
Russell was writing at a time when idealism was coming to domi-
nate the teaching of philosophy in the universities. He and G. E. 
Moore, both members of the Bloomsbury group, wrote rigorous 
refutations of the foundational tenet of idealism that the only reality 
available was that of the mind.20 Idealist modes of thought, however, 
were increasingly infl uential across wide sections of policy-making 
on public welfare, education and class legislation. Idealism was also 
shaping notions of national identity and the role of the state. Russell 
was highly critical of this political dimension of idealist thinking. 
For this reason, although he pays tribute, in Mysticism and Logic, 
to the power of the metaphoric mode of language he associates with 
visionary thinking, he is most severe upon systems of thought that 
elevate the mental or spiritual at the expense of the empirical. Even 
the meanest things, such as hair, mud and dirt are part of material 
existence, he insists, and the tendency to ignore such everyday real-
ity, the thingness of the world, constitutes a failure of perception that 
renders so much of idealist thought ‘thin, lifeless and insubstantial’ 
(p. 14). Russell recognises the imaginative attraction of exorcising 
all that is mundane and messy in physical existence as unreal and 
to locate reality, instead, in the coherence and totality of rational 
systems of belief. But he warns that identifi cation with the self-
suffi ciency of ideal mental worlds leads ethically and politically to 
‘absence of indignation or protest’ (pp. 16–17).
Idealist philosophy no longer dominates the discipline within 
universities, in part due to Moore’s and Russell’s critiques. Never-
theless, idealist modes of thought are arguably more powerful and 
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pervasive today across the globe than they were in Russell’s time. 
Idealist assumptions underpin the consensus that regulates current 
regimes of the perceptible. The abstract mental and spiritual totali-
ties of nationalism, religion and free-market neo-liberalism dominate 
much of human existence with coercive assertions that there is no 
alternative, rejecting any appeal to evidence and experience beyond 
the enclosure of system. According to David Harvey, in Cosmopoli-
tanism and the Geographies of Freedom, for instance, neo-liberalism 
has become a universalistic mode of discourse, increasingly defi ning 
‘the common sense way many of us interpret, live in, and under-
stand the world’.21 In Critical Realism, the philosopher of science, 
Roy Bhaskar, claims that during his training as a mathematician and 
economist, it was ‘totally taboo to talk about the real world’ existing 
beyond the realm of mathematical models and macro systems.22 In 
fact, as Katrine Marçal points out, there was remarkably little resis-
tance to idealist economics. The abstract models were ‘quite sim-
ply too elegant. Sexy [. . .] From Wall Street to university campuses: 
people wanted to believe in this dream. And so they did.’23 We live 
now, it is claimed, in the era of post-factual debate.
At the other end of the spectrum from macro systems and models 
of reality, idealism equally underpins the ideology of individualism, 
by holding in place the subject-object hierarchy. This is the mental 
structure that determines most forms of social inequality. The eleva-
tion of reason and spirit above fl esh has been, and still is, used to jus-
tify the subordination of women, the poor, the non-heterosexual and 
non-European. In addition, belief in the human capacity to master 
the object world has brought the planet close to ecological disaster. 
The persuasive charm of abstract perfection too frequently renders 
imperceptible its material costs. Human life would be immeasurably 
impoverished without dreams, aspirations beyond self and pursuit of 
expansive ideals. Yet, cut adrift from the empirical realities of actual 
lives, the rhetorical force of abstractions like freedom, sovereignty, 
civilisation, honour, can seem to promise a desired but dangerous 
simplicity.
Bertrand Russell’s insistence that such ‘lowly’ physical things as 
hair and mud cannot be put aside in accounts of reality is, in effect, 
a call for the redistribution of the perceptible so as to recognise the 
hidden continuities and dependencies of the mental and the physical. 
It is a demand, in Rancière’s words, for ‘a new way of linking the 
sayable and visible, words and things’ (Politics of Literature, p. 9). 
Acknowledging the egalitarian relation of people and things chal-
lenges the exceptionalist status of the human over the object world. 
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It foregrounds the fact that as physical beings we have our existence 
in a shared material space. The regime of the perceptible is reconfi g-
ured when things are recognised as constituting the actual stuff that 
mediates our lives and interactions with others. As Hannah Arendt 
points out, in The Human Condition, it is objects that ‘guarantee 
a permanence and durability without which a world would not be 
possible [. . .] they give rise to the familiarity of the world, its cus-
toms and habits of intercourse between men and things as well as 
between men and men’.24 Recent research into neurology and cogni-
tion has further erased the idealist hierarchical separation of mind 
from the object world, suggesting that the physical environment has 
to be thought of as part of our ‘cognitive architecture’.25 Andy Clark, 
in Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action and Cognitive Exten-
sion, suggests the mind needs to be thought of as ‘the productive 
interface of brain, body and social and material world’.26
In The Social Life of Things, Arjun Appadurai suggests that the 
powerful tendency to ‘regard the world of things as inert and mute’ 
should be exchanged for a view in which ‘it is the things-in-motion that 
illuminate their human and social context’.27 He quotes Nancy Munn’s 
observation on an exchange system based upon shells: ‘Although men 
appear to be the agents in defi ning shell value, in fact, without shells, 
men cannot defi ne their own value; in this respect, shells and men 
are reciprocally agents of each other’s value defi nition’ (Social Life, 
p. 20). In his work on Actor-Network Theory, Bruno Latour takes 
this radical equalisation of people and things even further. He vigor-
ously attacks the idealist tradition that elevates the mental and disre-
gards matter. Things, he says, ‘are much more interesting, variegated, 
uncertain, complicated, far-reaching, heterogeneous, risky, historical, 
local, material and networky than the pathetic version offered for too 
long by philosophers’.28 Reversing the traditional notion of human 
agency as expression of mental willing, Latour claims, of things, 
‘they too do things, they too make you do things’.29 This is what Jane 
Bennett, in Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things, refers to as 
‘thing power’.30
Latour takes from Heidegger the term ‘gathering’ to suggest the 
way meaning is collected in objects, extending the scope of the term 
well beyond Heidegger’s usage. To consider a thing as a ‘gathering’ 
is to recognise all it brings together in its very substance: the range 
of materiality, the networks of people, institutions, social struc-
tures, past, future and present events, and so on, in an unclosable, 
horizontal chain of connection. For example, a camera ‘gathers’ 
within its material existence the scientifi c institutions that produce 
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knowledge of its technology, industrial plants that bring the tech-
nology into being, commercial and advertising networks that pro-
mote its consumption; in addition, photography, professional and 
amateur, has shaped public and private rituals, and has reconfi g-
ured notions of aesthetics and realism, truth and identity.
Things, in this sense, can be seen as metonymies, as parts of 
larger structures, networks and social forces. Within literary criti-
cism, however, things are more usually read as metaphors and 
symbols, valued especially within post-structuralist discourse as 
fi guration that introduces ambivalence and playfulness into writ-
ing. Yet Jacques Derrida, in his essay, ‘White Mythology’, gives a 
more negative account, accusing metaphor of complicity with the 
whole tradition of Western idealist philosophy. Metaphor performs 
an illusionist trick, conjuring the abstract into the perceptible. Ide-
alism, Derrida argues, deploys metaphor pervasively to elevate the 
transcendent and downgrade or erase from notice the physical. Con-
crete terms are imbued with spiritual values and with passage of 
time that fi gurative element is forgotten or reliteralised. ‘Above all,’ 
Derrida writes, ‘the movement of metaphorization (origin and then 
erasure of the metaphor, transition from proper sensory meaning 
to the proper spiritual meaning by means of a detour of fi gures) is 
nothing other than a movement of idealization.’31
A simple example of this movement from concrete to spiritual 
by way of metaphor would be the use of physical terms like above/
below, high/low, inner/outer as literalised metaphors to refer to non-
spatial, immaterial relationships imputed to mental realms, like 
morality, consciousness and social relations.32 Without such terms it 
is diffi cult to see how the metaphysical hierarchy of mind over matter 
could be thought, let alone articulated. Similarly, objects transformed 
into symbols like the cross or the national fl ag function to give fi gu-
rative tangibility to abstract concepts like sacrifi ce and nation. In 
this way metaphor can imbue the non-existent with a powerful sense 
of referentiality borrowed from the actual non-metaphysical world, 
providing the visionary and spiritual with perceptibility to be felt 
upon the pulse.
Woolf’s novels are thick with things, but it is perhaps surprising to 
recognise how few of these function as symbols. Jacob’s boots are not 
metaphors of abstract values. On the contrary, they point poignantly 
to the embodied life that has been physically destroyed. Things, in 
Woolf’s texts, are frequently metonymic, referring horizontally to 
larger material structures and forces, as Jacob’s room stands for male-
dominated cultural institutions and power relations. Woolf is, indeed, 
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wary of the ideological functioning of symbolism and metaphor to 
impart a spurious reverence to questionable values, institutions and 
agendas. As Alex Zwerdling comments in his chapter on Jacob’s 
Room, ‘she had an instinctive distrust for reverence of any kind, treat-
ing it as a fundamentally dishonest mental habit that made symbols 
out of fl esh-and-blood human beings’ (Virginia Woolf and the Real 
World, p. 73). Things are, perhaps, less prolifi c in Jane Austen’s fi c-
tion. Nevertheless, objects in her novels are far from being ‘reality 
effects’ in Roland Barthes’ sense of functioning to guarantee verisi-
militude. As with Woolf, things in Austen’s writing are frequently 
metonymic, part of wider discursive networks, social processes and 
change. In this sense, certainly, the writing of both Austen and Woolf 
challenges the idealist regime of verisimilitude that relegates the mate-
rial world below the mental. Their worldly realism makes perceptible 
the meaning systems articulated by mute things.
A representational regime that makes perceptible the egalitar-
ian continuities and force fi elds linking the human world with the 
world of things radically challenges the exceptionalist status of the 
sovereign subject of interiority. Woolf’s declaration of the necessity 
to kill the angel in the house is well-known. What is less recognised 
is that the whole project of her fi ction from Jacob’s Room onwards 
is to kill the angel within, the sovereign subject of privatised inte-
riority. Austen, too, looks critically upon the developing individu-
alistic ideology of self and subjects its illusions to ironic defl ation. 
This scepticism towards the autonomous subject, by both writers, 
draws upon an anti-idealist understanding of self that develops in 
the eighteenth century.
Liberal individualism is frequently understood, by both detractors 
and supporters, as deriving unproblematically from Enlightenment 
thinking. It is important, therefore, to stress that David Hume is a 
major originator of an inherently social, as opposed to individualist, 
perception of self. The unity and sovereignty of the individual sub-
ject, deriving from Descartes’s location of truth solely and innately in 
the rational mind, is dismissed by David Hume as ‘unintelligible’.33 
The self, Hume argues, is nothing more than ‘a train of different 
perceptions’ (Enquiry, p. 142). Elsewhere, he exclaims, ‘But what is 
man but a heap of contradictions.’34 The passions, Hume claims, will 
always overrule reason. Instead of the autonomous, but lonely, indi-
vidualism of the Cartesian interiority, Hume insists upon the priority 
of the co-operative process that constitutes social being and a shared 
world. ‘The mutual dependence of men is so great, in all societies, 
that scarce any action is compleat in itself, or is performed without 
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some reference to the actions of others’ (Enquiry, p. 64). Even poetic 
vision, the sine qua non of idealist aesthetics, is regarded by Hume, 
as essentially a social process: ‘it runs along the earth; is caught from 
one breast to another’ (Essays, p. 114). The progress of the arts and 
sciences, he declares, is not due to ‘the spirit and genius of the few, 
but concerns those of the whole people’ (Essays, p. 114). Inevitably, 
this brings to mind Woolf’s rather enigmatic assertion in A Sketch 
of the Past, ‘But there is no Shakespeare, there is no Beethoven; 
certainly and emphatically there is no God; we are the words; we are 
the music.’35
Adam Smith saw himself as continuing the work of his friend, 
Hume. So it is not surprising that he, too, stresses the social consti-
tution of the self only possible within a shared world, although this 
may be an unfamiliar idea to those proclaiming Smith as an original 
proponent of ruthless individualism. On the contrary, Smith insists 
that a notion of self is only possible at all through interaction with 
others. As Roy Porter has observed, for Smith, ‘self was a construct 
of various force-fi elds of sympathy between individuals’.36 Smith’s 
notion of sympathy, at the heart of his Theory of Moral Philosophy, 
is based upon an almost novelistic understanding of perspective: the 
imaginative ability to shift across different viewpoints. For Smith, 
this is the necessary given of a shared world. He elaborates a concept 
of an ‘impartial observer’ – a far more productive idea than that 
of his one reference to an ‘invisible hand’ – as the basis of just and 
humane social relations.37 When our opinion or interests come into 
confl ict with another’s, Smith argues, ‘We must view them neither 
from our own place nor yet from his, neither with our own eyes nor 
yet with his, but from the place and with the eyes of a third per-
son.’38 This horizontal process of moving across perspectives offers 
an egalitarian expansion of the self, helping us to recognise ‘that 
we are but one of the multitude, in no respect better than any other 
in it’ (TMS, p. 158). Indeed for Smith there are no bounds to the 
expansive worldliness of the imagination: it is ‘circumscribed by no 
boundary, but may embrace the immensity of the universe’ (TMS, 
p. 276). This statement could well provide a summary of Woolf’s aim 
in writing The Waves.
Austen is undoubtedly heir to the Enlightenment understanding 
of perspective as foundation of a shared world. The ideas of Hume 
and Smith were pervasive in the public sphere when Austen began 
to write, both in the form of their own essays and popularised in 
reviews and discussions in the periodical press. It is perhaps not sur-
prising, therefore, that Austen developed such complex techniques for 
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representing perspective. The innovative fl uidity of point of view in 
her fi ction constitutes the discursive grammar of a familiar common 
world which is the experience of reading her work. In her stories, 
it is those characters capable of achieving an observant impartial-
ity, encompassing the viewpoints of others beyond their own, who 
embody the possibilities of progressive change. She initiates a trans-
formation of plot structure, abandoning gothic plots and picaresque 
adventure to centre upon the ramifying social consequences of dif-
fering points of view. This experimental exploration of perspective 
projects focalisation to the heart of subsequent novel development. 
Opposing regimes of the perceptible become, in effect, the dynamic 
of narrative. From that transitional moment, at the end of the eigh-
teenth century, the novel came to foreground perspective, the neces-
sary condition of a shared world, in a way no other literary medium 
does. This defi ning emphasis upon point of view, within realism as a 
genre, has sustained a continuously experimental methodology into 
the present time.
Adam Smith’s claim that a shared world of mutual justice depends 
upon the ability to enter into different viewpoints has considerable 
common ground with Jürgen Habermas’s advocacy of a new ‘para-
digm of mutual understanding’.39 A paradigm that he hopes can move 
philosophy beyond the sterile binarism of ‘the transcendental and the 
empirical modes of dealing with issues’. Perspective is central to this 
project. Mutual understanding, Habermas claims, is ‘structured upon 
the system of reciprocally interlocked perspectives among speak-
ers, hearers and non-participants who happen to be present at the 
time’ (Philosophical Discourse, p. 297). Going further than Smith, 
Habermas ties perspective to language structures, like, for instance, 
the ability of all competent speakers to use the grammar of personal 
pronouns. Anyone who has assimilated this practice has attained the 
performative capacity ‘to take up and to transform into one another 
the perspectives of the fi rst, second and third persons’ (Philosophical 
Discourse, p. 297). One could go further and ask whether language as 
practice would even be possible in the absence of this intersubjective, 
shared world and equally whether self identity could be attained at all 
without the availability of such discursive positions.
An egalitarian understanding of perspective not only consti-
tutes the condition of possibility for a shared social world. It also 
militates against the coercive imposition of a universalist system of 
belief. Classical idealism assumes a unitary mental elevation able to 
comprehend the particular as part of a totalised system of thought. 
Belief in a divine overview may be replaced by an ideal of science but 
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the aim remains to impose order and meaning upon heterogeneous 
material existence by means of abstraction and distance. This is 
what Michel de Certeau, in The Practice of Everyday Life, terms an 
‘exaltation of a scopic and gnostic drive [. . .] a solar Eye, looking 
down like a god’ that imposes regularity upon the swarming, disor-
dered confusion of mass society.40 It is the Olympic distance assumed 
by the narrator in Jacob’s Room in which living and dying men 
become only numbers and unreal, twig-like fi gures. Hannah Arendt 
warns that ‘The end of the common world has come when it is seen 
only under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one 
perspective.’ Against this homogenising perspective, Arendt insists 
‘the reality of the public realm relies on the simultaneous presence of 
innumerable perspectives’ (Human Condition, pp. 58, 57). This con-
stitutes a good description of Woolf’s radical use of multiple perspec-
tives as in Mrs Dalloway, for example, where the varied passers-by 
on the street look up at a plane above London. This small episode 
crystallises the opposition of Olympic distance against an egalitarian 
horizontal continuity of ‘innumerable perspectives’.
Well before twentieth-century experience of totalitarianism, 
David Hume issued a similar warning against the impulse to impose 
mental order upon the randomness of the world, ‘lest we assign 
causes which never existed, and reduce what is merely contingent to 
stable and universal principles’ (Essays, p. 113). In another essay, he 
comments, ‘But would these reasoners look abroad into the world, 
they would meet with nothing that, in the least, corresponds to their 
ideas, or can warrant so refi ned and philosophical a system’ (Essays, 
pp. 469–70). ‘System’ is a key term in Enlightenment critique of 
idealism; the imposition of conceptual schemes without due regard 
for the empirical, of vision at the expense of fact. Adherents of 
current neo-liberalism fi nd it convenient to ignore Adam Smith’s 
equally fi rm rejection of universal systems imposed upon human real-
ity. ‘Human society,’ he writes, ‘when we contemplate it in a certain 
abstract and philosophical light, appears like a great, an immense 
machine’ (TMS, p. 372). But, he warns, ‘The man of system [. . .] is 
often so enamoured with the supposed beauty of his own ideal plan 
of government [. . .] [that] He seems to imagine that he can arrange 
the different members of a great society with as much ease as the 
hand arranges pieces upon a chess-board’ (TMS, p. 275).
Despite Austen’s radical restructuring of narrative upon ways of 
seeing rather than upon action, her characters are very far from being 
disembodied points of view. Austen’s people are always embodied, 
driven by physical vitality. David Hartley, very infl uential at the end 
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of the eighteenth century, foregrounds what is largely absent from 
Hume’s and Smith’s accounts of self. To Hume’s and Smith’s con-
siderations of the nature of human nature, Hartley contributed the 
notion of the embodied self, a self under the necessity of producing 
itself from the earliest physical sensations of pleasure and pain. For 
Hartley, therefore, self is always incomplete, emergent. As a complex 
of sensations and impressions, self is also, he says, ‘“factitious”, i.e. 
generated by association; and therefore admit[s] of intervals, aug-
mentations, and dimunitions’.41 In David Hartley on Human Nature, 
Richard C. Allen explains that for Hartley ‘the self, as a complex 
psychological structure of memories, thoughts, and, especially, dis-
positions, arises out of a ground of purely physical responses to one’s 
circumstances’.42 Hartley’s materialist psychology foregrounds the 
long process of transformation from purely physical drives to the 
most highly cultural forms of self.
The account of self that prioritises social being, put forward 
by Enlightenment thinkers like Hume, Smith and, more recently, 
Habermas, can be criticised as overly optimistic. David Hartley is, if 
anything, yet more optimistic in his view of human nature. Never-
theless, his grounding of the self in the physical body makes percep-
tible the continuity of human life with that of the physical universe. 
There is nothing innately exceptionalist about the new-born child. 
On the contrary, Hartley’s emphasis upon the fraught process that 
constitutes a factitious self from the primary physical sensations of 
pleasure and pain can lend itself to a darker psychology. For example, 
Judith Butler’s understanding of identity as produced by reiterative 
practices that coerce the body into a gendered self shares common 
ground with Hartley’s focus upon repetitive processes that consti-
tute the factitious subject.43
Hartley’s psychology was also developed in a much less optimistic 
way by Elizabeth Hamilton, Austen’s contemporary. Hamilton’s work 
did not and does not have the weight of major thinkers of the time but 
Austen knew at least some of her writing and spoke appreciatively of 
it.44 Some recent studies of Hamilton have situated her on the con-
servative side of what Marilyn Butler termed the War of Ideas.45 As 
I have argued elsewhere, this is surely mistaken. Hamilton’s writing 
contains an acerbic critique of women’s subordination to men and 
sets out in detail the ramifying evils that arise from that inequality.46 
The psychological insights she gains from this consideration of the 
human desire to dominate lead her to develop a remarkably mod-
ern account of a will to power that shapes individual identities, and 
social and national prejudices. Apart from William Godwin, there 
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seems nothing comparable to its radicalism in the thinking of her 
male Enlightenment contemporaries. Although Austen most probably 
did not know Hamilton’s later writing, it demonstrates the kind of 
insights into human relations that might well come more readily to a 
woman’s perspective. Indeed, Austen’s psychology shares signifi cant 
similarities with Hamilton’s.47
The basis of Hamilton’s thinking is Hartley’s embodied psychol-
ogy. Like him, she accepts that the self is factitious, an identity that 
emerges from fl eshly being. As such, the self is never complete, it has 
to be perpetually produced and sustained. It is this existential inse-
curity that engenders what Hamilton terms the ‘primary motive’ of 
human existence, prior even to self-love.48 She calls this primal drive 
‘a propensity to magnify the idea of self ’. It is, she claims, ‘the most 
active of all the principles inherent in the mind of man’ (Popular 
Lectures, 1.279). Self as an ‘idea’ is a radical notion and Hamilton 
provides an illustration of what she means from primitive societies. 
In such a world, bodily strength alone would allow a person so 
endowed to enlarge their sense of self ‘by multiplying into it all the 
human beings whom he has brought into complete subjection to his 
authority [. . .] The persons, the wills, nay the very thoughts of the 
multitudes whom he thus appropriates are considered by him as part 
of self’ (Popular Lectures, 1.301). Although the example is from 
primitive societies, the application to modern social formations is 
clear and Hamilton points out that currently when women marry the 
ceremony ‘annihilate[s] her legal existence which is at that moment 
merged in his’ (Popular Lectures, 1.304).
What happens to the idea of self in all those who are forced 
into subservience to aggrandise the factitious identity of those with 
power? Hamilton’s answer seems remarkably close to recent theoris-
ing of the ‘willing’ subordination of the subordinate. By identify-
ing with those in authority, Hamilton argues, those without power 
fi nd a ‘species of gratifi cation’ by merging self in the greatness of 
their superiors. In this way ‘the yoke is transformed into a badge of 
honour’ and ‘the wills of the many become not so properly subjected 
by, as incorporated with, the will of the individual who dominates’ 
(Popular Lectures, 2.10). Hamilton extends this thinking to national 
identity and politics at a time when glorifi cations of Englishness 
and denunciations of the perfi diousness of France resounded in the 
public sphere. Love of country, Hamilton says, agreeing with Edmund 
Burke, constitutes one of the earliest benevolent associations. But the 
result of this in Hamilton’s thinking is very different from that of 
Burke. Because of the strength of early associations there is no object 
5215_Morris.indd   20 30/11/16   10:32 AM
 Introduction: Worldly Realism  21
more likely to be part of the idea of self than the land of one’s birth. 
Where love of country becomes grafted to the propensity to magnify 
the sense of self, a zealous resistance meets any criticism and a refusal 
to contemplate change or reform. Where the idea of self depends 
upon the glorifi cation of national identity, Hamilton warns, ‘bigotry 
begets national hatred of all other countries with which the bigot is 
not identifi ed’ (Popular Lectures, 1.412). The primal need to mag-
nify the idea of self can lead to similar intolerance when the idea of 
self is derived from identifi cation with party or class or religion. For 
Hamilton the fl eshly neediness for a self is the given for any under-
standing of identity or social relations.
What Hamilton recognises is the complex interrelationship 
between abstract belief systems and the desires and needs of the 
embodied self, a materiality that idealism disavows. A dissensual 
regime of the perceptible brings into visibility this inseparable inter-
dependence of the mental with the physical realm, radically overturn-
ing the foundational distinction of idealist ideology. It foregrounds, 
equally, the constitutive continuity of self with others and with the 
world of things as the necessary basis of a shared world and language. 
It replaces the subject-object hierarchy with a relationship of equality 
between the embodied self and physical universe. This anti-idealist, 
egalitarian, horizontal regime of representation I am terming worldly 
realism. It is an order of the perceptible that, I shall argue, underlies 
the sceptical irreverence of Austen’s and Woolf’s views of reality and 
which drives their aesthetic innovations and achievements.
I have organised the book so that chapters on Austen alternate 
with chapters on Woolf. The idea is to allow for recognition of the 
similar areas of engagement between them. I would not wish to over-
emphasise this; they are writing from very different worlds. Plac-
ing chapters by Austen and Woolf alongside each other also makes 
the point that realism and modernism are not incompatible. Both 
are experimental and both can constitute a regime of the perceptible 
that is radically at odds with the consensus. If preferred, however, 
the chapters on Austen may be read fi rst before moving on to those 
on Woolf. This would allow for greater sense of the chronological 
development and continuity within each writer’s fi ction. In Sense and 
Sensibility, Emma and Persuasion, for example, Austen positions 
each of her young female protagonists as a prime focus of change. In 
each case they move from place as location of idealist time-resisting 
values out into a more mobile, heterogeneous social space. This 
narrative pattern grows increasingly pronounced and overt from 
Sense and Sensibility onwards, culminating most radically in the 
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unfi nished novel, Sanditon. In a similar narrative trajectory, Woolf’s 
main female protagonists move out from the domestic regularity of 
the private drawing room into the public world.
In Sense and Sensibility, Austen registers a transitional moment, in 
the wake of the French Revolution, when consensual notions of the 
self begin to shift. Earlier traditions of sociability, of self as primar-
ily social being, come under challenge from emergent individualistic 
values centred upon an idea of self as superior sensibility, understood 
as a unique interiority, or upon competitive acquisition of wealth 
and possessions as aggrandisement of identity. Both of these ideas of 
self are subject to Austen’s irony, as they continue to be throughout 
her work. Woolf, writing in the period of social upheaval following 
the First World War, also sets out to dismantle the ideology of indi-
vidualism. In overturning the idealist belief in human exceptional-
ism, both writers reconnect an embodied self to the physical world 
and to the world of things in a relationship of equality. In Persuasion, 
Austen ridicules aristocratic claims of exemption from fl eshly vulgar-
ity, emphasising the vulnerability of the physical body. In The Waves, 
Woolf reorders the distribution of the perceptible, evoking the bodily 
movement of nerves alongside the currents of tides and seasons. In 
all six novels, material things, like fi replaces and fl owers, connect the 
lives of characters into larger networks of social change.
Alongside this redistribution of the self from a vertical to a hori-
zontal relationship with material existence, both writers warn of 
the dangers inherent in the disconnection of ideas and beliefs from 
empirical reality. Elevated mental systems, each writer shows, are 
often driven by embodied desires for mastery, perfection and from 
fears of dissolution. Emma Woodhouse’s sweeping confi dence when 
she declares ‘there can be no doubt’ causes pain and harm to indi-
vidual lives in her community. Woolf shows the devastation wrought 
by idealised systems of belief nationally and internationally.
In all six novels, narrative perspectives are subject to constant 
experimentation as determined by each writer’s worldly comprehen-
sion of social and physical continuities. For both Austen and Woolf, 
fl uidity of point of view is the creative condition of community, of the 
common life we have as part of physical existence. It is the rigorous 
refusal of mysticism and deference that allows them to treat what 
is revered with irreverent comedy and to look sceptically at what-
ever and whoever claims authority. Considering Austen and Woolf 
together, in this way, allows for a fuller recognition of just what 
an impressive, intelligent, artistically ambitious body of work these 
two women writers achieved. Above all, their writing constitutes 
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an aesthetic regime that makes perceptible the vision and the fact of 
human life as primarily that of embodied creatures sharing all the 
vicissitudes of our material existence in a common physical world. In 
its ethical and political implications, there can be no greater dissen-
sual challenge to the consensual order of things.
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Chapter 1
Sense and Sensibility: 
Wishing is Believing
Sense and Sensibility (1st drafts c.1795–7; pub. 1811) opens with a 
wrenching moment of change and loss as the Dashwood women are 
forced to leave their home. Yet the pressures and insecurities of lives 
caught up in processes of change seem barely to fi gure in popular 
screen adaptations of Austen’s novels which serve largely to perpetu-
ate an idealist consensus. Visually beautiful and nostalgic in tone, 
these versions of her stories offer viewers entry into a charmingly 
organic English world of pretty young women, safely comic idiosyn-
crasy, wealthy young men and country estates. This is a popularised 
idealism of eternal verities, benign hierarchy, predictable plots, all 
untouched by historical forces and seeming to have existed always 
in a sunny clarity of the imagination. Such depictions represent 
what Raymond Williams has criticised as ‘idealised abstractions’ of 
Austen’s novels.1 Yet this bland popularism belies the critical serious-
ness with which Austen’s writing was received by some, at least, of 
her fi rst readers. Walter Scott, for example, immediately recognises 
that Austen is doing something new in fi ction. Not only is she deal-
ing with characters and feelings taken from ordinary life as opposed 
to the nobility, it is the innovative quality and detail of this ordi-
nariness in her writing that is interesting and illuminating for Scott.2 
What Scott appears to grasp here is that Austen is shifting the fi eld 
of the perceptible, to use Jacques Rancière’s term, making visible and 
audible a familiarity which was nevertheless previously below the 
horizon of notice, deemed inappropriate to the dignity of representa-
tion. Rancière locates this shift of representational regime at around 
the end of the eighteenth century.3
The potential insights contained in Scott’s assessment of Austen 
had dissipated by the mid-nineteenth century. George Henry Lewes 
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condescendingly concurred with those like Bishop Whately who, 
in 1822, praised the Shakespearean realism of Austen’s dramatic 
dialogues;4 for Lewes, however, the smallness of scale and limited 
social range of her work denied it serious artistic stature.5 This 
view of an unhistorical, unchallenging Austen was reinforced by 
her family’s posthumous emphasis upon her retiring, lady-like 
demeanour.6 Although she remained steadily popular through into 
the twentieth century, there was no early critical reappraisal of the 
importance and scale of her work. Only Virginia Woolf, in her 
essays, consistently asserts a far more appreciative view. For Woolf, 
Austen is a highly signifi cant writer, undoubtedly the more so for 
being a woman. She fi gures among those writers that Woolf regards 
as achieving the highest levels of novelistic art. She belongs with 
Defoe, Dickens, Hardy and Conrad, writers certainly not thought 
of as limited in scale or ambition. Woolf largely ignores Austen’s 
story matter, recognising her rigorous artistic impersonality and 
capacity to light upon that detail which ‘expands in the reader’s 
mind and endows with the most enduring form of life scenes that 
are outwardly trivial’.7
In The Rise of the Novel (1957), Ian Watt sought to position 
Austen at a pivotal moment in literary, cultural and social history. 
Watt claims Austen is heir to eighteenth-century philosophical and 
social developments and, as such, must be recognised as the initia-
tor of a modern tradition of realism. Austen combines Richardson’s 
psychological focus upon individual subjectivity with Fielding’s 
social objectivity, Watt asserted.8 Despite this recognition of Austen’s 
heritage in eighteenth-century empiricism, the predominantly ideal-
ist understanding of Austen’s art remained; as a supreme ironist she 
was concerned to express a classic moral, rather than a historical, 
vision. In 1963, Watt summed up the consensual view of her art in 
ahistorical, universalist terms: ‘the current view of Jane Austen is 
that she is fi rst and foremost a critical observer of humanity’. Her 
novels, he concluded, are now seen as ‘a microcosm of some larger 
moral universe’.9 It was not until Marilyn Butler’s groundbreaking 
Jane Austen and the War of Ideas, published in 1974, that Austen’s 
fi ction was fully considered within a historical perspective. Butler’s 
scholarly account of the polarisation of British politics in the era 
of the French Revolution and her readings of Austen’s novels as 
partisan products of these polemics broke completely with earlier 
reverential accounts of the fi ctions as timeless masterpieces. While 
opening up Austen studies to invigorating historical research, Butler 
nevertheless imposed a new orthodox view of Austen as morally, 
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socially and politically conservative.10 Butler banished the moral 
idealist and superb ironist, but she banished, too, Austen as heir 
to the Enlightenment. Butler’s Austen is unattractively pious and 
illiberal.
From the 1970s, feminist critics began to engage with Austen’s 
texts from a historical perspective, that of the woman writer in the 
early nineteenth century, but none directly challenged Butler’s thesis. 
Important early feminist studies, like those of Gilbert and Gubar 
and Mary Poovey tended to interpret her as a female artist hemmed 
in by repressive patriarchal structures and ideologies.11 Such a per-
spective inevitably slants the readings towards negative discoveries 
of what Austen cannot do or to ways in which she is complicit with 
masculine hegemony. It also tends to preclude awareness of other 
social and cultural forces beyond those of gender. Even Claudia L. 
Johnson’s undoubtedly radical readings in Jane Austen: Women, 
Politics and the Novel (1988) and Equivocal Beings (1995) avoid 
direct confrontation with The War of Ideas. Although Johnson situ-
ates Austen within a discussion of the infl uence of Locke’s liberalism 
upon end-of-century women writers, the focus is still upon her rep-
resentation of marriage and family rather than any wider national 
forces and structures.12 As such, Austen’s realism has only a slightly 
wider scale of reference from that allowed her by early critics like 
George Henry Lewes.
Recently, Butler’s argument in Jane Austen and the War of Ideas 
has been more seriously challenged. Edward Neill, for example, in 
The Politics of Jane Austen, is undoubtedly right when he points to 
‘a certain theoretical naivety’ in the way Butler presents her case, and 
the lack of all consideration of language, techniques of representation 
and subjectivity in Butler’s readings of the novels.13 In The Historical 
Austen, William H. Galperin also convincingly overturns the Butler 
view of Austen as wholly conservative and supportive of regulatory 
structures.14 However, these studies by Neill and Galperin, and oth-
ers like them, are informed by New Historicism and poststructuralist 
critical perspectives. Thus they look for progressive elements within 
Austen’s novels only in terms of the uncanny or of a resistant other-
ness. Their theoretical positions disallow any recuperation of a more 
radical Austen by linking her in positive ways to either the Enlighten-
ment or to realism. Indeed, in addition to refuting Butler, their stated 
aim is to deny Ian Watt’s recognition of Austen as originator of 
the modern tradition of realism. According to Galperin, Austen’s 
‘historical role as realism’s most important progenitor has been 
grossly exaggerated’ (Historical Austen, p. 6).
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Only Peter Knox-Shaw, in Jane Austen and the Enlightenment, 
attempts to answer Butler in her own historicist terms. He refutes 
the accusations of religious conformity and conservative politics, 
demonstrating instead Austen’s many allegiances to Enlightenment 
thinking and ‘more particularly [to] that sceptical tradition within 
it that fl ourished in England and Scotland during the second half 
of the eighteenth century’.15 Knox-Shaw’s scholarly and detailed 
account of the whole Austen family’s pervasive cultural engage-
ment with many aspects of Enlightenment thinking provides an 
authoritative counterbalance to Butler’s over-polarised interpreta-
tion of post-revolutionary England. The limitation of his study lies 
in its concern entirely with ideas and cultural context. Readings of 
individual novels provide few insights into how the techniques and 
form of the fi ctions are shaped by Austen’s immersion in Enlight-
enment views of self, social reality and structures of knowledge. 
Without this dual perspective of Austen’s formal innovations and 
the determining social vision that requires them, it is impossible 
fully to appreciate either her experimental realism or her political 
progressivism.
In fact, the narrative form of all three novels that I shall discuss 
here, Sense and Sensibility, Emma and Persuasion, articulates a con-
tested process of emergence as an old order begins to yield to new 
possibilities of an order not yet fully resolved. It is thus a moment of 
dissensus in which contesting regimes of representation, both artis-
tic and political, strive for dominance. The writing practice Austen 
forges from this transitional context articulates a worldly realist aes-
thetic and perspective, emphasising the horizontal continuity of self 
with social and bio-physical worlds. In each of these three novels, the 
central character or characters track a movement from a stable, hier-
archical order of life out into a world of horizontal social plurality. 
Moreover, the primary concern of the fi ction increases in scope from 
novel to novel; widening from contested representations of self to 
those of nation and fi nally to the commonality of all creaturely life. 
In each story, the central protagonist, who mediates the energies of 
social change and shifting values, is a woman. It is through her young 
women that Austen looks to the possibilities of a more progressive 
social order. This movement enacted by the plot structure of these 
three novels can also be understood, in Michel de Certeau’s terms, as 
a shift from place as metaphor, symbolising time-denying values, to 
space as metonymic process and fl ow.16 Equally, it can be seen as a 
shift of representational regime from what Jacques Rancière denotes 
as the vertical classical order of the perceptible to a new horizontal 
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democratic distribution of the seen and heard, of people and things, 
of self and other (Politics and Literature, p. 10).
A representational struggle over what constitutes the self is 
always at issue in any emergence of a new social order. Roy Porter 
remarks that there was no single Enlightenment view of what con-
stituted human nature ‘but rather difference, debate and dialogue’.17 
Austen’s novels enter into these debates by dramatising confl icting 
representational regimes of self. Hence the prevailing impression, in 
her fi ction, that characters are in some sort performing their iden-
tity, their idea of self. The predominant view from the eighteenth-
century Enlightenment tradition of David Hume, Adam Smith and 
David Hartley is of the self as a factitious, embodied, social being; 
an identity produced as physical sensation is wrought upon by social 
sympathies and mutual interests. This eighteenth-century notion of 
embodied sociability has roots in an earlier tradition in which the 
shared needs of physical existence − shelter, warmth and food – 
provided the common basis of celebrations, rituals and festivals 
like Christmas, harvest, weddings and so on, that punctuated the 
yearly calendar.
By the end of the eighteenth century, however, the ideal of socia-
bility was challenged by two emergent forms of individualism, both 
of which situated the self within a newly conceptualised private 
realm. One version of the individualistic private self is produced by 
identifi cation with competitive possession. Wealth, land and con-
sumer goods all function to magnify the imagined idea of self, to 
utilise Elizabeth Hamilton’s term,18 by the ceaseless expansion of 
material ownership, of the realm of what is mine as opposed to 
yours. Subjective individualism, on the other hand, augments the 
idea of self by imposing its own abstract system of values, its men-
tal universe, upon the external world. In giving dramatic form to 
these two factitious versions of self, Austen seems to recognise, like 
Hamilton, the powerful embodied energies that relentlessly impel 
such self-projections. For Austen, both self-interest and subjective 
idealism are driven not so much by rationality as by the self’s desires 
and insecurities.
Austen’s worldly realism is evident in her recognition of the 
interactive dynamics between self and things. In Austen’s novels 
material objects are inseparable from the emergence of new social 
formations and from the self’s ability to objectify its own imagined 
identity. This horizontal interdependency between social structures, 
self-consciousness and things is most apparent in the realm of taste, 
in which objects of consumption constitute emerging and residual 
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representational regimes. On the one hand, conspicuous consump-
tion denotes, materially and competitively, the extent and substance 
of wealth and hence the importance, power and amplitude of self. 
On the other hand, and equally competitively, things act as signifi -
ers of inner sensibility. In this regime, the substance and materiality 
of things is disavowed as they become symbols of abstract values. 
This paradoxical, idealist conversion of the objective world into 
the subjective is directly opposed to eighteenth-century empiricism 
in which material things are taken as evidence of the order of the 
physical world.
There is an earlier still representational tradition in which things 
function both materially and symbolically to refer to the necessities 
of creaturely life: they are, in this sense, literally objects of con-
sumption. Food and fi res, for example, contain rich residual con-
notations of older communal life and values. In all of these ways, 
things, in Austen’s texts, traverse various, often antagonistic, net-
works of residual, dominant and emergent discourses, institutions 
and practices. Things, for Austen, as for Bruno Latour, function as 
gatherings.19
Despite the binarism of its title, the opening of Sense and Sensibil-
ity plays upon a different opposition: the constitution and visibility 
of a shared world versus the restrictions and possessiveness of the 
private realm. The fi rst two paragraphs trace an alternation between 
expansion and contraction of the social identity and sympathies of 
the Dashwood family. Having previously lived expansively on the 
family estate of Norland in ‘the general good opinion of their sur-
rounding acquaintance’, the late owner retrenched to a less outgo-
ing social style with only his sister as companion and housekeeper. 
Her death, however, brought into his life ‘the society of his nephew 
and niece, and their children’.20 ‘Society’ is a much used term in 
the text. Marvin B. Becker has noted how the meaning of the word 
shifts during the course of the eighteenth century. It is a shift that 
denotes the loss of value of the social and public realm to the pri-
vate. Whereas the older designation had been that of fellowship, it 
increasingly came to denote ‘an entity both distant and abstract’.21 
Austen uses the term ‘society’ here in this fi rst chapter and elsewhere 
in the older sense of ‘fellowship’ underlining this by emphasising the 
comfort of social sympathies the elder Mr Dashwood gains from the 
goodness of heart of his nephew and wife and the relish added to his 
life by the cheerfulness of the children. Yet, despite this experience 
of expanded social being, his death seals a contraction of identity 
around a strictly bounded notion of possessive self. He secures the 
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whole of his estate to the nominal male line, a child of four years 
old. As a result, the Dashwood women are propelled out from the 
settled security of place into an interactive space of unpredictable 
social processes and events.
‘A world without property was almost inconceivable to eighteenth-
century Englishmen’, according to Paul Langford.22 In a very real 
sense, property, for the upper classes, was self. Certainly, for a great 
many of the characters in Sense and Sensibility it is their foremost 
concern. Characters almost invariably accompany a person’s name 
with an account of their property, as if the two are inseparable. At 
times the text almost reads like a property catalogue, or indeed, the 
front page of national dailies, like the Morning Chronicle, taken by 
the Austens, which were wholly given up to advertisements of prop-
erties for sale, with detailed inventories of furniture, china, domestic 
and outdoor goods of all kinds. Late eighteenth-century society was 
intensely concerned with wealth and money. The frequent wars dur-
ing the century had exponentially increased the national debt result-
ing in higher taxation demands, a grievance constantly featuring in 
the newspapers. It also enhanced riches for wealthy capitalists able 
to loan money to government at high returns.
John and Fanny Dashwood represent a propitious union, not at 
all uncommon in Austen’s actual world, of landed wealth with city 
wealth. It suggests an early stage of what Raymond Williams, in The 
Country and the City, terms ‘a developing capitalist order of the land’ 
(p. 139). Mrs Ferrars’ desire that her son, Edward, make a fi gure as 
an orator in Parliament is driven by no ideal of civic duty to promote 
national interests. Men ‘no more dreamt of a seat in the House in 
order to benefi t humanity than a child dreams of a birthday cake that 
others may eat it’, Lewis Namier writes.23 Edward’s success as a pub-
lic fi gure would certainly have gratifi ed his mother’s vanity but more 
importantly it would have opened the way to further wealth-getting. 
According to Namier, a parliamentary seat was always regarded as a 
means to self-making and self-enrichment (p. 2). Banking, merchant 
and political hierarchies were thoroughly interrelated during the last 
decades of the eighteenth century.24
If Edward eschews the path of self-interest, John and Fanny Dash-
wood are exemplary in their obsessive and competitive acquisitive-
ness. While all their passions are invested in wealth-getting, their 
sense of social extension into a shared world of fellow-feeling is 
practically non-existent. John Dashwood is ‘cold hearted, and rather 
selfi sh’, epithets used throughout the text to indicate those lacking 
social sympathies and pursuing self-interest. The second chapter of 
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the novel, in which John is only too ready to accept Fanny’s argu-
ments against keeping his promise to his father to provide for his 
step-sisters, offers a comic drama of the contraction of sympathies 
to exclude all but self. Fanny’s language repeatedly foregrounds the 
possessive pronouns of the private individualist self as she contrasts 
the projected impoverishment of ‘our poor little boy’, John’s ‘own 
child’ against the claims of Elinor and Marianne who are nor ‘really 
his sisters [. . .] only half blood’ (p. 7). Further contraction of social 
sympathies is exemplifi ed in Fanny’s example of her mother being 
‘clogged’ by her husband’s will with the payment of annuities to old 
superannuated servants so that ‘her income was not her own’ (p. 8). 
The chapter closes with Fanny’s possessive indignation that her 
mother-in-law, Mrs Dashwood, has been left all the china, plate and 
linen from the former household. Again her language emphatically 
opposes ‘our’ and ‘own’ to ‘theirs’ and ‘them’ as the discursive struc-
ture of competitive, acquisitive individualism.
Land enclosure reached a peak at the end of the eighteenth cen-
tury, funded in part from increases in landed wealth due to high grain 
prices and also from investment from merchant and capital sources.25 
In the long term, land enclosure and improvement increased food 
production but at the time the most obvious result was the impover-
ishment of many small land-holders, tenant farmers and the agricul-
tural poor who depended on common land for grazing and foraging. 
Land enclosure provides a materially literal example of the exclusion 
of others in order to magnify the idea of self by means of posses-
sions. John Dashwood details a typical pattern of enlargement of his 
property by the ‘inclosure of Norland Common’ and the purchase 
of East Kingham Farm, so immediately adjoining his own land ‘that 
I felt it my duty to buy it’ (p. 196). ‘Duty’ here functions typically 
as an abstract moral euphemism for competitive materialism since 
‘I might have sold it again the next day, for more than I gave’ (p. 197). 
That the Dashwood’s use their property and wealth to compete in the 
stakes of conspicuous consumption is indicated by a newly fashion-
able greenhouse and garden Fanny is planning for Norland. Their 
factitious notion of self as substantiated and magnifi ed by competi-
tive possession demands a continual expansion of their acquisitions 
of material things. ‘English landowners were a class of consumers’, 
Professor Habakkuk notes.26
Originally the notion of ‘taste’ was aligned to Adam Smith’s 
idea of sympathy as responsiveness of feeling extended to the aes-
thetic realm. By the turn of the century, however, it was increas-
ingly associated with more socially restricted notions of refi nement 
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and consumerism. Taste, as a subjective attribute of the refi ned 
interiority, came to be substantiated in the competitive purchase 
of material things. In Sense and Sensibility, those who most osten-
tatiously pride themselves on their displays of taste, like Lady 
Middleton, Fanny Dashwood and Mrs Ferrars, are also represented 
as those most concerned with purely conventional forms of civil-
ity as opposed to ‘society’ as fellowship. Throughout the text, this 
type of civility is linked to coldness, self-centredness and especially 
to lack of social sympathies. Fanny is ‘narrow-minded and selfi sh’, 
Lady Middleton ‘piqued herself on the elegance of her table’ but 
is ‘reserved’ and ‘cold’ and they are attracted to each other by 
mutual ‘cold-hearted selfi shness [. . .] [and] an insipid propriety of 
demeanour’ (pp. 3, 27, 200).
Initially Willoughby seems to represent an opposing view of 
taste, one based upon sympathy and warmth of feeling rather than 
conspicuous consumption and elegant civility. He enters fully into 
Marianne’s enthusiasms and shares her romantic tastes in music, 
literature and art. Yet his predatory attitude to women reveals a drive 
to expand self by means of possession. His callous disregard for the 
trail of misery he leaves in the wake of his sexual conquests and his 
loveless marriage to gain a fortune are alike indicative of his ruthless 
self-interested individualism. Elinor rightly judges him extravagant, 
‘cold-hearted and selfi sh’ (p. 290). Lucy Steele is another character 
dominated by competitive self-promotion. As a means of magni-
fying her own sense of self, she clearly relishes the thrill of power 
she gains from wounding Elinor. She is even more cold-hearted than 
Willoughby in swapping lovers purely for fi nancial gain. She earns 
an unusually direct comment from the narrator, ‘The whole of Lucy’s 
behaviour [. . .] and the prosperity that crowned it, therefore, may 
be held forth as a most encouraging instance of what an earnest, 
an unceasing attention to self-interest, however its progress may be 
apparently obstructed, will do in securing every advantage of for-
tune’ (p. 331). Were its irony to pass unnoticed, this statement could 
be read as a comprehensive summary of the moral myth of individu-
alist self-making by struggling against adversity as disseminated or 
‘held forth’ by numerous early nineteenth-century clergymen, moral-
ists, politicians, economists and novelists. Throughout her novels, 
Austen’s hostility to the emergent values of possessive individualism 
remains unambivalent.
Her representation of subjective individualism is also consistently 
critical but more complex and nuanced. Marianne, for example, 
might seem to represent an idea of self derived from a notion of 
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sensibility and taste more closely aligned to Adam Smith’s view of 
sympathy, based upon fellow feeling. Marianne’s sense of her self 
expands around an imagined identity as unique sensibility. For her, 
sympathy is demonstrated primarily in reciprocal enthusiasm for 
favourite music and poetry. ‘I could not be happy’, she declares, 
‘with a man whose taste did not in every point coincide with my 
own. He must enter into all my feelings; the same books, the same 
music must charm us both’ (p. 14). Austen’s irony here is easily noted: 
Willoughby ‘must enter into all my feelings’ (emphasis added).
It is no accident that Austen represents Marianne’s especial 
accomplishment to be piano playing and Elinor’s to be drawing. In 
Essays on Philosophical Subjects, published posthumously in 1795, 
and extensively reviewed in 1796–7, Adam Smith contrasts the plea-
sures arising from both arts. Drawing and painting give delight by 
the skill of rendering objects in the three-dimensional world in a 
two-dimensional form as if they are indeed three-dimensional. The 
aesthetic satisfaction is thus outward-looking, deriving from atten-
tiveness to the empirical world. The pleasure of music, on the other 
hand, derives not from imitation of external objects, ‘but [from] the 
power of exciting and varying the different moods and dispositions 
of the mind’.27 In Jane Austen’s Possessions and Dispossessions, 
Sandie Byrne points out that of the possessions unpacked on arrival 
at Barton Cottage the ‘pianoforte is described as Marianne’s particu-
lar property, but Elinor’s drawings are fi xed to the walls to become 
the decoration and property of all’.28
Marianne equates knowledge, in the mode of idealist philoso-
phy, with the self-revealed, intuitive truth of the sovereign mind, 
scorning any reference to an objective social world. For her, truth 
is a matter of inner feeling and emotional response. She boasts that 
despite the very short time she has known Willoughby, she is better 
acquainted with him than with any other creature in the world. ‘It 
is not time,’ she claims, ‘it is disposition alone’ (p. 50). When Elinor 
criticises her impropriety in driving off alone with Willoughby, she 
insists that she would have known intuitively if she had been acting 
wrongly (p. 59).
By the end of the eighteenth century, it had become a common-
place in women’s conduct writing across the political spectrum, from 
Hannah More to Mary Wollstonecraft, to attack the dangers that 
excessive sensibility posed to vulnerable young women. Undoubt-
edly, Sense and Sensibility shares this concern and Marianne’s treat-
ment by Willoughby exemplifi es the risk. The satiric treatment of 
sensibility by Austen also provides a central part of Marilyn Butler’s 
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argument for Austen’s political conservatism. Austen’s critique of 
Marianne’s claims to sensibility, however, derives from a social, even 
a radical perspective, and is forward-looking in its historical signifi -
cance rather than inhering in the narrow evangelical partisanship of 
revolutionary era politics. Austen’s position originates in the scepti-
cal empiricism of Hume and Smith in their quarrel with idealism as 
imposing totalising systems of thought regardless of evidence from 
the material world.
Austen uses one of the key terms of Smith’s accusation against 
idealism’s totalising tendency when Elinor criticises Marianne’s 
enthusiasm for her ‘systems’ of thought which are based upon an 
‘ignorance of the world’ (p. 48). Conceptual systems, according to 
Hume, rely upon imagination and the exclusion of external reality. 
Adam Smith warned against ‘the man of system’.29 Idealism, its crit-
ics claimed, facilitates the expansion of subjective self by disavowing 
or rendering imperceptible anything contrary to a wished for men-
tal reality. When Marianne declares she could love no man whose 
taste did not in every point coincide with her own, it is not fellow 
feeling she is affi rming but the desire to subsume the world into 
her own subjective identity. Marianne, with all her excellent abili-
ties and disposition, says the narrator, ‘expected from other people 
the same opinions and feelings as her own, and she judged of their 
motives by the immediate effect of their actions on herself’ (p. 175). 
As David Hume pointed out, one of the dangers of this subjectivism 
is the imaginary association of ideas into coherent mental systems 
so that wishes and illusions come to seem reality. Colonel Brandon 
says, ‘Where the mind is perhaps rather unwilling to be convinced, 
it will always fi nd something to support its doubts’ (p. 150). Mrs 
Dashwood comically demonstrates this truth in reverse; where the 
mind is willing, rational doubt is easily excluded. Once she learns 
of Brandon’s love for Marianne she is immediately ‘carried away by 
her imagination’ and her ‘active fancy [. . .] fashioned every thing 
delightful to her’ as to her daughter’s future (p. 295).
This easy transition of ideas and wishes into fi rm systems of belief 
is facilitated by an assumed contempt for materiality. Like most ideal-
ists, Marianne pretends to scorn worldly things. ‘What have wealth 
and grandeur to do with happiness’, she proclaims romantically. When 
Elinor mischievously enquires what she considers a moderate estab-
lishment, Marianne produces a very material list: servants, one or two 
carriages and hunters. In a similar way, she accepts Willoughby’s offer 
of a horse without the least consideration of the enormous additional 
expense this would involve for her mother: ‘Most unwilling was she to 
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awaken from such a dream of felicity, to comprehend all the unhappy 
truths which attended the affair’ (p. 49).
A regime of perceptibility structured vertically by the dominance 
of mind over matter renders the physical realm inconsequential, of 
no account. The socially divisive effect of contempt for the material 
world is its tendency to downgrade the commonality of embodied 
human existence which forms the basis of fellowship and sympathy. 
The high esteem placed upon private interiority, mediated as refi ne-
ment of individual taste, functions as a mechanism of social exclu-
sion, justifying disregard, even contempt, for others. While Marianne 
is narcissistically charmed by Willoughby because he ‘acquiesced in 
all her decisions, caught all her enthusiasm’, she dismisses Colonel 
Brandon as possessing ‘neither genius, taste, nor spirit’ (p. 44). These 
perceived imperfections of Brandon’s mind, Elinor suggests, rest upon 
‘your own imagination’. Marianne similarly projects her intolerance 
upon the kindly if loquacious Mrs Jennings. Despite all the objec-
tive evidence of Mrs Jennings’s compassionate sympathies, Marianne 
insists upon excluding her from any possible fellowship, ‘she cannot 
feel. Her kindness is not sympathy; her good nature is not tenderness. 
All she wants is gossip’ (pp. 174–5). As her last sentence here sug-
gests, Marianne is actually making a judgement based upon a system 
of social prejudice and passing it off to herself as a matter of her 
own superior innate sensibility and the other’s lack of the same 
delicacy of feeling.
Yet once convinced that some fellow humans have no feelings 
of value, it becomes possible to treat them as beings without a self 
worthy of note. A vertical, idealist regime of the perceptible con-
stitutes the labouring poor, the uneducated, superannuated servants 
and those to be cleared away for land enclosure, as wholly insignifi -
cant existences. Marianne, comments the narrator, ‘had never much 
toleration for any thing like impertinence, vulgarity, inferiority of 
parts, or even difference of taste from herself’ (p. 109). Far from 
being implicated in revolutionary ardour, as Butler claims, sensibil-
ity, as productive of a notion of self constituted as refi ned interiority, 
became, especially as the nineteenth century progressed, a powerful 
means of social exclusion.
A new distribution of the perceptible rendered the polite, pri-
vate bodies of the respectable invisible, while the bodies of the poor 
became the focus of public attention as indices of troubling inferior-
ity. Roy Porter comments, ‘The representatives of gross corporeality 
were the vulgar, the labouring poor; élites upheld their own superi-
ority as creatures of mind rather than base matter.’30 He concludes, 
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‘The doctrine of mind over matter stood for power over the people’ 
(p. 474). As Rancière notes, changes in the regime of the percep-
tible are always political. At the turn of the eighteenth century, it 
is Austen’s prescient insight that both emergent ideologies of self, 
acquisitive individualism and subjective individualism, entailed an 
expansion of the idea of self upon the world and, at the same time, a 
radical retraction of sympathies, and of any horizontal sense of self 
as part of extended social and embodied being. The respectable self is 
privatised. Commonness becomes synonymous with the vulgar.
Sir John Middleton and Mrs Jennings, his mother-in-law, are the 
two characters in the novel who most exemplify an earlier tradition 
of self as both social and embodied. Indeed, Sir John represents his 
sense of sociability almost entirely in terms of food. On the Dash-
woods’ arrival at Barton Cottage he sends the family a large basket 
of garden stuff, followed by a gift of game (p. 25). Their comfort, 
as this unsolicited generosity suggests, is ‘an object of real solicitude 
to him’ and he is vociferous as to ‘his earnest desire of their liv-
ing in the most sociable terms with his family’ (p. 25). His gregari-
ous enthusiasm offends current notions of civility as upheld by his 
wife. Inclusive sociability was becoming old-fashioned in a culture 
increasingly valorising the more restricted virtues of the private and 
domestic. By contrast, ‘Sir John’s satisfaction in society was [. . .] 
real; he delighted in collecting about him more young people than 
his house could hold [. . .] in summer he was forever forming parties 
to eat cold ham and chicken out of doors’ (p. 27). In this passage, 
as throughout the novel, Austen is again using the words ‘sociable’ 
and ‘society’ in the older sense to suggest fellowship and social being. 
While Lady Middleton enjoys entertaining in order to show off her 
domestic elegance, Sir John is frequently planning informal outdoor 
meals. Austen repeatedly stresses Sir John’s real feelings in opposi-
tion to what is recurrently described in the text as ‘cold civility’, a 
politeness without fellow feeling.
Mrs Jennings is introduced as ‘a good-humoured, merry, fat, 
elderly woman, who talked a great deal and seemed [. . .] rather 
vulgar’ (pp. 28–9). Judging by this description, refi ned readers 
might well expect her to be a fi gure of fun. Yet, over narrative time, 
it becomes apparent that her sterling qualities are far more impor-
tant than any defi ciencies in civility. Objective judgement, based 
upon evidence, corrects fi rst opinion. Mrs Jennings is one of those 
characters in Austen’s fi ction who seems to reach back into much 
older popular traditions, associated as she is with those carnival 
qualities of birth, food and merriment. Mrs Jennings has affi nities 
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with a character like Juliet’s nurse in Romeo and Juliet. She has 
the same robust interest in marriage and procreation, proclaiming 
enthusiastically of her pregnant daughter, Charlotte, ‘I warrant you 
she is a fi ne size by this time’ (p. 141). She regales Elinor with all 
the details of her husband’s last illness and death (p. 46). As this 
suggests, Mrs Jennings has no notion at all of the self as private; 
she is a wholly social being. For her, relationships and alliances are 
warp and woof of a communal sphere of sociability and her desire 
to know all that is going on provokes her to question acquaintances 
without the least sense of indelicacy at encroaching upon a private 
realm. Believing Colonel Brandon to have been involved in matters 
concerning what she has termed ‘a love child’, she accosts him, 
‘Come, come, let’s have no secrets among friends’ (p. 141). The 
many secrets in the text are, in fact, an index of the encroachment 
of the private upon the social.
In the story, it is Mrs Jennings who represents the antithesis of 
idealist disavowal of the fl esh. Her earthy understanding of people 
as embodied beings rather than interior sensibilities determines her 
practical expressions of fellowship and kindness. In contrast to her 
daughter-in-law’s fastidious disavowal of the fl eshly, her satisfac-
tion, like Sir John’s, comes from providing creature comforts. On the 
journey to London she is solicitous for everything that could ensure 
Elinor’s and Marianne’s ease and enjoyment, insisting upon a choice 
of salmon, cod, boiled fowls or veal cutlets when they stop for din-
ner (p. 138). In London, once she learns of Marianne’s unhappiness 
she treats her ‘with all the indulgent fondness of a parent towards a 
favourite child’, ensuring she has ‘the best place by the fi re’ and is 
tempted ‘to eat by every delicacy in the house’ including some of ‘the 
fi nest old Constantia wine’ (pp. 167, 171). She refuses to leave Elinor 
alone to tend Marianne in her illness, declaring that by her attentive 
care she will supply the place of their mother. This ‘kindness of heart 
[. . .] made Elinor really love her’ and in all the fatigues of the sick-
room she found in Mrs Jennings ‘a most willing and active helpmate’ 
(p. 269). The fi nal biblical word, here, is a forceful and striking term 
to express sympathetic fellowship.
Mrs Jennings meets all of life with the same material practical-
ity, disregarding the mores of new civility. When she believes that 
Lucy and Edward will start upon an impoverished married life, she 
cries, ‘Aye, we all know how that will end [. . .] they will have a 
child every year! And Lord help ’em!’ Her immediate response, in 
sharp contrast to the mercenary deliberations of Mrs Ferrars and 
Fanny and John Dashwood, is ‘I must see what I can give them 
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towards furnishing their house’, declaring of Mrs Ferrars, ‘I have 
no notion of people’s making such a to-do about money and great-
ness’ (pp. 241, 225). The earthy vigour of Mrs Jennings’s discourse 
derives much of its force from roots in demotic speech. Deploring 
the imminent departure of Elinor and Marianne home to Barton, 
she exclaims to Colonel Brandon, ‘Lord! We shall sit and gape at 
one another as dull as two cats’ (p. 245). In the redistribution of 
the perceptible, imposed by a new regulatory regime of privacy, the 
vigorous insistence upon life as embodied, as represented by Mrs 
Jennings’s voice, would become mute.
In the representation of Sir John and especially Mrs Jennings, 
therefore, Austen elegises the ethos of sociability that would be 
sacrifi ced in a culture dedicated to private individualism, whether 
in the form of materialist possessiveness or idealist interiority. The 
perceptibility of embodied existence that underwrites extended 
sympathies and fellow feeling drops out of sight. This is not to 
suggest that Austen is indulgently nostalgic in her treatment. Both 
Mrs Jennings and Sir John are the objects of her ironic comedy. 
Their constant, undiscriminating geniality can seem inappropriate 
and even tedious. More damagingly, their refusal of any space for a 
private self is shown to lead to insensitivity that can be wounding. 
While Austen clearly views the coming order of acquisitive indi-
vidualism with dismay and dislike and the development of idealist 
values with concern and scepticism, she does not turn away from 
change as such. For the Dashwood women, the loss of Norland 
impels them into processes that cause insecurity and pain but their 
lives are opened up to wider experiences and to new possibilities 
that are ultimately empowering.
In Elinor, Austen explores the tensions arising from the confl icting 
claims of the private and the social self. As such, Elinor represents 
Austen’s projection of a potentially progressive modern sensibility. 
In contrast to the acquisitive self that desires to possess ever more 
of the world and the subjective self intent upon shaping the world 
to its own desires, Elinor’s sensibility expresses a worldly sense of 
self as horizontally part of the larger social whole. Her behaviour is 
grounded in toleration of others even if their values differ from her 
own. She tells her mother, ‘I will not raise objections against anyone’s 
conduct on so illiberal a foundation, as a difference in judgement 
from myself, or a deviation from what I may think right and consis-
tent’ (p. 70). This does not constitute a collapse into relativism, how-
ever. When Marianne accuses her of advocating subservience to the 
judgements of neighbours, Elinor’s response is fi rm and unequivocal. 
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‘My doctrine has never aimed at the subjection of the understand-
ing,’ she insists, ‘I confess [. . .] often having wished you to treat 
our acquaintance in general with greater attention; but when have 
I advised you to adopt their sentiments or conform to their judge-
ments in serious matters?’ (p. 81).
The irony, of course, is that this is precisely what Marianne does 
insist upon from others, that they conform to her sentiments and 
judgements. Elinor’s principles, outlined in these two statements 
above, place her centrally in the Enlightenment tradition of David 
Hume and Adam Smith in their insistence on tolerance and sympa-
thetic fellowship, their hostility to idealism as an imposition of self 
and systems of belief. Often in the story, Elinor occupies a position 
like that of Smith’s impartial observer, able to enter into a much wider 
range of perspectives than those characters enclosed in self-interest 
or their own interiority. Elinor’s artistic ability is drawing, an art that 
Adam Smith praises for its comprehensiveness of observation.
Critics have pointed to Austen’s sustained use of forensic lan-
guage in the story where terms like ‘proof’, ‘evidence’, ‘grounds’ and 
‘conviction’ abound. In fact, this linguistic preoccupation was quite 
common within the general discourse of the time due to the expo-
nential increase in empirical experiments and observations. This was 
not a specialist discourse conducted only within a small scientifi c 
community; it constituted a shared account of the common world. 
The investigations were discussed at length in the literary quarterlies 
aimed at a wide readership among the whole of the educated class. In 
1794, the Monthly Review, for example, carried a substantial article 
on Thomas Beddoes, Observations on the Nature of Demonstrative 
Evidence (1793).31 Every issue of the journal throughout that decade 
carried articles evaluating the observations and evidence put forward 
in published works on electricity, chemistry, medicine, agriculture, 
mathematics, mineralogy and many other empirical studies.
In contrast to most other characters who nourish secrets and sub-
jective illusions, Elinor consistently attempts to order her judgements 
and behaviour upon empirical evidence. In so doing she asserts her 
realist faith in a shared world. Rather than elevating mind over 
matter, Elinor respects the substance of materiality, the things, that 
constitute the common world. When Lucy reveals her secret engage-
ment to Edward, Elinor ‘dared no longer doubt; supported as [Lucy’s 
claim] was too on every side by such probabilities and proofs, and 
contradicted by nothing but her [Elinor’s] own wishes [. . .] the pic-
ture, the letter, the ring, formed altogether such a body of evidence, 
as overcame every fear of condemning him unfairly, and established 
5215_Morris.indd   44 30/11/16   10:32 AM
as a fact, which no partiality could set aside, his ill-treatment of her-
self’ (p. 119). Like a true empiricist, Elinor challenges wishes with 
things and facts. When she begins to doubt the honesty of Willough-
by’s intentions she resolves to gain ‘every new light as to his character 
which her own observation or the intelligence of others could give 
her’ (p. 137).
Although Elinor accepts the challenge of empirical evidence, 
the novel does not subscribe to naive actualism. In the tradition of 
David Hume’s epistemological scepticism, the text foregrounds the 
unpredictability of events and the partiality and fallibility of human 
perspectives. Indeed, Austen gains much of her comedy from the 
incongruous mismatch between characters’ desiring interpretations 
and confl icting actuality, often in the shape of other people’s desires 
and interpretations. The innovative narrative technique of free indi-
rect speech she develops to exploit these comic fallibilities owes much 
to Adam Smith’s novelistic exposition of interactive shifts of perspec-
tive through fi rst, second and third person points of view. Yet, in 
contrast to her characters’ attachment to their own systems of belief, 
authorial omniscience is denied totalising knowledge. Understanding 
of people and things is certainly asserted to be possible and shar-
able, but never fi nal. In each Austen novel there comes a moment or 
moments when the narrator admits to lack of knowledge or of words 
that can adequately convey a state of affairs.
In Sense and Sensibility, when Edward is told by Elinor of Colonel 
Brandon’s offer of a living that will allow him to marry Lucy, the nar-
rator comments, ‘What Edward felt, as he could not say it himself, 
it cannot be expected that anyone else should say for him’ (p. 252). 
At the end of the story, when Elinor’s future prospects are even more 
radically transformed, the narrator asks, ‘But Elinor – How are her 
feelings to be described?’ (p. 318). The explicit and implicit semantics 
of those two sentences are, as always with Austen, complex. Clearly, 
they mark out a space of interiority as private, an acceptance that 
the press of memories, impressions, hopes and fears can be so intense 
and fl uid as to be knowable to no-one but the experiencing self, and 
perhaps not even fully by them.
Yet the interpellative logic of Austen’s sentences draws the reader 
into a communicative space with the narrator in which the implicit 
norm is of shared communication of feelings, of distributed con-
sciousness. It is only the existence of this norm that gives force to 
the exceptions of these two cases. Indeed, without such a norm there 
could be no shared life. The constitution of intersubjective conscious-
ness between narrator and reader is a pervasive means by which 
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Austen produces that sense of an interactive familiar community that 
is the experience of reading her novels. Austen’s innovative prose 
foregrounds the linguistic structures of a shared world paradoxically 
at the very moment when the notion of it comes under attack from 
an ethos of privacy.
Partly the sense of inclusivity is achieved by the innovative motil-
ity of Austen’s language, its fl uid ability to slide horizontally across 
linguistic temporalities as well as different consciousnesses. The sud-
den movement into the present tense, as in ‘How are her feelings to 
be described’, provides a good example, bridging as it does the past 
tense of the story and a present narrative moment shared by implied 
teller and implied listener/reader. The effect of immediacy, in her 
prose, is further strengthened by Austen’s frequent use of deictics, 
especially ‘now’. ‘I come now to the relation of a misfortune’, the 
narrator directly informs the reader, implying a shared temporal 
space. When Chapter 5 opens, ‘The Dashwoods were now settled 
at Barton’ the reader is effectively brought into the time and space 
of the story as well as that of the narrator. By such means Austen 
gives linguistic substance to the intersubjective experience that is 
communal reality.
This writerly constitution of consciousness as shared and fl uid 
contributes equally to a sense of self as non-bounded and incon-
clusive. David Hartley saw the self as always emergent and facti-
tious. Austen’s characters convey a very similar sense. Frequently, 
they seem at one and the same time wholly familiar yet startling and 
unpredictable. Character speech not only suggests unspoken cur-
rents of thought but equally the force of non-verbal energies. Self, for 
Austen, is an embodied performance, like that of the Steele sisters 
and Marianne, for example, but a performance driven by needs 
and passions. There are those, moreover, like Mr Palmer and Fanny 
Dashwood, who seem to exist at the edge of performative excess. 
These qualities are perhaps those that earlier critics were recognising 
when they refer to Austen’s dialogue as Shakespearian. The effect is a 
sense of identity as resistant to any fi nal interpretive closure.
The social self, for Austen, is also inseparable from the world of 
things. Her novels mark the initiating moment in which consumer 
goods of all kinds become active forces shaping individual identity 
and social structures. In Sense and Sensibility, shops and purchases 
feature prominently in the text. Shops can be understood as metony-
mies of a public sphere largely structured upon consumption. On the 
very fi rst day of their stay in London, Elinor and Marianne accom-
pany Mrs Jennings and Mrs Palmer on a shopping trip. Thereafter 
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they make several other trips to shops in Pall Mall and Bond Street. 
These occasions are represented by Austen as social events in the 
public sphere as much as they are purchasing opportunities. Women 
do not shop singly, friends are met and gossip and news exchanged. 
These interactions are shown to be part of the interdependent dynam-
ics of the public and private spheres, in that they lead to further 
social events, opinion forming and the circulation of rumour and 
information as well as cash.
Consumer goods also function as metonymies for the public con-
stitution of self. Miss Grey’s wedding clothes are put on display in a 
fashionable warehouse (p. 187). Men, too, use things to signify their 
identity as wealthy connoisseurs of taste. Robert Ferrars exploits the 
public purchase of a toothpick to demonstrate the ‘correctness of his 
eye and the delicacy of his taste’ (p. 192). Willoughby contemptu-
ously dismisses Colonel Brandon as the kind of man who only buys 
two suits a year, while Marianne insists that the Colonel’s fl annel 
waistcoats are attributes of age and ailment (pp. 44, 32).
It is ironic that Marianne, who insists upon the priority of mind 
over matter, should be so quick to judge Brandon’s person by his 
clothing. What the text shows, comically, is that the most sublime 
and intense experiences of the subjective self depend upon com-
mon things for substantiation. Even moments of romantic intimacy 
require the banal mediation of material objects as catalogued by 
Margaret’s account of seeing Willoughby take up Marianne’s scis-
sors, cut off a long lock of her hair, and fold it ‘in a piece of white 
paper, and put it into his pocket book’ (p. 51). When Willoughby 
leaves abruptly without explanation, Marianne would have thought 
herself inexcusable if she had been able to sleep or eat (p. 71). Yet 
despite rejection of what is offensively material to her emotional 
state, she turns to objects that are just as material to express her 
grief. She spends hours playing the pianoforte and reading the 
books they had shared. Taste, as a means of expressing transcendent 
sensibility, is, moreover, just as inseparable from the economics of 
consumption as is taste as conspicuous display. Austen is typically 
astute as to the hard cash necessary to substantiate and maintain the 
inner life. Edward fantasises on the ‘magnifi cent orders’ that would 
fl ow to London booksellers, music-sellers and print-shops should 
the family come into a fortune. Knowing Marianne’s ‘greatness of 
soul’, Edward claims, ‘there would not be music enough in London 
to content her’ (p. 79). How else is the soul to know its greatness 
or estimate its qualities if not substantiated by material things and 
practices?
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It is undoubtedly signifi cant that Edward, Elinor and Colonel 
Brandon all disclaim at various moments what the Colonel calls ‘pre-
tensions to connoisseurship’, a term newly current in the eighteenth 
century (p. 205). They do not use things either to extend the acquisi-
tiveness of the competitive self or to substantiate interior sensibility. 
Brandon listens attentively to Marianne at the pianoforte but with-
out ‘being in raptures’ (p. 30). Elinor, too, makes no claim to musical 
taste, and is unrestrained ‘by the presence of a harp and violoncello’, 
from turning her eyes to ‘other objects in the room’ (p. 218). Edward 
stubbornly refuses to associate things with sensibility and his inter-
change with Marianne brings to the surface the opposing politics of 
the material versus the ideal, empirical facts versus an abstract sys-
tem of belief. ‘How can you think of dirt, with such objects before 
you?’ Marianne exclaims. Edward replies, ‘Because [. . .] among the 
rest of the objects before me, I see a very dirty lane’ (p. 76). He 
goes on to insist that he prefers tall, fl ourishing trees to crooked, 
blasted ones, he dislikes tattered cottages, nettles and thistles, and 
takes pleasure in a troop of tidy, happy villagers (p. 84). This last 
image of contented poor may suggest patrician complacency. Yet, 
that negative judgement needs to be balanced with recognition that 
tattered cottages and weeds indicate the poverty of tattered, ill-clad, 
undernourished inhabitants and of neglect by landowners. During 
the peak of the enclosure movement at the end of the eighteenth 
century, and with rural hardship and unrest increasing, Edward’s 
preference does not seem reactionary. Romantic rapture at ‘tattered 
cottages’ provides as little to ameliorate pressing material needs as 
does indulgence in extravagant display.
Political ideologies are also at stake in a material site of even 
greater import for self, sensibility and taste than that of landscape, 
namely, the ideology of home, of domesticity. This prime location of 
the private self is, of course, constituted by things, common objects. 
When the Dashwoods move into Barton Cottage they endeavour, 
‘by placing around them their books and other possessions, to form 
themselves a home’ (p. 25). Again, material things produce the sub-
jective values. ‘Home’ is an important and recurrent term in the 
text. The idealisation of domesticity and the shift of values from the 
public to the domestic, occurring from the latter part of the eigh-
teenth century and into the nineteenth is a well-documented aspect 
of British patriotic and moral discourse. There is an easily recogni-
sable metaphoric transformation of the concrete into the ideal in 
the movement from hearth to home to domesticity to Englishness. 
Sense and Sensibility is undoubtedly participating in this discursive 
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domain. The ideology of the home as a privileged sanctuary that 
sustains the competitive struggle in the public sphere underwrote 
the increasing privacy of the family and its individualistic ethos. 
In Englishness Identifi ed, Paul Langford notes that even foreign-
ers and overseas visitors to Britain commented upon the fervent 
belief in home life that most English people espoused. Yet, visitors 
also noticed the devaluing of more general sociability and fellow-
ship. Festive days based upon commonality beyond the home were 
neglected in England. Langford quotes an Austrian diplomat who 
concludes, ‘it proves how little the English feel it necessary to give 
proof of their good feeling to each other’.32
Where does Sense and Sensibility position itself within the shifting 
semantic-political fi eld of domestic values? It is certainly not privacy 
that is stressed in the text. Mrs Dashwood’s fi rst thought on settling 
in Barton is of enlarging the cottage so that they can accommodate 
‘such parties of our friends as I hope to see often collected here’ 
(p. 24). In the meantime, she hopes they can make themselves ‘toler-
ably comfortable’. The notion of comfort is much associated with 
the word ‘home’ in the narrative, as in national discourse. Elinor rec-
ognises that Edward’s mother does not make ‘his home comfortable’ 
to him and Edward himself later repeats this phrase (pp. 18, 318). 
When Mrs Jennings is praising Delaford as Marianne’s future home 
if she marries Colonel Brandon, she calls it a ‘nice, old-fashioned 
place, full of comforts and conveniences’ (p. 170). Willoughby comes 
to love Barton Cottage ‘as his home’ (p. 61). In his discussion of 
English domesticity, Langford points out that the ‘idea of comfort 
was a subject of endless debate both at home and abroad’, the more 
so since there existed no obvious synonym for comfort in other lan-
guages (Englishness, p. 117).
Part of the semantic fi eld constituting the ideology of English 
domestic comfort was the idea of warmth, a notion that moves 
effortlessly from the material basis of life to the metaphorical, sub-
jective domain. Within Sense and Sensibility almost all the characters 
are categorised as either cold-hearted or warm-hearted. Not surpris-
ingly, fi res and fi replaces are among the domestic things referred 
to in the text. Warmth and creature comforts were quintessentially 
associated with the open fi re typical of English domestic interiors 
as opposed to the stoves in continental countries (Englishness, pp. 
116–17). In national discourse and in its physical substance ‘the 
hearth’ undoubtedly operates as a ‘gathering’ in Bruno Latour’s 
sense of a point of intersection of many meaning systems (‘Why 
has Critique’, p. 170). Both in the public sphere and in Sense and 
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Sensibility ‘the hearth’ resonates across the discursive domains of 
traditionalism, patriotism, reaction and reform.
The emotional leverage of the hearth within domestic ideology, 
for example, was intensifi ed by nostalgic connotations of older, 
partly mythic, traditions of a merry England in which peasantry 
and nobility gathered in fellowship around Yule logs blazing in the 
squire’s feudal halls. The character in Sense and Sensibility most 
closely associated with a comforting fi re is Mrs Jennings. After a 
three-day journey to London, Elinor and Marianne are grateful to 
enjoy ‘all the luxury of a good fi re’ (p. 138). When she learns of 
Marianne’s unhappiness, Mrs Jennings makes sure that she has ‘the 
best place by the fi re’ (p. 167). This association with both physical 
warmth and sympathetic warmth accords with Austen’s depiction of 
Mrs Jennings as not only representative of an older ethos of sociabil-
ity, as opposed to privacy, but also of an earlier way of envisaging 
human life as shared and embodied.
It is not only Mrs Jennings who is associated with fi replaces and 
sociability. Mrs Dashwood wants to put a new grate into the spare 
bedroom in readiness for guests (p. 33). Her plans to enlarge the 
cottage, however, meet with passionate resistance from Willoughby. 
He declares he would not sacrifi ce one sentiment of local attachment 
for all the improvements in the world. In response, Elinor asks him 
whether he fi nds even ‘a kitchen that smokes’ desirable (p. 62). This 
is almost certainly a reference out to the world of things beyond 
the text. In particular, it alludes to Count Rumford’s invention of a 
stove that eliminated the smoky fi res of traditional building. Count 
Rumford was much in the news during the years Austen was writing 
the novel. There were lengthy discussions of his ideas in Monthly 
Review throughout the 1790s. The Review praised him as a man 
who was practical as well as philosophical and who had made a real 
improvement to the comforts of ordinary life.33
Not everyone was in favour of Rumford, however. In a politically 
factional world, innovation was regarded at best with suspicion by 
conservatives. One reactionary commentator expresses his opposi-
tion in terms not so unlike those of Willoughby, ‘Rumford, by his 
philosophical chimneys, is likely to destroy the comforts of our fi re-
sides. When will reformers and sciolists meet with that contempt 
which they deserve!’ (Langford, Englishness, p. 117). There is no 
doubt that, at the time, the reference to philosophy would bring to 
many English minds thoughts of the French philosophes whose scep-
ticism and anti-religious sentiments were held by many in Britain to 
have precipitated the Revolution.
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Indeed, it was not just chimney innovations that accounted for 
Rumford’s unpopularity among those of conservative opinion. One 
of his publications, Essays, Political, Economical and Philosophi-
cal (1796), provides an account of his administration of poor relief 
in Munich. The Monthly Review quoted a lengthy passage that 
would have offended all those insisting that the indigent must be 
made to espouse the moral discipline of sturdy individualism. Rum-
ford writes, ‘To make vicious and abandoned people happy, it has 
generally been supposed necessary, fi rst, to make them virtuous. 
But why not reverse this order? Why not make them fi rst happy and 
then virtuous? If happiness and virtue be inseparable, the end will 
be as certainly obtained by the one method as by the other [. . .] 
[therefore] Every thing was done that could be devised to make 
the poor people I had to deal with comfortable and happy in their 
new situation.’34 On 21 October 1800, the Austens’ daily paper, the 
Morning Chronicle, printed a letter to the editor advocating the 
adoption of Count Rumford’s system for ameliorating the condi-
tion of the poor.35
It is, of course, impossible to know what Austen would have 
made of such comments if she read them. They do, however, pro-
vide an intriguing gloss on Edward’s preference, like Rumford’s, 
for ‘happy villagers’ over ‘tattered cottages’ and on Willoughby’s 
defence of nostalgic sentiment despite the consequent discomfort 
to servants in a smoky kitchen. What is certain is that when homes 
are re-formed at the close of the novel the emphasis is upon social 
being not individualistic privacy. Mrs Jennings, the text’s represen-
tative of sociability, is the fi rst to visit Elinor and Edward at their 
parsonage. Once Marianne has married Colonel Brandon there is 
‘constant communication’ between Barton and Delaford (p. 335). 
The ending of the novel, and especially Marianne’s marriage, have 
left some readers disquieted. What is less noticed is that it indicates 
a rejection by Marianne of the narcissistic subjectivism that sought 
to impose self and its systems upon the world. This critical blind-
ness to Marianne’s blindness on the part of present-day readers is, 
perhaps, an index of the still powerful charm of the ideology of 
individualistic interiority.
True to the realist grounding of the story, however, Marianne 
fi nally accepts that her passionate opinions and principles have been 
tested by experience and observation and proved false. She acknowl-
edges the empirical reality that constitutes a shared world. For mod-
ern readers, however, there is a further jarring note to the description 
of her ‘submitting to new attachments, entering on new duties, placed 
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in a new home, a wife, mistress of a family, and the patroness of a 
village’ (p. 333). Undoubtedly, an element of the condescension of 
the lady of the manor is evoked by the term ‘patroness’.
Austen’s plot structures articulate a movement of social change from 
a settled world to one that is more socially fl uid and open. Neverthe-
less, Austen never conceives a world that is not ordered by rank. Yet, in 
the context of the novel’s critique of the self-expansionism of acquisi-
tive individualism and the imposition of self upon the world by subjec-
tive idealism, one should perhaps also recognise the emphasis upon 
the outgoing social inter-activeness of Marianne’s new roles. The text 
perhaps implies that Marianne will be more passionately concerned 
with the happiness of the village in terms of material needs than with 
its supply of picturesque, blasted trees.
There is also a gender infl ection in the outline of Marianne’s new 
position. She does indeed enter on new duties as a wife, but the terms 
‘mistress of a family’ and ‘patroness of a village’ seem to emphasise 
empowerment rather than conventional feminine submission. The 
submission, if there is one, is of the private interiority to the social 
self. Sense and Sensibility opens by expelling its two young female 
protagonists from the security of the patriarchal home. By its conclu-
sion, both Elinor and Marianne have moved into a larger material 
world. They have, however, retained a sense of self as social being, 
rejecting both privatised interiority and acquisitive competitiveness. 
As so often in Austen’s fi ction, the close of the narrative hints at 
the formation of a new, potentially dissensual, social order, worldly 
rather than idealist, horizontal rather than vertical, and one in which 
women have an active and intelligent public role to play.
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Chapter 2
Mrs Dalloway: The Spirit of 
Religion was Abroad
‘We think back through our mothers, if we are women’, Woolf 
famously said.1 If Woolf has a literary mother it must surely be Jane 
Austen. The recurrent references to Austen throughout Woolf’s 
critical writing express a fascination with and admiration for her 
artistic achievements.2 In the essay devoted to Austen in The Com-
mon Reader, Woolf’s language constitutes Austen’s writerly effect in 
terms that seem almost identical to her own aesthetic. From out of 
the stream of the commonplace in Austen’s narrative, Woolf claims, 
a moment is suddenly full of meaning, ‘It fi lls itself; it shines; it glows; 
it hangs before us, deep, trembling, serene for a second’ (Essays, 
4.152). Had Austen not died young, Woolf suggests, her art would 
have continued to develop. She seems to draw Austen into a conti-
nuity with modernism, predicting she would have ‘devised a method 
[. . .] for conveying not only what people say, but what they leave 
unsaid [. . .] She would have been the forerunner of Henry James 
and of Proust’ (Essays, 4.155). Persuasion marks the beginning of a 
shift in Austen’s sensibility, Woolf claims, ‘the observation is less of 
facts and more of feelings’ (Essays, 4.152–3). Yet despite the appar-
ent dichotomy here between facts and feelings, what Woolf most 
pervasively shares with Austen is an aesthetic of worldly realism 
and an antipathy to idealist modes of thought. As against a world 
ordered vertically and hierarchically, Woolf, like Austen, perceives 
self, social world, the world of things and the physical universe as a 
horizontal, material continuum.
Nevertheless, the emphasis upon subjective interiority rather than 
facts would certainly have seemed, to many of Woolf’s fi rst read-
ers, wholly applicable to Woolf’s own art. Early criticism of Woolf’s 
novels interpreted them within an idealist perspective as privileging 
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inner states of mind rather than an object world. According to ide-
alist infl ected readings, Austen was held to deal with universal and 
timeless moral values, albeit in a limited domestic sphere, whereas 
Woolf was read, yet more negatively, as a writer only concerned with 
a nebulous and class-privileged inner life. Again, as with Austen, 
Woolf’s own family helped seal the negative image. In his biography, 
her nephew, Quentin Bell, wrote, ‘Her gift was the pursuit of shad-
ows, for the ghostly whispers of the mind and for Pythian incom-
prehensibility.’3 The only striking exception to early readings of 
Woolf as inward-looking and soulful, by both detractors and admir-
ers, was Erich Auerbach’s groundbreaking account of her narrative 
techniques in Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western 
Literature (1946).4 Mimesis was not published in an English transla-
tion until 1956, but even then it had surprisingly little impact within 
Woolf studies in terms of realism as opposed to appreciation of her 
formal methodology.
During the 1950s and 1960s, serious scholarly studies of Woolf 
tended to consider her work from philosophical, Jungian and Freud-
ian perspectives.5 Yet, while enhancing her status as a major writer, 
they did not challenge the idealist perception that her concern was 
with the inner life rather than the body and with universal abstrac-
tions like time rather than history. It was feminist studies, as with 
Austen, which began to situate Woolf’s novels within the particu-
larities of the time in which she was writing. Many of the feminist 
studies of Woolf published from the 1970s onwards took a psycho-
analytic approach to the novels.6 While this focus did not directly 
undermine the dominance of idealist concentration upon interiority, 
the concern with gender identity and especially with issues facing 
a woman novelist in the early twentieth century did redirect Woolf 
studies to cultural realities. Undoubtedly, it was this earlier feminist 
work that gave impetus to the current recognition of, and scholarly 
investigation into, Woolf’s concern as a writer with many of the most 
urgent cultural, political and social issues of her own time.7 The most 
recent scholarly edition of her work, for example, provides a mass of 
textual information relating each work in complex ways to Woolf’s 
social and political world.8
Surprisingly, though, despite this detailed and rich body of studies 
demonstrating Woolf’s imaginative and intellectual response to her 
world, there has been almost no concomitant re-examination of her 
views on realism. The critical consensus that, as a high modernist, 
Woolf was unquestionably intent upon a wholesale rejection of past 
forms, especially realism, remains veritably unchallenged. Linden 
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Peach, for example, in his illuminating study of Woolf’s historical 
imagination, reiterates the critical orthodoxy, ‘The Years, despite its 
apparent concessions to social realism [. . .] can be seen in terms of 
her quarrel with realism in her essay “Modern Fiction”.’9 Peach’s dis-
missive phrase ‘concessions to social realism’ is typical of the pejora-
tive attitude to realist writing that continues to inform much current 
critical discourse written from a modernist perspective.
In Virginia Woolf and the Real World, Alex Zwerdling, one of 
the few critics to offer positive readings of Woolf’s realism, asks 
why this aspect of her work has been so largely ignored. By way of 
answer he suggests that one cause is the smokescreen Woolf her-
self created in her classic essay ‘Mr Bennett and Mrs Brown’.10 The 
quotation above from Linden Peach indicates that we should also 
include the other classic manifesto of modernist intent, ‘Modern 
Fiction’ as contributing to the misunderstanding. Peach’s comment, 
however, equally indicates that it may be critics themselves in their 
selective reading of these two seminal essays that have created the 
smokescreen, not Woolf herself. As Jacques Rancière points out, it 
is a mistake, made by Barthes and similar critics, to understand a 
modernist aesthetic as a rejection of world for word, as a move to 
self-referential textuality.11 Rather, Rancière argues, it is a new aes-
thetic regime, originating around the end of the eighteenth century, 
that opens up the text to the proliferating fl ood of people and things 
that constitute existence; a disorder that challenges the dominant 
hierarchical consensus.
Woolf’s two essays, ‘Modern Fiction’ and ‘Mr Bennett and Mrs 
Brown’ are so often and so confi dently cited as articulating the 
break of modernism with realism that it comes almost as a shock 
to realise that in them Woolf nowhere uses the words ‘realism’ 
or ‘realist’. The only terms of distinction she uses to characterise 
different conventions of novelistic writing are the ‘Edwardians’ 
and the ‘Georgians’, adding that the Edwardians, such as Bennett, 
Wells and Galsworthy, are ‘materialists’ while the Georgians, rep-
resented by the younger generation of Joyce, Lawrence and For-
ster, are ‘spiritual’ (Essays, 4.159, 161). She does, undoubtedly, 
express strong dissatisfaction with the novelistic aims of Bennett 
and his contemporaries to ‘embalm’ probability within a mass of 
factual detail, but this constitutes a criticism of what I suggest 
is actualist writing rather than realist. Indeed, in both essays she 
explicitly praises realists like Austen, Thackeray, Hardy, Chekov 
and Tolstoy. ‘Our quarrel [. . .] is not with the classics’, she says in 
‘Modern Fiction’ (Essays, 4.158).
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Woolf takes the oppositional terms ‘materialists’ and ‘spiritualists’ 
from her father’s usage. Leslie Stephen refers to materialists as those 
subscribing to the doctrine that matter is the ultimate reality, while 
spiritualists, he defi nes as those who believe that mind is the only 
reality.12 In other words, spiritualists subscribe to idealism, a mode 
of thought to which Woolf is largely hostile. In this she follows her 
father but equally she is engaging with the public debates and con-
tention of her own generation. This explains the ambivalence of her 
account of Joyce’s writing in ‘Modern Fiction’. Certainly, the famous 
injunction to ‘Look within’ seems to demand a shift of focus away 
from the material world of realist texts into the subjective states of 
consciousness that typify so much modernist fi ction (Essays, 4.160). 
The declaration in favour of interiority in ‘Modern Fiction’ is under-
mined, however, as the essay continues. She singles out James Joyce 
as pre-eminent among the younger generation of writers in being 
‘concerned at all costs to reveal the fl ickerings of that innermost 
fl ame’. He does ‘undoubtedly come so close to the quick of the 
mind’, she affi rms. Yet, she goes on, the experience of reading him is 
not one of imaginative expansion. Rather, there is a ‘sense of being in 
a bright yet narrow room, confi ned and shut in [. . .] centred in a self 
which, in spite of its tremor of susceptibility, never embraces or cre-
ates what is outside itself and beyond’ (Essays, 4.162, my emphasis). 
The fi nal sentence here constitutes the essential critique of idealism 
by opponents.
Woolf does, at times, although rarely, seem explicitly to reject real-
ist forms. In her positive review of Dorothy Richardson’s experimen-
tal stream-of-consciousness novel, The Tunnel (1919), she exclaims, 
‘We want to be rid of realism’ (Essays, 3.12). Yet, characteristically, 
the review constantly shifts position so that the viewpoint oscillates 
between seeming to yearn for the new while adhering to tradition. 
Although she welcomes Richardson’s ambitious experimental repre-
sentation of interiority, she also admits ‘the old method seems some-
times more profound and economical’ (Essays, 3.12). The review 
concludes with a plea that the new be fashioned into ‘the shapeli-
ness of the old accepted forms’ (Essays, 3.12). The implication of 
these oscillations of opinion that structure the review, seems to be that 
while a new generation of writers must be impatient with and criti-
cal of earlier forms of writing, they should retain, in some way, what 
is artistically powerful in the old. In her biography of Roger Fry, she 
says of him, ‘he could explain that it was quite easy to make the tran-
sition from Watts to Picasso; there was no break, only a continuation. 
[The post-impressionists] were only pushing things a little further’.13
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She also quotes Fry’s vigorous anti-idealism, ‘I elaborated a 
good deal on my empiricism [. . .] So the scientifi c spirit really 
had the last word and a great triumph over the abstractionists 
and metaphysicians’ (Fry, p. 268). Woolf does not, perhaps, seek 
a ‘great triumph’ over idealists but, as her critical comments on 
Bennett’s and Joyce’s writing suggest, she does believe that neither 
a wholly idealist nor a crudely materialist perspective is adequate 
for the writer. Rather, what is required is a disciplining balance 
of the two forces, as she explains in her essay on Turgenev. The 
great writer, like Turgenev, she claims in that essay, has that rare 
quality of being able to combine fact and vision, ‘[he] is never 
allowed to mount unchecked into the realms of imagination; 
again the observer pulls him back and reminds him of that other 
truth, the truth of fact’ (Essays, 6.11). In ‘Phases of Fiction’, she 
warns that the ‘two powers fi ght if they are brought into combi-
nation. The most complete novelist must be the novelist who can 
balance the two powers so that one enhances the other’ (Essays, 
5.83). As well as Fry, Woolf’s thinking here is undoubtedly infl u-
enced by Bertrand Russell’s assertion, in Mysticism and Logic, that 
the greatest achievements in human thought have been produced 
by a fusion of vision with empiricism.
Russell’s quarrel with idealism was part of a widespread public 
debate over the relative social, political and epistemological merits 
of idealism as opposed to empiricism. In this sense, Woolf was writ-
ing within a strikingly similar intellectual context to that of Austen 
at the end of the eighteenth century. By the 1870s, idealism was 
becoming a powerful force in British intellectual, cultural and politi-
cal circles. Publications by leading fi gures within the movement, like 
F. H. Bradley, T. H. Green and Bernard Bosanquet, offered a unifi ed 
spiritual account of self and world that was welcomed by those late 
Victorians reacting against what they saw as the aridity and materi-
alism of philosophies that had determined public thinking for much 
of the century: empiricism, utilitarianism and Darwinian natural-
ism.14 The idealists re-asserted the vertical hierarchy of spirit over 
matter, and gave priority to those concomitant virtues of reverence, 
obedience and duty towards authority and tradition. As idealists, 
they denied the possibility of a reality independent of mind, elevat-
ing purely rational sciences like mathematics over empirical obser-
vation. They propounded a revisionary theory of evolution, insisting 
that explanations of existence must necessarily move from higher 
forms of life down to the lower. It was impossible, they argued, 
for inferior matter to give rise to more elevated beings. For them, 
 Mrs Dalloway: The Spirit of Religion was Abroad  59
5215_Morris.indd   59 30/11/16   10:32 AM
60  Jane Austen, Virginia Woolf and Worldly Realism
evolution was the progress towards greater spiritual perfection and 
unifi cation of ideal self with ideal world.
British idealists attacked utilitarianism for purveying a notion of 
self as atomistic and of society as merely an aggregate. They argued 
that the individual has no reality but as part of the ideal organic 
unity that is the collective mind and will of the nation inherited 
down the generations. By subordinating themselves to the ideal 
of the state or nation, individuals become one with the common 
Good and the common Will that constitutes its and their perfec-
tion. This hierarchical view of society was expounded most fully 
in a highly infl uential essay by F. H. Bradley, entitled, ‘My Station 
and its Duties’. ‘We have found ourselves when we have found our 
station and its duties’, Bradley declares.15 In a later essay he asserts 
that a person’s best self consists for the greater part in ‘his loyalty, 
and according to the spirit, in performing his duties and fi lling his 
place as a member of a family, society and the state’ (Boucher, Brit-
ish Idealists, p. 103).
The thinking of the British idealists became infl uential across a 
wide range of political opinion during the early part of the twentieth 
century. Some of the major idealists like T. H. Green and Bernard 
Bosanquet were active fi gures in the fi elds of education, welfare 
and social policy. Many of their students from Oxford became 
prominent in public life.16 British idealist thinking constituted an 
important force in British life until at least the 1930s and remains 
an infl uential strand of thought within modern conservative under-
standing of public policy. Undoubtedly, the identifi cation of the 
mental with the spiritual, the mind with the Good, reinforces social 
class conservatism. It underpins a representational regime in which 
material indications of deprivation are transformed into symbols 
or symptoms of inner states, thereby losing their perceptibility as 
physical actuality. T. H. Green saw poverty as indicative of a moral 
defi ciency of character (Boucher and Vincent, British Idealism, 
p. 115). Bernard Bosanquet argued that poverty was a breakdown 
of the will (British Idealism, p. 118). State intervention to relieve 
hardship, therefore, could be deemed injurious in increasing feeble-
ness of character rather than self-reliance. If the fullest expression of 
the self was manifest in spiritual perfection, then the corollary cast 
those whose feebleness of will left them bereft of even the decencies 
of life into an underclass perceived as barely human. This represen-
tation of the poor as trapped by mental wretchedness shifts atten-
tion away from, renders imperceptible, those material inequalities 
of insanitary housing, endemic unemployment and chronic ill health 
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that actually determined the conditions of the labouring population 
in early twentieth-century Britain.
The philosophers G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell, both mem-
bers of the Bloomsbury group, published elaborate logical refuta-
tions of the idealists’ claim that there was no reality independent of 
mind.17 Bertrand Russell additionally extended his arguments into 
a comprehensive political critique. In Mysticism and Logic (1918), 
he begins by castigating idealism’s elevation of individual inward-
ness and denial of value to the shared material life of existence. 
Anyone who has experienced ‘absorption in an inward passion’, 
he suggests, has felt the strange sense of ‘unreality in common 
objects, the loss of contact with daily things’.18 In its assertion 
of the priority of the individualist mental realm, idealism passes 
over the thingness of the world as beneath notice; common objects 
that give substance to a shared common life are rendered effec-
tively imperceptible and insignifi cant. In Problems of Philosophy, 
Russell repeats this charge that idealism demotes from notice all 
that constitutes the material world. There is currently a widespread 
philosophical tendency, he claims, towards the view that ‘Man is 
the measure of all things, that truth is man-made [. . .] and that, if 
there be anything not created by the mind, it is unknowable and of 
no account to us.’19
This denigration of material life is frequently driven, Russell 
claims, not by rationality as idealists like to think but by ‘passion’. It 
is fl eshly distaste for the messiness of life that leads idealists to seek 
otherworldly perfection, whether mental or religious. A system of 
thought promising unity, harmony and coherence produces ‘a feeling 
of infi nite peace’, and such quietism goes along with an ‘absence of 
indignation or protest’ (Mysticism and Logic, p. 17). Social ills can 
be unnoticed or rendered inconsequential when perfection is sought 
in transcendence. There is a further, more active, danger present 
within idealist modes of thought, Russell asserts. The passion driv-
ing idealists is not only the desire for perfection, he argues, it is, not 
infrequently, the will for self-assertion and aggrandisement, the urge 
to impose self upon the world. What is claimed as knowledge in such 
cases, he says, is nothing ‘but a set of prejudices, habits and desires, 
making an impenetrable veil between us and the world’ (Problems, 
p. 93). This is precisely the folly of subjective idealism that Austen 
satirises throughout her fi ction. It is also the passion of the man of 
system who, Adam Smith warns, will seek to enforce his will upon 
others as if they are merely pieces upon a chess board.20 Idealist dis-
missal of empiricism ensures that inconvenient facts are excluded as 
 Mrs Dalloway: The Spirit of Religion was Abroad  61
5215_Morris.indd   61 30/11/16   10:32 AM
62  Jane Austen, Virginia Woolf and Worldly Realism
evidence against the system of thought. ‘A man who fi nds pleasure 
in such a theory of knowledge is like the man who never leaves the 
domestic circle for fear his word might not be law’, Russell declares 
(Problems, p. 93). Woolf takes this insight much further, suggesting 
that the will to impose authoritarian systems of belief is often domes-
tic tyranny writ large.
That Woolf shared much of Russell’s criticism of idealism is made 
clear in an extended passage near the beginning of Mrs Dalloway 
(1925), the novel in which she sets out to attack the ‘social system 
and to show it at work, at its most intense’.21 The word ‘system’ 
occurs frequently in anti-idealist critiques. In the passage in ques-
tion, the narrator offers an account of the thoughts and feelings of 
an unnamed fi gure, ‘an atheist perhaps’.22 The language and details 
provided are remarkably similar to those of Bertrand Russell. The 
‘solitary traveller’, as he is called, experiences what Russell terms 
an ‘inward passion’ as moments of ‘extraordinary exaltation’. These 
convince him that ‘Nothing exists outside us except a state of mind’ 
(p. 48).
That he is perhaps an atheist is Woolf’s way of suggesting that 
it is not only the conventionally religious who seek otherworldly 
perfection and unity; unbelievers, scientists and others can equally 
experience that desire. Typically, this impulse felt so strongly by the 
‘traveller’ in Mrs Dalloway is driven by distaste for actual fl eshly 
life, a desire for ‘something outside these miserable pigmies, these 
feeble, these ugly, these craven men and women’ (p. 48). In seeking 
relief from such unwanted realities, he reassures himself that if he 
can only ‘conceive’ of a solacing perfection, ‘then in some sort [it] 
exists’ (p. 48). He proceeds to imagine an idealised image of majestic 
womanhood, showering down ‘from her magnifi cent hands, com-
passion, comprehension, absolution’ (p. 49). Woolf is clearly having 
fun here at the expense of all those male thinkers who deify women 
as abstract virtues and ideals while frequently denying dignity and 
value to their actual material lives.
There is a darker irony also in that even while bestowing a 
kind of religious reverence upon abstractions like compassion and 
comprehension, the traveller is turning away from actual people 
as contemptible and beneath regard. Idealism disavows the mate-
rial conditions of human existence that could give substance to the 
values it claims to pursue. ‘Such are the visions’, the narrator com-
ments, ‘which ceaselessly fl oat up, pace beside, put their faces in 
front of, the actual thing [. . .] taking away [. . .] the sense of the 
earth’ (p. 49). No novelist is more aware of the actual thingness 
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of the world than Woolf, and in Mrs Dalloway things are repre-
sented as essential anchors holding the individual within shared 
social existence. But the ‘solitary traveller’ does not hanker for a 
shared, common world; his longing is to lose himself in a ‘general 
peace, as if [. . .] all this fever of living were simplicity itself; and 
myriad things merged in one thing’ (p. 49). This is desire for vision 
unchecked by fact.
Mrs Dalloway opens with a totally opposite view of ‘this fever of 
living’. We are presented with Clarissa Dalloway’s celebratory iden-
tifi cation of the pulsing energy of London streets with the vitality 
of life itself. City streets, in all of Woolf’s London novels, are repre-
sented as complex locations of multiple social forces. At the begin-
ning of Mrs Dalloway, they evoke a surging space of possibilities, a 
heterogeneous fl ood of people and things, vividly suggestive of the 
demotic realism that, Rancière claims, challenges the vertical orderli-
ness of classical representational modes. The ‘bellow and uproar’ of 
London makes audible as well as visible the teeming, random disor-
der of ‘carriages, motor cars, omnibuses, vans, sandwich men shuf-
fl ing and swinging; brass bands; barrel organs [. . .] the triumph and 
the jingle and the strange high singing of some aeroplane overhead’ 
(p. 4). This is a new regime of the perceptible, a seen and heard mate-
rial, horizontal, egalitarian continuity of being, the audibility of the 
common life.
Woolf’s writerly style is equally fl uid and inclusive, preferring 
non-subordinate conjunctions and constantly shifting perspectives. 
Yet, despite the motility of viewpoints, Woolf retains a third person 
narrator. She thereby reserves a space that is formally non-subjective 
to avoid the enclosure within subjective imagination that she criti-
cises in ‘spiritual’ writers like James Joyce. The narrator’s position, 
however, is never Olympian; it stays at the level of life in the streets. 
Woolf’s representation of self is equally open and fl uid. Sally Rosse-
ter’s exclamation that we are imprisoned in self and can only scrib-
ble on the walls of our separate private cells is treated ironically for 
its melodramatic egoism (p. 163). Clarissa Dalloway’s sense of self 
as metonymic is underwritten by Woolf’s own stylistic horizontal 
fl uidity. Travelling up Shaftesbury Avenue by bus, Clarissa explains 
that ‘she felt herself everywhere; not “here, here, here”; and she 
tapped the back of the seat; but everywhere [. . .] so that to know 
her, or any one, one must seek out the people who completed them; 
even the places [. . .] some woman in the streets [. . .] even trees, and 
barns’ (p. 129). This passage well illustrates the worldly realism of 
Woolf’s artistic imagination; it evokes the egalitarian perception of 
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a material continuity between self, social world, the world of things 
and the physical universe.
There are, however, forces represented in the text that are hostile 
to disorder and heterogeneity, forces that are intent upon imposing 
systems of discipline and conformity on any unregulated form of 
existence. It is salutary that immediately after she has exulted in 
the common life of the streets, Clarissa Dalloway encounters Hugh 
Whitbread with his government-stamped dispatch box and his mis-
sion to take his cowed wife ‘to see doctors’ (p. 5). Yet the streets 
themselves contain impulses that run contrary to diversity and 
nonconformity. Woolf uses the episode of the imposing car, with 
blinds drawn down, that gets stalled in Bond Street to illustrate a 
general willingness among people of all classes to coalesce emo-
tionally around idealised abstractions, and more especially around 
things metaphorically elevated into symbols of such abstractions. 
The mysterious car quickly becomes an object of veneration as the 
location of ‘greatness’, ‘the majesty of England’, ‘the enduring sym-
bol of the state’ (p. 14). Caught up in this sense of awe for a power 
beyond themselves, ‘faces which a second before had been utterly 
disorderly’ are stilled. The heterogeneity of those in the street is 
erased: ‘they had heard the voice of authority; the spirit of religion 
was abroad’ (p. 12).
Woolf’s mocking language to describe this mass emotional reli-
giosity – ‘mystery had brushed them with her wing’ – undoubtedly 
pokes fun at idealist veneration of a spiritual or mystical common 
will that binds people under the ‘voice of authority’ into a cohesive 
organic state. What the episode demonstrates is that reverential pas-
sion is easily triggered by something, as the text says, ‘so trivial’. The 
feeling, far from emanating from a communal best self, is merely 
irrational emotion sweeping through the crowd. Yet the effect is sin-
ister and threatening. Just as the car has blinds drawn to shut out 
the world beyond its privileged enclosure, so the passions aroused 
are blind to actuality: ‘the spirit of religion was abroad with her 
eyes bandaged tight and her lips gaping wide’ (p. 12). The urge of 
the crowd to become one with an imagined majesty and greatness is 
‘formidable’ the text concedes; the emotional fervour is dangerous 
to those so caught up but also to anyone perceived to dissent. The 
nationalist zeal aroused by the trivial incident of the car leads to 
xenophobic brawls in a public house and to a desire to sacrifi ce self 
‘in the cannon’s mouth’ (pp. 15, 16).
Not all of those infl uenced by a religious spirit of idealism are 
anonymous. Indeed Mrs Dalloway is peopled with characters who 
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are idealists. This takes a variety of forms but they all share a desire 
to impose a more orderly vision upon the imperfections of human 
existence. They seek to escape the ‘fever of living’ in a non-material 
realm. Doris Kilman’s religious faith, expressed in her fondness for 
metaphor, is perhaps the most traditional form of idealism (p. 110). 
She is drawn to the ‘bodiless’ light of Westminster Abbey as escape 
from ‘the infl iction of her unlovable body’ and all the pains of the 
fl esh, the anguish of the hates and loves of earthly life it brings 
upon her (pp. 103, 109). Part of the misery she suffers is at the 
hands of Clarissa Dalloway. Woolf uses their fraught relationship 
to illustrate the power of abstract ideas when they become visions 
or veils blocking out actuality. Clarissa fears Doris Kilman is steal-
ing her daughter’s affections and under the infl uence of that pas-
sion of jealousy the tutor becomes a fi gment of her hatred rather 
than a real person, so that when ‘the body of Miss Kilman was 
not before her, it overwhelmed her – the idea’ (p. 107). Clarissa, 
however, just as Woolf demands in her essay on Turgenev, brings 
the truth of metaphor into contact with the truth of fact. When she 
makes herself look at the actual embodied person, there is a com-
plete ‘dwindling of the monster’ (p. 107). Clarissa’s response to this 
shift from imprisoning idea to observed reality is to laugh at the 
comic mismatch of vision to fact.
The carnage of trench warfare leaves Septimus Warren Smith with 
an overwhelming repugnance for embodied life. He recoils in horror 
from ‘the sordidity of the mouth and the belly’ and the ‘fi lth’ of copu-
lation (p. 75). Yet Septimus is acutely sensitive to the materiality of 
the physical world, responding intensely and sensuously to the tex-
ture of sounds and sights. But he elevates these out of the horizontal 
realm of physical matter into a system of symbols to be interpreted as 
‘the birth of a new religion’ (p. 19). Sir William Bradshaw deems this 
a highly dangerous symptom, indicative of insanity, unaware appar-
ently of his own resort to metaphysics in worshipping the abstract 
Goddesses of Proportion and Conversion (pp. 84–5). Septimus’s 
poignant moment of release from metaphysical delusion is brought 
about by material things. To use Woolf’s terminology from the Tur-
genev essay again, Septimus stops interpreting and starts observing. 
He becomes a realist, shifting from the vertical metaphoric mode to 
the horizontal metonymic. ‘And so, gathering courage, he looked at 
the sideboard; the plate of bananas; the engraving of Queen Victoria 
and the Prince Consort; at the mantelpiece, with the jar of roses. 
None of these things moved. All were still; all were real’ (p. 120). 
Once grounded in this material thingness of actuality, he realises that 
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the voices of the dead that have been coercing him are nothing more 
than his own imposition of transcendent meaning upon mundane 
things like a curtain rustling, a mouse squeaking (p. 123). In this 
space of empiricism, recognising the comic incongruity of things as 
just things, Septimus, like Clarissa, begins to joke and laugh. ‘He had 
become himself then,’ Rezia thinks, ‘he had laughed then’ (p. 122). 
Contrary to idealism, self is produced in active relationship with the 
things that constitute a common daily life.
All of Woolf’s novels bring perceptibility to things. In Mrs Dal-
loway there are two kinds of things in particular that recur on 
almost every page: cars and fl owers. The two things are brought 
together at the start of the novel when Clarissa is in Miss Pym’s 
fl ower shop selecting blooms for her party. She is startled by ‘a 
violent explosion’ (p. 12). The noise comes from the car outside 
in Bond Street, but Woolf’s language links it metonymically with 
the violence of the fi rst fully mechanised world war. The exam-
ple of Septimus and of the idealist interpretations that passers-by 
so readily impose on the car, suggest that symbolic readings of 
these recurrent things in the text are best avoided. This is so, even 
though the description of Sir William Bradshaw’s opulent grey car 
with silver-grey rugs, is clearly intended to evoke the highly pres-
tigious Rolls Royce Silver Ghost and thereby point ironically to 
Bradshaw’s boasted concern with souls while actually enhancing 
his own wealth and power.
The extended series of references to cars and fl owers consti-
tute a metonymic structure connecting Woolf’s text dialogically to 
political, cultural and scientifi c forces in the world of 1920s Britain. 
Cars fi gure as metonymies for the whole transport revolution and 
increased mobility that constitute modernity. In 1924, the London 
Traffi c Act was passed in response to public debate and concern 
about the threat posed by the ever-increasing volume of traffi c on 
the streets of the capital. Mrs Dalloway contains references to every 
form of modern traffi c: not just cars but buses, taxis, vans, an ambu-
lance, a plane and the tube. Cars also serve as metonymies for the 
process of mass industrialisation, known metonymically as Fordism, 
which had become a determining force shaping the modern world. 
Methods of mass production also brought about transformation in 
means of warfare.
Flowers, understood metonymically as part of the whole biologi-
cal system of life, might seem to assert a deliberate textual opposi-
tion to industrial mechanisation. Yet in the 1920s, horticulture was 
being transformed by advances in biological sciences into a mass 
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production industry. Human biology and reproduction were equally 
becoming the focus of scientifi c ‘engineering’. Both industrial mech-
anisation and biological science were coming to be recognised as 
effi cient means of managing potentially troublesome populations. 
While the conformist spirit of religion was much abroad in pub-
lic rhetoric transposing material things like cars into symbols of 
abstract ideals, real politics was only too aware of the actual con-
tinuum of embodied selves, the social world and the physical uni-
verse. The two metonymies of cars and fl owers in Mrs Dalloway are 
thus much over-determined, they are ‘gatherings’ bringing together 
multiple intersecting networks of meaning.
Peter Walsh is another of the text’s idealists. Seeing the ambu-
lance carrying Septimus Warren Smith’s body, he thinks admiringly, 
with unwitting irony, that it is a symbol of ‘civilization’ which he 
associates with the further progressive-sounding abstractions of 
‘effi ciency’ and ‘organisation’ (p. 128). All these intangible ide-
als are substantiated for him by the busy yet orderly traffi c in the 
streets of London. In her representation of characters like Peter 
Walsh, Woolf suggests that the religiously infl ected idealism of her 
father’s generation is in process of shifting into the new discourses 
of science and progress. With his belief in the abstract concept of 
‘civilization’, Peter prides himself on his progressive idealism. His 
identifi cation of futuristic effi ciency and technology with a vision 
of glamorous and powerful modernity is illustrated as he stops to 
admire the ‘great motor cars’ through the plate-glass windows of a 
car sales room. ‘How many miles on how many gallons?’ he won-
ders (p. 41). Peter would have been at Oxford University when it 
was dominated by idealist thought and his approval of the ‘com-
munal spirit of London’ suggests his affi liation with idealist social 
organicism (p. 128). Although he was sent down from Oxford for 
being a Socialist, he yet complacently assumes, ‘with their love of 
abstract principle [. . .] the future of civilization lies in the hands of 
young men like that’ (p. 43).
Immediately following this self-congratulatory thought (if I can 
think it then it must in some sense exist), Peter sees a troop of 
working-class boys marching to the Cenotaph. The ‘weedy’, ill-
nourished condition of their physiques passes him unnoticed, a 
materiality rendered imperceptible within an idealist regime of rep-
resentation. To Peter, their faces appear stamped with those abstract 
principles of ‘duty, gratitude, fi delity, love of England’ (p. 43). It is 
‘a very fi ne training’, he thinks as they march by him. The princi-
ples he mentally imposes on the boys’ faces are precisely those that 
 Mrs Dalloway: The Spirit of Religion was Abroad  67
5215_Morris.indd   67 30/11/16   10:32 AM
68  Jane Austen, Virginia Woolf and Worldly Realism
British idealist F. H. Bradley invoked in his essay ‘My Station and 
its Duties’ as expressive of the best self. Yet Peter’s use of the term 
‘training’, here, indicates that it is the force of authority and disci-
pline that has wrought this effect, not any spiritual recognition of 
the Common Good. Indeed, the impersonal narrator makes explicit 
the subordination of particularity and diversity, whether of class or 
person, that underpins the pursuit of idealised national unity. It was 
‘as if one will worked legs and arms uniformly, and life, with its 
varieties, its irreticences, had been laid under a pavement of monu-
ments and wreaths and drugged into a stiff yet staring corpse by 
discipline’ (p. 44). Not only have the young men been put into uni-
form, they have been transformed from the heterogeneity of living 
beings into an almost mechanistic force. Their faces are ‘unmixed 
with sensual pleasure or daily preoccupations’, fl eshly life has been 
converted into the will of duty and conformity (p. 43).
Peter’s admiration for the ‘fi ne training’ of the working-class boys 
follows on from his admiration of the power and effi ciency of ‘great 
cars’. This suggests he would equally admire the kind of discipline 
that Henry Ford was imposing upon his industrial workforce in the 
name of effi ciency and organisation. Another group of marching men 
also appear in the novel. They are the unemployed seen by Elizabeth 
Dalloway (p. 117). By the 1920s, the end of military conscription 
was resulting in rising unemployment and increasing political and 
industrial unrest and protest. With military training at an end, the 
disciplinary regimes imposed by new mass production methods were 
looked to in the British press and in governing circles as an alterna-
tive means of inculcating a regulated and productive labour force, 
‘one will working arms and legs uniformly’, the body subordinated 
to the mind.
An article in The Times, in 1923, for example, the year in which 
Mrs Dalloway is set, advocated the adoption of Henry Ford’s 
methods to address the problem of the unruly poor in Britain.23 Ford 
also had many admirers within the growing Nazi party in Germany, 
including Adolph Hitler. He had opened his fi rst British car plant 
in Manchester in 1911, and by 1923 the Times estimated that the 
plant was selling 40,000 to 50,000 cars a year in Britain. What par-
ticularly appealed to British authorities, though, was the system-
atic and rigorous regime of discipline Ford imposed upon his work 
force. Not only did he resort to brutal strong-arm tactics to pre-
vent unionisation, he also employed a department of investigators 
to check that his employees were adhering to the strict standards of 
personal behaviour the company prescribed. These applied not only 
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while at work but also governed all aspects of behaviour outside the 
factory. Advocates of Ford’s industrial relations couched their argu-
ments in the abstract ideals of effi ciency, progress and productivity, 
but what they sought in material terms were docile working bodies 
disciplined to the regulated order of machinery. J. B. S. Haldane, a 
leading British scientist, asked in 1923 whether ‘the machine minder 
engaged on repetition work [is] the goal and ideal to which humanity 
is tending’.24 Antonio Gramsci described Ford’s production methods 
as ‘the biggest collective effort to date to create, with unprecedented 
speed, and with a consciousness of purpose unmatched in history, a 
new type of worker and a new type of man’.25
Mr Bentley is another idealist in Mrs Dalloway who admires 
machines as symbols of abstract values. This is, perhaps, unsurpris-
ing given the illustrious reputation of the Bentley car. Like Peter 
Walsh, the character of Mr Bentley also suggests that, by the 1920s, 
idealism was shifting its dominant location into the realm of science 
and visions of modernity. Not only does Mr Bentley see the plane 
over London as a symbol of human aspiration, of man’s desire to 
‘get outside his body [. . .] by means of thought’, the systems of 
thought he names are largely the abstract sciences: ‘Einstein, specu-
lation, mathematics, the Mendelian theory’ (p. 24). To many people 
in the early part of the twentieth century, Einstein’s theories seemed 
to offer conclusive scientifi c validation to idealism, since his work 
set out a fi eld of knowledge that could only be comprehended by 
the intellect and was not, it was claimed, susceptible to empiri-
cal verifi cation. The science of mathematics was expanding forms 
of knowledge derived entirely from closed-system abstract models 
of the sort that have come to dominate the present-day systems of 
macro-economics.
But why does Woolf include Mendelian theory in this list of 
speculative knowledge that Mr Bentley associates with the desire to 
leave the body for a realm of greater mental perfection? Mendel’s 
genetic work on pea plants in the 1860s only came to prominence 
in the early part of the twentieth century when the scientist William 
Bateson recognised the signifi cance of the work for agriculture. 
Bateson coined the term ‘genetics’ in 1905. He became director of 
the John Innes Institute, set up by a wealthy businessman of that 
name, who astutely recognised the vast commercial potential of the 
new science. The institute was soon at the forefront of international 
genetic research.
Bateson’s successor at the John Innes Institute was J. B. S. Haldane, 
whose radical politics and enjoyment of controversy ruffl ed the 
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establishment but ensured him a public platform. In 1923, the year 
in which Mrs Dalloway is set, as we have noted, Haldane delivered a 
widely-published lecture to the Heretics Society at Cambridge. One 
year later, Woolf read a version of ‘Mr Bennett and Mrs Brown’ to 
the Heretics. The title of Haldane’s paper, ‘Daedalus, or Science and 
the Future’, suggests a more questioning view of the ideal of intel-
lectual fl ight from material concerns than that of Mr Bentley in the 
novel. Haldane’s starting point was the horrifi c destructive power 
witnessed in the First World War which had largely been made possi-
ble by scientifi c knowledge. Despite this, Haldane expresses cautious 
optimism that scientifi c research would lead to signifi cant improve-
ment in human life. Yet it would not be Einstein’s theories that would 
achieve these benefi ts, he predicted. It would be advances in the sci-
ence of biology, in particular, genetic research, that would transform 
the conditions of future existence by its revolutionary progress in 
the fi elds of food production, human reproduction and the eradica-
tion of diseases (Daedalus, pp. 57–68). When Elizabeth Dalloway 
is stimulated by her exciting fi rst bus ride, to reject her mother’s 
traditional woman’s world and enter upon a career, her intention 
is to pursue this either in farming or medicine (p. 116). These were 
the fi elds of knowledge, agriculture and medicine, about to be 
radically transformed by Mendelian theory; the fi elds of genetic 
knowledge that Haldane believed would, in their turn, transform 
human life.
Throughout Mrs Dalloway there is an unobtrusive trail of ref-
erences to plant breeding, at times explicitly related to Darwinian 
theory. Clarissa’s aunt, old Miss Parry, who went botanising in 
Burma, was part of that generation, facilitated by imperial con-
quest, who scoured the world for exotic plants to enhance English 
estates. Her book on orchids was commended by Charles Darwin 
(p. 152). Sally Seten, who shocked Miss Parry by fl oating the heads 
of fl owers in bowls, turns up years later as Lady Rosseter who 
breeds ‘hydrangeas, syringas, very, very rare hibiscus lilies that 
never grow north of the Suez Canal’ (p. 161). Part of the social 
satire here is that the rebel Sally, who chopped off heads, now 
aspires, by means of her husband’s industrial wealth, to imitate 
the aristocratic pursuits she used to mock. Plant breeding, how-
ever, had become popularised since Miss Parry’s time. Peter Walsh 
elicits approval from fellow diners in his hotel simply because he 
asks for a specifi c breed of pear, a Bartlett (p. 135). The family he 
impresses, the two-car-owning Morrises (another non-coincidental 
name; Morris was an early British popular car company), have 
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travelled down from Leeds to attend the Westminster fl ower-show 
(p. 136). The many different kinds of fl owers in Miss Pym’s shop 
that, left to nature, would bloom at different seasons, also point 
to the commercialisation of plant breeding.26 Even Moll Pratt, a 
street fl ower seller, has bunches of roses, not the traditional vio-
lets, to sell. She is tempted to throw a bunch after the mysterious 
car, thinking the passenger may be the Prince of Wales (p. 16). 
The Prince’s mistress, the Countess of Warwick, aptly nick-named 
‘Daisy’, founded one of the fi rst agricultural colleges for women 
at Reading. It may perhaps be another aspect of Woolf’s humour 
with names in the novel that Peter Walsh’s most recent conquest is 
named Daisy!
The war imposed a pause on the popularisation, among all 
classes, of fl ower cultivation and breeding. The government encour-
aged patriotic gardeners to turn their land over to vegetable produc-
tion to help feed the nation. Royalty set an example by replacing 
the geraniums from the fl ower beds in front of Buckingham Palace 
with potatoes.27 The end of hostilities heralded a renewed burst 
of enthusiasm for fl ower cultivation. Civic and domestic displays 
of colour in public parks and gardens seemed appropriate to the 
general celebration of peace. The Chelsea Flower Show and other 
municipal ones reopened to showcase the latest plant species pro-
duced by large-scale commercial producers like Suttons. In 1923, 
the novelist, Marion Cran, began broadcasting radio’s fi rst garden-
ing programme (Uglow, Little History, p. 257). In Mrs Dalloway, 
post-war London is bright with fl owers, in public areas, in hanging 
baskets, and bought in large bunches as gifts (pp. 46, 56, 79, 88, 
97). The statue of Queen Victoria in front of the palace is again 
bedecked with geraniums (p. 16). Geraniums were, indeed, one of 
the earliest successes of plant hybridisation programmes.28
However, not all references in the text to improved breeding by 
scientifi c means, and certainly not those in public discourse out-
side the text, were so innocuous. Septimus Warren Smith looks 
forward to a world entirely changed ‘after all the toils of civiliza-
tion – Greeks, Romans, Shakespeare, Darwin’ (p. 57). Darwinian 
ideas clearly infl uence his religious vision of evolutionary improve-
ment in which dogs become men and fl esh melts from the body 
leaving only nerve fi bres. In Septimus’s madness Woolf dramatises 
the fusion of idealist religiosity with scientifi c modes of thought. 
Septimus repeatedly insists that his vision of future redemption of 
the fl esh, given only to him, must be understood ‘scientifi c[ally] 
above all things’ (p. 58). It is, he presumes, the effect of the heat 
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wave ‘operating upon a brain made sensitive by eons of evolution’ 
(p. 58). Public discourse in the non-fi ctional world of 1920s Brit-
ain was much pre-occupied with a redemptive vision of the future 
proffered by Social Darwinism, or, as it was increasingly called, 
eugenics. The rediscovery of Mendel’s work in the 1900s seemed to 
offer scientifi c credence to the project of Social Darwinism with its 
dream of human perfectibility. The Eugenic Society was formed in 
1907 and its journal, The Eugenic Review, in 1909. The movement 
mounted a high profi le public campaign in support of the Mental 
Defi ciency Act of 1913. Opponents of the Act described it as the 
fi rst attempt ‘in the scientifi c breeding of the poor’.29 As here, the 
language of the eugenics debate drew heavily upon the popularised 
scientifi c discourse of horticulture; it combined that with the other 
new discourse of mass production processes.
In the 1920s, the Eugenic Society raised the stakes by campaign-
ing for legislation that would permit the voluntary mass sterilisation 
of the feeble-minded poor. In addition to utilising the familiarised 
discourses of breeding and mass production, proponents of eugen-
ics also made use of emotive abstractions such as ‘Civilisation’, 
‘Nation’ and ‘Nature’, invariably capitalised, to impart a sense of 
threat to the physical integrity of national identity. On 20 June 
1922, The Times printed a review entitled ‘Civilization’s Danger. 
The Revolt of the Underman’. The author of the reviewed book, The 
Revolt against Civilization, was American journalist and eugenicist, 
Lothrop Stoddard. The Times quotes him as warning that ‘racial 
misfi ts’ and ‘the congenitally unfi t’ would seek to destroy what they 
cannot understand, namely the superior, more intelligent classes. 
On 21 October 1922, The Times reported the speech of William 
Inge, Dean of St Paul’s Cathedral, to the Society of Medical Offi cers 
of Health. To the cheers of his audience, Inge declared it mistaken 
philanthropy to allow those to survive whom Nature ‘might have 
preferred to die [. . .] The only way to eliminate [some diseases] 
was to discourage the propagation of infected stocks.’ Similarly, 
on 18 January 1922, an article in The Times declared ‘We may not 
agree on what is “best” but we can agree that the mental defective, 
the blind, the dumb are not the “best” and we can largely limit our 
production of them.’
In Mrs Dalloway, fi gures from the lowest stratum of social life 
appear fl eetingly but recurrently at the margins of the narrative. 
They represent an encroaching otherness at the perimeter of the 
privileged community of those deemed the superior, more intelli-
gent classes. From the woman who sits drinking in a doorway, to 
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the pub brawl with broken glasses, to Moll Pratt selling fl owers, 
to Mrs Dempster with her knobbed lumps for feet, to the seedy-
looking unemployed man at St Paul’s, to the battered woman at 
the tube station, to the superfl uous youth Lady Bruton intends to 
ship abroad, to the costermongers and prostitutes harassed by the 
police, to the female vagrant Richard Dalloway smiles at, to the 
unemployed men noticed by Elizabeth Dalloway, to the shindy of 
brawling women, all of these fi gures are perceived as troublesome 
or threatening to social order (pp. 4, 15, 16, 23, 24, 69, 93, 98, 99, 
117, 139). Many of these unruly characters are women. One of the 
emotive anxieties driving support for the Mental Defi ciency Act was 
the belief that feeble-minded women were invariably promiscuous, 
hence responsible for the increased breeding of defective children. 
After the Act was passed any poor, unsupported woman suspected 
of sexual misconduct was liable to be judged mentally defective 
and as such institutionalised for life. In the novel both Clarissa and 
Richard Dalloway express concern about the welfare of vagrant 
women they notice in the streets (pp. 4, 99). Clarissa is sure they 
cannot be dealt with by Acts of Parliament.
In the text there are idealists who fi nd the messiness of unreg-
ulated fl eshly life repugnant, especially that of ‘miserable pigmies, 
these feeble, these ugly, these craven men and women’ (p. 48). For 
Peter Walsh, the discipline imposed upon the troop of weedy youths 
converts their ugly feebleness into an image of patriotic nobility. 
In the 1920s world of Britain beyond the text, feeble, ugly life was 
repeatedly associated with vagrants, prostitutes, the mentally defi -
cient, the poor, the insane, homosexuals and the racially degener-
ate. Psychiatrists were closely involved in public debates, campaigns 
and legislation concerning mental defi ciency, vagrancy and insanity, 
categories which lacked any clear dividing distinctions. In the early 
twentieth century there was unease among psychiatrists that their 
professional discipline lacked the prestige of other branches of medi-
cine.30 As part of their campaign to raise their social and professional 
status, psychiatrists had a vested interest in working with govern-
ment and legislators. Their science, they claimed, offered objective 
knowledge of mental disorder and their theory-based practice the 
means to control those whose defi ciencies posed a threat to the com-
mon good of the nation.
In Mrs Dalloway, Sir William Bradshaw is gratifi ed to be seen in 
consultation with those in power. With his worship of the Goddess 
of Proportion, Bradshaw is undoubtedly the most sinister idealist in 
the text. He ruthlessly feeds his desire for power by forcing all those 
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who fall into his hands to submit to his authority, including his own 
wife. Once she had caught salmon freely, but ‘quick to minister to 
the craving, which lit her husband’s eye so oilily for dominance’, 
she had ‘gone under’ (p. 85). Bradshaw is one of those frightening 
types of idealist, as described by Bertrand Russell, who insists their 
word is law. In Mrs Dalloway and elsewhere in her fi ction, Woolf 
represents this bullying insistence upon conformity as a coercive con-
tinuum from the domestic sphere to the public and political domains. 
In Mrs Dalloway, this desire for domination is termed ‘Conversion’, 
sister goddess to Proportion. It is a force that ‘feasts on the wills of 
the weakly, loving to impress, to impose, adoring her own features 
stamped on the face of the populace’ (p. 85).
Some such submissive process as this is illustrated in the rapt faces 
of the youths that Peter Walsh admires and in the faces, transfi xed 
with veneration, of those who behold the large car as symbol of ‘the 
majesty of England’. While the aim is to impose conformity of will 
upon the populace, the force of Conversion is equally ready to ‘smite 
out of her way roughly the dissentient, or dissatisfi ed’ (p. 85). Clar-
issa Dalloway, who insists she would never try ‘to convert anyone’, 
feels instinctively that Bradshaw is ‘capable of some indescribable 
outrage – forcing your soul’ (pp. 107, 157). ‘Conversion’ is primarily 
a religious term; it is to renounce the world for the spirit, to subdue 
the body for the sake of the soul. Woolf’s choice of the word suggests 
the intolerant and fanatical zeal with which those like Bradshaw 
seek to force upon others their systems of belief, whether secular or 
religious. It points, also, to the idealist desire to transform the dis-
ordered imperfection of embodied life into a docile unity of conform-
ing souls or wills, into what could be thought of euphemistically as 
the common Good.
Septimus Warren Smith also has religious visions of a brave new 
world in which fl esh has melted away leaving only the nerves or will. 
It is a religion that, he insists, is based upon science above all. It is 
his duty, he believes, to communicate his knowledge to the Cabinet 
(p. 57). Sir William Bradshaw, ‘priest of science’, shares that vision 
of fl esh brought under control of the will (p. 80). The parallels 
between Septimus’s insane delusions and the social visions of Brad-
shaw are deliberate, yet there is an important difference. Bradshaw 
seeks to impose his subjective prejudices as objective knowledge just 
as Bertrand Russell accused idealists of doing. Unlike Septimus, but 
like leading idealists in the real world, Sir William has access to the 
Cabinet and the legislative means to impose his will on all those 
who are in any way disempowered and vulnerable. ‘There was no 
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alternative. It was a question of law’, he says relentlessly to Septimus 
(p. 82). Yet while his rhetoric is that of the irresistible authority of 
science and law that have ‘made England prosper’, his methods are 
the technologies of eugenics, practised upon the fl esh. He ‘secluded 
[. . .] lunatics, forbade childbirth, penalised despair, made it impos-
sible for the unfi t to propagate their views’ (p. 84). Such measures 
are justifi ed by his ‘scientifi c’ belief that all ‘unsocial impulses [are] 
bred more than anything by lack of good blood’ (p. 86).
For Woolf, any form of subjectivity or system of beliefs that 
avoids confrontation with the materiality of bodies and things 
risks succumbing to a will to power: the attempt to impose prej-
udices and passions upon others in the name of ‘higher’ values. 
In Mrs Dalloway she demonstrates the paradoxical regime of the 
perceptible that holds idealism in place. On the one hand, idealist 
rhetoric, whether of the nation’s common Good or of the ratio-
nal power of science and progress, depends upon the metaphorical 
functioning that allows things to provide tangibility to abstrac-
tions like nation, duty, civilisation. On the other, idealist emphasis 
upon the ‘will’ as the defi ning value of self and nation renders 
inconsequential, beneath notice, the physical suffering and damage 
infl icted on embodied persons and population by the brutalities of 
war, poverty and legalised coercion.
Elizabeth Hamilton, living through factional post-Revolutionary 
politics, suggested that the factitious self frequently shores up its pre-
carious idea of self by imaginative identifi cation with the nation or 
a system of values. Any challenge, criticism or perceived harm to 
these mental projections that enlarge and empower the idea of self 
will be experienced as a threat to the self’s very existence. Woolf 
similarly suggests that those enjoying class privilege and power are 
wholly unable to distinguish between self and an ideal of the nation 
that sustains and refl ects back their own imaginary ‘best self’. Not 
surprisingly, anything or person that does not subscribe to the regu-
lated homogeneity of that imaginary order has to be either excluded 
or compelled to conform. Peter Walsh excludes from the civilised 
effi ciency that he imagines is England the otherness that he terms 
the chaos of India. There are moments when ‘civilization’ seems 
to him ‘a personal possession’ as, too, does ‘pride in England’ (p. 
47). Lady Bruton’s glorifi cation of a mythic England of Shakespeare 
energises her ruthless drive to exclude, by means of emigration, ‘the 
superfl uous youth of our ever-increasing population’. This project 
has become an ‘object round which the essence of her soul is daily 
secreted’ (p. 92). It is for her a ‘sublime conception’, an abstract idea 
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in other words, but one which she, nevertheless, intends to impose 
upon those whom she never conceives as actual people with particu-
lar lives, hopes and incongruities. Her term ‘superfl uous’ precisely 
registers the idealist regime of the perceptible in which those without 
status are denied the right even to material existence.
British idealists were accused by their critics of justifying the 
subordination of the subject to an ideal of the state as a spiri-
tual unity. Instead of the horizontal mobility and heterogeneity 
of space, as Woolf represents London, with its democratic blare 
and uproar, idealists desire a controlled and bounded place struc-
tured vertically by lines of obedience to rank and duty, just as the 
clocks of Harley Street counsel ‘submission, upheld authority, and 
pointed out in chorus the supreme advantages of a sense of pro-
portion’ (p. 87). The many idealists in the text of Mrs Dalloway 
do not by any means share the same vision of order, even though 
they all desire the imposition of the will upon what they see as the 
waywardness of physical being. The object of Woolf’s attack is 
not any one specifi c school of idealism or even on any one form of 
social or political tyranny underwritten by it. Rather her critique 
is aimed at idealism as a pervasive ideological structure, sustaining 
a regime of the perceptible that allows visibility to the mass of the 
population only at the price of disciplined conformity. In just this 
way, Peter Walsh screens out from his view of the marching boys 
evidence of their malnutrition, seeing only disciplined uniformity. 
The novel suggests, moreover, that idealist systems of thought fol-
low the discourses of power. From the moral and religious con-
ceptions of the state and the self that dominated Woolf’s father’s 
late Victorian world, idealism, with its zealous spirit of religion, 
has moved into those modern forms of knowledge that operate 
from an Olympian perspective. From that disembodied distance, 
heterogeneity and diversity can be homogenised into a mass, or be 
conceptualised into abstract regularity.
In opposition to that imposed conformity from above, Woolf’s 
writing fl uidity offers a common horizontal world teeming with peo-
ple and things. Only a democratic regime of the perceptible, as a 
shared world in which everyone and everything is visible and heard, 
can create a dissensus that resists totalising systems of thought. It is 
the non-reverent, secular, non-vertical visibility of a comic incongru-
ity, so often prevailing between the vision and the fact, that allows 
monsters to be destroyed by laughter before the idea or abstraction 
takes substance through infl iction upon actual bodies. As Woolf 
argues in her essays, the idea must always be brought back to the 
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truth of empirical fact. Mrs Dalloway suggests there are hugely 
crucial political imperatives at stake in this necessary adherence to 
empiricism. This is the insight underlying her aesthetic practice of 
worldly realism. The metonymic structures and stylistics of Mrs Dal-
loway enact an egalitarian recognition of the multiple interdependent 
force fi elds constituting self, social structures, things as ‘gatherings’ 
and the physical world. Her inclusive aesthetic lays bare the brutal 
coercion of ‘the social system at its most intense’. Equally, it consti-
tutes a radical dissensus to the authoritarian vertical regime of the 
perceptible imposed by idealist ideology.
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Part II
Nation and Universe
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Chapter 3
Emma: A Prospect of England
Emma (1815) is one of those literary works which can seem to exist 
within the timeless glow of its own perfection. For many readers, 
Emma’s world evokes an ideal of England. Of all Austen’s novels 
it is perhaps the one that most lends itself to what Roger Sales 
calls the promotion of a ‘particular idea of Englishness’.1 The ‘asso-
ciation between Austen and Englishness is currently a very strong 
one’, he says. The perception of timeless, quintessential national 
values is, however, an illusion largely imposed on Austen’s text by 
an idealist regime of interpretive practice. Rather than depicting a 
pastoral England that never was, Emma is a novel that proclaims, 
from its very fi rst page, the inevitability of change. As in Sense and 
Sensibility, this process is enacted as a shift away from the settled 
order of inherited place to the motility of social space. A vertical 
regime of the proper gives way to horizontal recognition of those 
previously regarded as below notice. Again, as in the earlier novel, 
the focus of change is a young woman, Emma Woodhouse. The 
transition that Emma makes in the novel continues Austen’s social 
critique of subjective idealism, as an imposition of self upon the 
world. Equally, the narrative trajectory explores the changing iden-
tity of the English nation, challenging the consensual acceptance 
of hierarchical social exclusiveness with the possibility of greater 
horizontal inclusivity.
Questions as to the proper nature of social relations and political 
settlements were central concerns within eighteenth-century British 
Enlightenment. Austen was rooted in that interrogative mode of think-
ing but she was writing in the aftermath of the French Revolution, 
and, importantly, after the publication of Edmund Burke’s infl uential 
Refl ections on the Revolution in France (1790). Burke’s romantic ideal-
ism produced a powerfully imagined vision of an immemorial England, 
sustained by hierarchical traditions of patrician and religious ideals. 
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National sentiment, Burke claimed, is nurtured in the small ‘platoon’ of 
childhood and that early reverence for local attachments expands and 
cements the ties of gratitude, benevolence and obedience that secure the 
unity of the nation.2 This ideal appealed powerfully to public reaction 
and anxiety in the wake of the Revolution and has retained a central 
place ever since in conservative concepts of English national identity.3
A sense of privileged English destiny was much enhanced dur-
ing the time Austen was writing Emma by the defeat of Napoleon 
in 1814 and the conclusion of a quarter of a century of continen-
tal wars. It was a momentous event. It requires an act of historical 
imagination now to comprehend what the removal of that constant 
threat to national safety must have felt like at the time to all shades 
of public opinion. The Edinburgh Review expresses something of 
the immense relief to people’s spirits and the sense of renewed social 
possibilities for the nation when it speaks of ‘the enchanting prospect 
of long peace and measureless improvement’ at last opening up.4 The 
journal goes on, this scene that has ‘burst on our view’ has arrived 
‘like the balmy air and fl ushing verdure of late spring after the dreary 
chills of a long and interminable winter’.
The Edinburgh plays here upon both the literal meaning of the 
word ‘prospect’ as an expansive view of English landscape and the 
metaphorical elevation of this primary, material sense into a mental 
image of some future possibility or hope. It thus operates across the 
matter−mind, empiricist−idealist dualism. ‘Prospect’ is also a word 
that resonates in the text of Emma, articulating its thematic concern 
with processes of transformation, the movement from the fi xture of 
‘here’ to an emergent or possible ‘there’, from the vertical order of 
metaphor to the horizontal movement of metonymy. In particular, 
there is a striking use of the term, prospect, in which Austen, too, 
plays across the material and metaphoric meanings. Her imagery 
and language are not only similar to that used in the Edinburgh 
Review, they also trace, at Emma’s personal level, the same emo-
tional transformation of hopeless stasis into delighted possibilities 
of ‘measureless improvement’. The moment of release from the 
paralysis of misery occurs when Emma’s spirits are at their lowest as 
she contemplates the closing off of her future due to her own class 
arrogance and blindness. ‘The prospect before her was threatening 
[. . .] Hartfi eld must be comparatively deserted; and she left to cheer 
her father with the spirits only of ruined happiness.’5 The physi-
cal prospect outside offers added gloom ‘with cold, stormy rain’ 
and a ‘despoiling’ wind (p. 459). Yet the following morning, with 
the wind changed into a softer quarter, ‘it was summer again’ and 
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the view of the garden warm and brilliant. Emma is experiencing 
bodily release from physical enclosure even as Mr Knightley makes 
an unexpected appearance that will totally transform her hopes for 
expansive change (p. 362).
The celebratory spirit marking the end of the Napoleonic wars 
gave powerful impetus to popular rhetorical representations of 
England as a united community or family, but these imagined identi-
ties were always politically infl ected. Two opposing ideas of national 
identity struggled for legitimacy of representation. The conservative 
Gentleman’s Magazine rejoiced that bread, meat and drink were so 
distributed that in every town and almost every village, people were 
able to participate ‘in the general joy and to keep the feast of peace, 
as one united family’.6 The naturalising image of nation as a fam-
ily constitutes the country as a benign organic hierarchy. Patronage 
of the poor by the rich, in the form of food and drink, was seen by 
conservatives as engendering those feelings of gratitude and benevo-
lence that cemented the bonds of social unity. Within this ideal of 
nationhood, the privilege of rank and its bestowal of favours were 
viewed as essential for the maintenance of civility, cultivation and 
social order. In 1814, for example, the Gentleman’s Magazine pub-
lished a letter deprecating the violent changes that had occurred to 
the internal structure ‘of ranks in old England’.7 As the nostalgic ref-
erence to ‘old England’ suggests, the writer is hostile to what he sees 
as the growing importance of commerce and the City fostered by 
the administration of William Pitt. The new men, the writer claims, 
have ‘ousted the old Country gentlemen [. . .] and shoved them 
into insignifi cance’. Another writer to Gentleman’s Magazine even 
blamed a rise in suicide on ‘this attempt to overthrow the bounds 
of society that have hitherto kept ranks of society distinct, and to 
confound and mix all that ought to have been kept separate’.8 Those 
who feared such social and political confusion tended to look to 
Edmund Burke’s powerful advocacy of rank and deference as the 
only sure foundation of national identity and as bulwark against 
social anarchy.
Not all imaginings of the nation as a unity were so opposed to 
change. As the Edinburgh Review claimed, peace brought with it 
possibilities of ‘measureless improvements’. Progressive opinion wel-
comed the ending of war as offering the opportunity for a widening 
of participation in the public and political activities that, in effect, 
constituted a more inclusive ideal of national identity. In British 
Society 1680–1880, historian Richard Price writes, ‘The French 
Revolution allowed the unthinkable to be imagined in politics. 
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It was for this reason that from the 1790s the boundaries of the 
politically (and socially) possible were continually tested and 
stretched.’ The revolution, Price argues, put reform irrevocably on 
the agenda, ‘largely because the French Revolution had extended 
the possibilities for the role of “the people” in the political nation’.9 
The question of who was recognised within perceptions of England 
as a nation became a matter of contestation. It was a moment of 
potential dissensus, to use Jacques Rancière’s term, when Burke’s 
vertical exclusivity of rank was challenged by an emergent hori-
zontal regime making visible and audible those formerly regarded 
as beneath notice.10 The Liberal Edinburgh Review, for example, 
argued that the whole revolutionary period had demonstrated that 
national prosperity and security rest upon ‘expressing and giving 
effect to the general sense of the community’.11 The question of 
Catholic emancipation much debated in the public sphere during 
1813 was also expressed, by those in favour of reform, as encourag-
ing ‘expanded affections which embrace the whole community in 
one system of fair and equal legislation, by which the several parts 
of the social body shall be as it were amalgamated into an harmoni-
ous whole’.12
Both the above quotations are implicitly drawing upon a 
widely recognised sense that a literate public opinion had devel-
oped rapidly during the latter part of the eighteenth century and 
was continuing to extend its social boundaries. This expand-
ing community of the informed and literate, ‘the people’, was a 
strengthening presence within national life. In Emma, the young 
tenant farmer, Robert Martin, provides a fi ctional illustration of 
the new class of citizen. Emma dismisses Robert Martin as having 
nothing to do with the public realm of books although he is actu-
ally well-informed and well-read. Emma’s initial response, here, 
in refusing to ‘notice’ Martin, voices the traditional regime of the 
perceptible in which those of lower rank are rendered mute and 
invisible within a tightly-circumscribed, elite perception of who 
constitutes England.
Nevertheless, in the real world, despite reactionary views like 
those of Emma, there were increasing voices in the public sphere, 
warning of the damaging effects of patronage as the dominant 
form of social relations. Critics argued that rather than maintain-
ing national stability, patronage was exerting a deadening infl uence 
on the country’s energies, holding back necessary change. In early 
1814, the Monthly Review, a moderate liberal journal, was rehears-
ing the evils of government by patronage.13 Maria Edgeworth 
5215_Morris.indd   86 30/11/16   10:32 AM
contributed to this critical discourse in her novel appropriately titled 
Patronage (1814), which contrasts the fortunes of two families, one 
relying only on their own energetic endeavours and the other rest-
ing upon hope of infl uence. A reviewer in the Edinburgh Review 
explained that the book offered ‘a picture of miseries resulting from 
a dependence on Patronage, in every form and degree, and through-
out every station in society’.14 The strongest critics of patronage and 
privilege were those advocating the ideology of competitive indi-
vidualism. They were, in effect, the spokespeople for the aspiring 
middle class. The pernicious effects of infl uence are also at the cen-
tre of Emma, and Austen, like Edgewood, sees patronage as damag-
ing those who bestow favour as much as those who are recipients. 
Nevertheless, Austen’s representation is more nuanced in terms of 
social class. Austen recognises that patronage was a source of infl u-
ence and power that many of the middle class were willing, even 
eager, to exploit in their own interests.
As this suggests, it is a mistake to understand the confl ict between 
traditional values like patronage and the new competitive ethos 
of individualism in unambiguous binary terms of old ruling elite 
against new commercial middle class. The main aim of the aspiring 
middle class was elevation into the elite, to become part of those 
recognised as the perceptible nation. Richard Price argues that, 
‘Competition and convergence describe the relationship between 
the middling classes and the patriciate. It is helpful [. . .] to imagine 
middle-class consciousness as a spectrum bounded at one end by 
emulation of the landed elite and at the other end by competition 
with its styles and politics’ (British Society, p. 311). In particular, 
Price claims, the middle class consolidated its hegemonic visibility 
and audibility by emulating and competing in the assertion of eco-
nomic, cultural and social patronage. One of the main locations in 
which the middle class was able to challenge the traditional elite 
in the exercise of infl uence and patronage was within the cultural 
realm demarcated as taste. Taste is a pre-eminent means of render-
ing status visible. The other sphere of competition was patriotism. 
Any real or perceived threat to the nation was seized upon as an 
oratorical and practical opportunity to display public patriotism. 
Middle-class women vied with aristocratic ladies in proclaiming 
loyalty as English women.
During the early years of the nineteenth century, there was indeed 
plenty to alarm even those less timid than Mr Woodhouse as to 
the precariousness of social order. Luddism was still a threat, and 
a series of bad harvests had exacerbated the hunger and suffering 
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of the poor, resulting in bread riots, attacks upon property, and an 
increase in burglary and housebreaking. Even those living in unaf-
fected areas of the country could have their fears aroused by the fre-
quent reports of law-breaking and disorderliness in the lower classes 
that featured prominently in all the daily, weekly and monthly jour-
nals.15 In 1811, the Gentleman’s Magazine carried an appeal to the 
Women of England to concern themselves with the plight of the 
poor by teaching the bible, presumably with the aim of preserving 
deference.16 Emma certainly concerns herself with helping the poor, 
but the emphasis is upon her practical administration to physical 
needs and well-being rather than to their minds or souls. She also 
inadvertently benefi ts when Mr Woodhouse’s fear of housebreaking 
persuades him to look more favourably on the change her marriage 
will bring.
The opening paragraphs of the novel, however, play not upon 
threats of disorder, but upon fairy-tale motifs that evoke an arrested, 
spell-bound world. Emma is the youngest daughter, her mother died 
while she was still a child, and like all princesses she is handsome, 
clever and imperious. Her doting father allows her full sway over 
their small kingdom or platoon, to borrow Burke’s term. Yet the 
language hints that the stasis of this select community is precarious. 
The use of the conditional ‘seemed’ in the fi rst sentence hints that the 
idyllic existence may lack reality. This suggestion is reinforced three 
paragraphs later by the deictic phrase ‘at present’. Even more than 
Austen’s recurrent use of ‘now’ in her narratives, ‘at present’ fore-
grounds temporality, the inevitable progression from past through to 
future. ‘At present’ evokes simultaneously the apparent immediacy 
of the moment and its ephemeral span.
Hartfi eld can be read metaphorically as symbolising those 
national values, revered by Burke, of tradition, stability, fi xture 
and civility. In the terms set out by Michel de Certeau, Hartfi eld is 
a ‘place’ as opposed to a ‘space’. A place, de Certeau suggests, is 
ruled by the law of the proper.17 ‘Place’ implies stability, boundar-
ies and order. By contrast, space is composed of intersections of 
mobile elements. While the former is viewed rather in the manner 
of a completed tableau, the latter exists largely as an experience of 
movement. In the novel, Hartfi eld is perceived by all the charac-
ters as a small world existing under the inviolable law of regularity 
and fi xity. Geographically, socially and mentally it exists complete 
within the boundaries of its own self-suffi ciency. Although Hart-
fi eld ‘did really belong’ to Highbury − the language again signals 
reluctance by its inhabitants to accept that reality – it is separated 
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from the town by extensive lawns and shrubberies, another hint of 
Sleeping Beauty seclusion (p. 5).
Mr Woodhouse is the almost caricatured representation of all 
of Hartfi eld’s time-resisting values. He hates the idea of matrimony 
because it is the origin of change. He is correct about this in that 
marriage alliances are the nexus of money and property transac-
tions, of status and power relations, and of generational move-
ment of past to future. The transformation of Miss Taylor into Mrs 
Weston not only introduces change into Hartfi eld, it also signifi es 
the possibility of movement across divisions of rank, as formerly 
dependent governess becomes wife of property-owning Mr Weston. 
Not surprisingly then, perhaps, the marriage provides the catalyst 
which sets in motion, directly or indirectly, all the other changes and 
social reconfi gurations in the narrative.
Emma, too, is set fi rmly against change. She is resolute in her 
determination not to marry. ‘I cannot really change for the better’, 
she tells Harriet with wonderfully unknowing irony (p. 90). For 
most of the story she is adamant as to the importance of maintain-
ing a fi xed social hierarchy, a wholly vertical ordering in which only 
the speech and visibility of the higher classes are deemed worthy of 
notice. Emma’s language echoes that of conservatives in the pub-
lic sphere of the day. ‘One should be sorry to see greater pride or 
refi nement in a teacher of a school’ she asserts (p. 58). Her immedi-
ate negative assumption is that Robert Martin and his family are 
intent on climbing out of their lower-class invisibility (p. 27). As 
this suggests, she views any mixed social interaction as occasioning 
risk of irregularity, insubordination and transgression of the proper. 
Even Frank Churchill displeases her with his ‘indifference to a con-
fusion of rank, [that] bordered too much on inelegance of mind’ 
(pp. 213–14). Emma maintains a social distance around herself no 
less than the physical separation of lawns and shrubbery. Her lan-
guage suggests an almost visceral fear that contact with the socially 
unrecognised will contaminate the integrity of her sovereign self. 
Her ‘horror [. . .] of falling in with the second rate and third rate 
of Highbury’ is such that she ‘seldom went near them’ (p. 165). To 
fall from privileged eminence is to lose perceptibility in the mass of 
undistinguished others.
Hartfi eld, then, as a place, symbolises a regime of vertically 
regulated order, and absolute, unchanging values. Highbury, by 
contrast, can be understood horizontally as a space of possibility 
and change, brought about by chance meetings, empirical contigu-
ity and unregulated social interaction. Harriet bumps into Robert 
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Martin and his sister when she is sheltering from the rain in Ford’s 
shop. Jane Fairfax is seen by Mr John Knightley as she goes to the 
post-offi ce to forestall any letter from Frank Churchill (p. 316). 
Highbury, a ‘populous village’, in the process of becoming a town 
(p. 5), can be seen as a synecdoche for a changing England. It is a 
space in which social boundaries are porous and social relations 
largely governed by reciprocity rather than patronage. In particular, 
the continual circulation of gossip in Highbury constitutes a space 
in which identity is understood as primarily social rather than pri-
vate and in which truth is dispersed into an interactive multiplicity 
of viewpoints.
It is worth noting that Emma’s hatred of Highbury gossip is not 
because it is in any way malicious, but because it fl ows horizontally 
violating her strict sense of vertical social divisions. It takes liber-
ties in other words. Highbury gossip can be thought of in terms of 
what Rancière calls the garrulous muteness of previously inconse-
quential social life to which democratic realism gives voice. The text 
offers an intriguingly modern image of the nation as a larger version 
of an interactive community brought into being through a continu-
ous, horizontal circulation of news, gossip and shared consciousness. 
‘The post-offi ce is a wonderful establishment,’ Jane Fairfax declares, 
‘The regularity and dispatch of it! [. . .] So seldom that a letter among 
the thousands that are constantly passing about the kingdom, is ever 
carried wrong’ (p. 320). John Knightley, in agreeing, attributes the 
effi ciency and capacity of the system to the fact that it serves and 
is paid for by ‘the public’, the new, anti-hierarchical force in post-
revolutionary politics.
Another way of reading the contrast of values between Hartfi eld 
and Highbury is that of the Enlightenment opposition between 
idealism and materialism, continuing Austen’s critique of the for-
mer mode of thought. Throughout Emma, recurrent distinctions 
are drawn between body or person, terms used synonymously, and 
mind. Mr Woodhouse is introduced as a valetudinarian, inactive in 
‘mind or body’ (p. 5). Emma fi nds little elegance of ‘person or of 
mind’ in Highbury, while Mr Elton is deemed by its inhabitants to 
be perfection ‘both in person and mind’ (pp. 179, 187). Even more 
frequent than these dualistic references in the text is the recurrence 
of the word ‘idea’. Many of the characters speak of having an idea 
but Emma does so most of all. She uses the term three times in her 
speculations with Mr Knightley as to what sort of person Frank 
Churchill will prove to be. ‘I have no idea of him being a weak 
young man,’ she asserts, adding, ‘My idea of him is, that he can 
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adapt his conversation to the taste of every body’ (pp. 160, 161). 
Later in the story, she comically accuses Mrs Weston of taking up 
an ‘idea’ and running away with it and later she ‘even wept over the 
idea’ of leaving her father should she marry (pp. 244, 474). What 
this last example demonstrates is the emotive force of ideas, and 
yet what the many textual references also imply is that this mental 
speculation is often untested by material reality. The world of mind 
is largely unchecked by physical actuality. There is similarity here 
with Marianne Dashwood, in Sense and Sensibility, whose enthusi-
asm for her own ‘systems of thought’ are based upon ‘ignorance of 
the world’.
As in Sense and Sensibility, Austen ironises the willingness to 
allow mind tyranny over matter, especially the imposition of sub-
jective perceptions upon the lives of others. Mr Woodhouse is the 
most humorously treated example of this dominance of the mental 
over the actual. His ‘general benevolence’ remains just that, a largely 
abstract principle undirected by any real knowledge of others. Typi-
cally he ‘protects’ his guests from those very dishes they would most 
enjoy. Such vague well-meaning has little moderating force upon 
his life-long ‘habits of gentle selfi shness’ (p. 6). Like other idealists 
he is ‘never able to suppose that other people could feel differently 
from himself’ (p. 6). Equally, like many idealists he is governed by 
a pervasive bodily fearfulness and dislike of the physical world. He 
shuns exposure to outside elements just as doggedly as he shuns any 
opinion he dislikes, rarely venturing away from the fi reside and even 
then fearful of draughts. Indeed, a striking feature of the text, gener-
ally, is a preoccupation with the state of the weather. This is one of 
the several means by which Austen underlines the physical nature of 
existence in contrast to Emma’s concern with ideas. Mr Woodhouse 
regards food, also, with deep suspicion, as harmful rather than nur-
turing, only able to recommend thin gruel. Apart from events organ-
ised ‘on his own terms’ he has a horror of change to routine, of any 
activity or event, seeing them only as openings for physical harm, 
illness and discomfort (p. 19). As far as possible, Mr Woodhouse 
disavows the fact of physical life.
Emma lacks her father’s nervous rejection of the physical and the 
text is at pains to stress her bodily vigour. Indeed, Emma’s vitality 
is represented as so integral with her lively imagination and feelings 
that notions of the mind−body separation as invoked by Emma and 
others are implicitly challenged. Austen’s representation of her char-
acters, especially her heroines, gives powerful dramatic expression 
to David Hartley’s sense of self as embodied energies, the physical, 
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the mental, the imaginative and the affective completely inseparable. 
So, too, Mr Knightley ‘always moves with the alertness of mind’ that 
suggests the indivisibility of physical and mental activity (p. 420). 
One reason why readers are convinced of the sexual charge between 
her characters is that, although she is the least explicit writer, she 
nevertheless conveys a full sense of them as embodied beings. Part 
of Austen’s irony in Emma is that Emma is so sure of her own mind 
that she fails to notice what her bodily feelings might well be able to 
tell her.
Certainly, for most of the narrative Emma privileges the men-
tal realm at the expense of the empirical. She has ‘a mind delighted 
with its own ideas’ and she readily imposes these upon reality, as 
Mr Knightley terms it, quoting William Cowper, ‘Myself creat-
ing what I saw’ (pp. 23, 373). Typically, with Mr Elton she is ‘too 
eager and busy in her own previous conceptions and views to hear 
him impartially or see him with a clear vision’ (p. 105). We could 
understand this as a case of the metaphorical form of prospect or 
‘vision’ overriding the basis of physical sight from which the fi gura-
tive meaning ultimately derives. The distribution of the perceptible 
is regulated by the mind, as Austen’s persistent linking of the mental 
realm with verbs of seeing and hearing indicates. Emma’s prospect 
is indeed governed by her willed sense of the distanced eminence she 
enjoys, an Olympic perspective, conferred by the privileged entitle-
ment of Hartfi eld. This produces, in Emma, a belief in her own pan-
optic insight, the source of much of the text’s irony. Emma assumes a 
patrician, god-like confi dence in her knowledge of others and thus a 
habit of treating them as objects, subordinated to her greater scheme 
of things. This is the characteristic perspective of the idealist who 
imposes a mental conception on the particularity of the actual world. 
Adam Smith’s warning, in The Theory of Moral Sentiment, that the 
idealist is ‘so often enamoured with the supposed beauty of his own 
ideal plan’ that he imagines people can be arranged in accordance 
with it as easily as pieces can be arranged on a chess board applies 
with great aptitude to Emma.18
Emma repeatedly asserts that her judgements are beyond error. 
‘There can be no doubt of your being a gentleman’s daughter’, she 
tells Harriet with sweeping confi dence based upon nothing (p. 30). 
Similarly, she ‘could not feel a doubt’ about directing Harriet’s feel-
ings towards Mr Elton, and as for her ability to manipulate and pre-
dict Mr Elton’s intentions, ‘I cannot have a moment’s doubt,’ she 
proclaims, adding, ‘I could not be so deceived’ (pp. 43, 78). This sense 
of vertical overview of others objectifi es those who are subjected to 
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such Olympic speculation. They are indeed treated like chess pieces. 
Emma thinks of Harriet in terms of ‘how useful’ she will be; she was 
exactly ‘the something which her home required’ (p. 25, emphasis 
added). Jane Fairfax, equally, is of interest only for the use-value she 
has for Emma’s imaginative plots and even Frank Churchill fi gures 
as much in Emma’s romantic self-fi ctions as he does for her as a real 
person in his own right.
That Emma does have the redeeming capacity to enter into the 
perspectives of others is perhaps hinted at in her practical approach 
to poor families where she attends to their real physical needs. This 
contrasts positively with her father’s inactive ‘general benevolence’ 
but even more so with Mrs Elton’s Marie Antoinette posturing in 
wishing to ride to the strawberry-picking at Donwell on a donkey 
(p. 386). Mrs Elton’s desire for a donkey as symbol of Arcadian 
simplicity provides a wonderfully comic image, yet it is typical of 
Austen’s materialist psychology. Idealist assertions of the mental 
realm as the primary reality are undercut in her novels as objects 
persistently point to the way things are required to give substance 
to the immaterial. Things, in Austen’s texts, demonstrate the nec-
essary interdependence of the subjective and the objective, the ide-
alist and the empirical. We know ourselves, even our interiority, 
through our interaction with things. The most explicit example 
of this in Emma is the sad little collection of ‘Most precious trea-
sures’, comprising a piece of plaster and a pencil stub, that Harriet 
stores away as a means of substantiating her romantic dreams of 
Mr Elton (p. 366).
In her fi ction, Austen frequently foregrounds the metaphoric sub-
stantiation of immaterial values by means of those things closely 
associated with the physical necessities of life. This effects a trans-
ference from the empirical realm to the ideal, a shift which paradox-
ically disguises the physicality that the mental realm depends upon 
for existence. In this way, Austen’s realism brings to notice a fi eld 
of visibility – the materiality of human life – just as it is about to 
be rendered invisible in genteel discourse. As the nineteenth century 
progressed, only the embodied materiality of the poor, a presence 
betokening lack, the absence of interiority, was allowed perceptibil-
ity. In Sense and Sensibility references to fi res and hearths afford 
substance to the textual opposition between cold-hearted civility 
and the warmth of traditional embodied sociability. In Emma, food 
is the main material thing by which immaterial values are medi-
ated and concretised. As such, food participates in the characters’ 
imaginative constitution of a self. While the text shows characters 
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wittingly and unwittingly using food to convey abstract meanings, 
Austen’s references are meticulously particularised: leg of pork, fric-
assee of sweetbread, scalloped oysters, asparagus and baked apples. 
Methods of cooking are also detailed as is the fact of butchering. 
For Mr Woodhouse, it is this materiality of food that provides him 
with means of expressing, by contrast, his sense of self as purely ner-
vous sensibility. He elaborates exacting rules for cooking to render 
food less dangerous and is particular in sending away from the table 
anything he deems not up to his fanciful standards. Cooking is, of 
course, the most basic means by which we transform the physical 
into cultural values.
For Miss Bates, food constitutes one of the main currencies 
of traditional sociable reciprocity, a reciprocity fi rmly based in 
the physical exigencies of existence. When Emma unexpectedly 
gratifi es her with a rare visit, Miss Bates’s welcome fl ows met-
onymically, but always materially, from anxiety about wet shoes, 
to concern for Mr Woodhouse’s health, to pressing invitations to 
take some ‘sweet-cake from the beaufet’ which Mrs Cole had ear-
lier ‘been so kind as to say she liked very much’ (p. 166). When 
the Bateses receive a gift of pork from Hartfi eld their immedi-
ate response is to invite friends to share it. Miss Bates welcomes 
apples from Donwell so that they can be given to Jane who is 
without appetite. For Miss Bates, who has no wealth, food is a 
means of generosity, of expressing her care for others. As such, it 
secures her sense of self as a wholly social being.
Quite the opposite is the case with Mrs Elton. Food for her func-
tions as individualistic self-promotion and status enhancement. She 
boasts to Emma of living in such a style as makes unexpected guests 
for dinner no inconvenience. ‘I should be extremely displeased if 
Wright were to send up such a dinner as could make me regret hav-
ing asked more’, she declares (p. 306). She plans to impress High-
bury with a ‘very superior party’ with waiters engaged ‘to carry 
around refreshments at exactly the proper hour, and in the proper 
order’ (p. 314).
References to giving, cooking and eating food form a continu-
ous, discursive thread throughout the text, indicating the interdepen-
dence of the physical with the immaterial. Yet, the ‘thing’ that most 
dramatically appears in the story is the piano given to Jane Fairfax. 
This is certainly not merely a device required by the plot. The piano 
can be thought of as a ‘gathering’ to use Bruno Latour’s terminol-
ogy.19 It constitutes a pivotal intersection of the various forces con-
tending for national dominance in early nineteenth-century England. 
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In particular, the piano mediates the mixture of competition and 
emulation by which the middle class sought to impose themselves 
as part of the perceptible nation. It is Austen’s ironic representation 
of this competitive emulation that drives the narrative of Emma, as 
Mrs Elton’s assertive individualism challenges Emma’s presumption 
of inborn right.
In Men, Women and Pianos: A Social History, Arthur Loesser 
associates the rapid growth in popular appeal of the piano, from its 
fi rst introduction into England in the 1750s, with a growing obses-
sion to achieve and maintain gentility. By the nineteenth century, he 
claims, this was the ‘most anxious ambition, the very aim of life of 
most English middle-class people [. . .] an endless quest [. . .] [that] 
was relative and competitive’.20 As middle-class wealth grew this 
aspiration for gentility was proclaimed by conspicuous display of 
‘all its paraphernalia and insignia. Among the latter, one of the most 
persistent was the keyboard instrument’ (Men, Women, p. 188).
In Piano Roles: Three Hundred Years of Life with the Piano, 
James Parakilas confi rms this centrality of the piano within the 
cultural shift taking place in post-revolutionary England, whereby 
power and status were in process of transferring from the old 
landed elite to a widening ‘circle of the population thinking of 
itself as “the people”’.21 Parakilas goes further, linking the role of 
the piano in this cultural revolution with the processes of change 
set in motion by the Industrial Revolution. It constituted a shift 
towards the mass production and consumerism that would breach 
the exclusivity of the cultural capital of landed wealth. The rapidly 
growing market for musical products fostered by the competitive 
cultural ambitions of the middle class ‘involved new means of pro-
ducing and distributing cultural goods – pianos, printed music, 
journals, systems of education and opinion – on a mass and inter-
national scale’ (Three Hundred Years, p. 93). In his study, Loesser 
argues that the actual physical form of the piano rendered it 
adaptable to mass production. The piano, unlike other instru-
ments, was ‘the factory’s natural prey’ (Men, Women, p. 233). John 
Broadwood’s son, James, seems to confi rm this claim. In 1798, he 
wrote to a wholesaler anxious for his order to be fi lled, ‘Would to 
God we could make them like muffi ns!’ (quoted in Three Hundred 
Years, p. 41).
In addition to its situation as a nexus of cultural competition 
and widening access to taste through mass production processes, 
the piano also played a pro-active role in directly promoting and 
enlarging the public sphere. In doing so it was part of the forces 
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that commercialised the public realm. The drive to make the piano 
an ever-cheaper product to meet a mass market required a commen-
surate increase in public promotion of the instrument. One of the 
fi rst means of advertising the virtues of pianos was by putting on 
public concerts entirely of piano performances. This in turn fostered 
the production and mass sale of music for the piano, as well as an 
expanding job market for music teachers. Soon, leading journals 
began to carry regular reviews of new music, musical clubs were 
formed and specialist music publications acted, in effect, like mail-
order catalogues allowing the public to keep up with all that was 
new and fashionable in the musical world. This range of activity, 
spreading horizontally across the public sphere, undoubtedly helped 
to bring into being an imagined national community of those aspir-
ing to be recognised as bearers of taste and cultivated consumerist 
life-style. More generally, like the circulation of mail, the circulation 
of music helped generate and swell a self-identifying national com-
munity of ‘the people’.
It is not surprising that both Loesser and Parakilas include sections 
on Jane Austen in their books, as a writer keenly aware of the cultural 
implications of the instrument. Certainly music features throughout 
Emma. One of Frank Churchill’s fi rst questions to Emma is whether 
Highbury is a musical society (p. 206). In contrast to Frank’s enthusi-
asm, Emma fears that musical events will entail inattention to proper 
social divisions. Certainly, music is most emphasised by those char-
acters wishing to underpin or enhance their social status. The newly 
wealthy Coles have purchased a grand pianoforte for display in the 
drawing room although the expensive instrument is only of use for 
the daughters’ music lessons. Mrs Cole explains that Mr Cole is ‘so 
particularly fond of music that he could not help indulging himself 
in the purchase’ (p. 233). Mrs Cole is also careful to point out that 
although the piano sent to Jane is ‘a very elegant looking instrument 
it is not a grand’ (p. 232). As the price of pianos fell with increased 
production, competition in display was safeguarded by the ostenta-
tious size and luxury wood and fi ttings of grand pianos only avail-
able to the wealthy.
Mrs Elton, rather like Mr Cole, protests that while her playing 
is mediocre, ‘I am dotingly fond of music – passionately fond; − 
and my friends say I am not entirely devoid of taste’ (p. 298). What 
is registered here is an elevation of subjective taste over physical 
performance. For young women, like Jane Fairfax, needing to earn 
a livelihood as governesses or to sustain claims to gentility as an 
asset in the marriage market, the ability to play well depended 
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on long hours daily devoted to the physical drudgery of repetitive 
practice. For the well-to-do, affi rmation of passionate appreciation 
was suffi cient to confi rm privileged status as superior interiority. 
Mrs Elton almost claims that music replaces physical needs to sus-
tain her life. ‘I do not think I can live without something of a musi-
cal society,’ she declares, ‘without music, life would be a blank for 
me’ (p. 298). In addition to substantiating inner superiority, music 
provides Mrs Elton, as it did non-fi ctional middle-class women, 
with opportunities to gain visibility and infl uence. Mrs Elton pro-
poses that she and Emma establish a musical club to hold regular 
weekly meetings (p. 299).
Mrs Elton’s challenge to Emma’s privileged position extends 
beyond the sphere of musical activities, however. She asserts the 
right of patronage. In so doing she threatens the fundamental verti-
cal structure of class power. Emulation in this particular is highly 
competitive. Emma is loud in her protests against the offensiveness 
of Mrs Elton’s patronising manner, largely because Emma’s own 
patrician identity is given substance by exercising her power for 
benevolence.22 Early on in their friendship, Harriet assures Emma 
that while she fi nds favour at Hartfi eld she has no fear of others 
looking down upon her birth. Emma replies complacently, ‘You 
understand the force of infl uence pretty well, Harriet’ (p. 30). Later, 
Emma comically boasts that her patronage has had a benefi cial 
infl uence on Harriet in that she has ‘perhaps given her a little more 
decision of character’ (p. 44). She has, of course, completely under-
mined and confused whatever independence of mind and action 
Harriet might originally have possessed. When Harriet shows even 
the most deferential impulse to follow her own inclination towards 
Robert Martin, the threat of displeasure and penalty, always pres-
ent in relations of patronage, is quickly revealed. ‘It would have 
grieved me to lose your acquaintance, which must have been the 
consequence of your marrying Mr Martin [. . .] I could not have 
visited Mrs Robert Martin, of Abbey-Mill Farm’ (p. 56). Harriet is 
aghast at her narrow escape from exile from favour and rendered 
more debilitatingly grateful than ever.
The case of Mrs Weston, by contrast, points to the desirability 
of independence over dependence, even for one so affectionately 
regarded by those she serves. ‘She had lived long enough to know 
how fortunate she might well be thought [. . .] her [new] situation 
was altogether the subject of hours of gratitude to [her]’ (p. 17). Mr 
Knightley is of the same opinion: ‘I have a great regard for you and 
Emma,’ he tells Mr Woodhouse, but, he asks rhetorically, ‘when it 
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comes to the question of dependence or independence!’ (p. 9). Mr 
Woodhouse deplores the changes brought about by the marriage 
and another way of understanding these changes within the narra-
tive structure would be as a movement away from vertical relations 
of superiority and subordination towards a less hierarchical social 
formation in which patronage and dependence are replaced by hori-
zontal interdependence and reciprocal esteem.
It is Mr Knightley who points out the dangers involved for those 
who exercise infl uence. It fosters a complacent sense of their own 
self-suffi ciency with a consequent blindness to the actual needs and 
rights of others. The fl attery inherent in any relations of patronage 
enhances the patroniser’s sense of power and omniscience, hence the 
egoistic dividend it constantly provides in magnifying the idea of self. 
Harriet is, in this sense, the ‘very worst sort of companion’ Emma 
could have, Mr Knightley complains, ‘She is a fl atterer in all her 
ways [. . .] How can Emma imagine she has anything to learn her-
self, while Harriet is presenting such delightful inferiority?’ (p. 39). 
Emma does indeed boast, ‘I cannot change for the better.’
The Woodhouses are ‘fi rst in consequence’ in their community 
due to birthright.23 They represent neither new money nor new 
blood, Emma takes pride in thinking. What infuriates Emma is 
that Mrs Elton utterly refuses to give place or recognition to the 
old hierarchy of rank upon which Emma relies. ‘I am Lady Patron-
ess, you know. It is my party’, Mrs Elton informs Mr Knightley in 
regard to the strawberry-gathering at Donwell (p. 385). She gra-
ciously bestows her favour upon Mr Woodhouse, this ‘dear old 
beau of mine’, and Mrs Weston, ‘I was rather astonished to fi nd 
her so very lady-like! But she is really quite the gentlewoman’ (pp. 
326, 300). By thus sweeping everyone in Highbury into her con-
descending bestowal of recognition, she magnifi es her own imag-
ined idea of self as measured by the extent of her social dominion. 
Mrs Elton is one of those many characters in Austen’s fi ction whose 
representation seems strikingly to dramatise self as factitious; yet 
it is a performance driven by embodied needs and passions. Mrs 
Elton’s discourse resembles a torrent of egoistic energy that sweeps 
all topics into the vortex of her sense of self-importance. Hartfi eld 
becomes only a copy of Maple Grove, the distance from Enscombe 
in Yorkshire to London only a means of comparison for the distance 
of Maple Grove to the capital. Her speech might be understood as 
a discursive caricature of the new, unstoppable, highly audible force 
of individualistic ambition.
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The humiliation infl icted upon those who are in no position to 
resist patronage is most graphically demonstrated in Mrs Elton’s offi -
cious assumption of the right to take control of Jane Fairfax’s life, 
to promote her social visibility. Soon after her arrival in Highbury, 
she tells Emma grandly, ‘my resolution is taken as to noticing Jane 
Fairfax [. . .] [I] shall introduce her wherever I can, shall have musical 
parties to draw out her talents’ (p. 306). Although Emma would have 
been loath to recognise it, there are ironic parallels here with her own 
objectifi cation of Harriet. Her resolution on fi rst meeting Harriet is, 
‘She would notice her; she would improve her’ (p. 23). Mrs Elton is 
also like Emma in her sweeping assumption that Olympian elevation 
over others affords her a privileged perspective into their characters. 
‘I know what a modest creature you are’, she informs Jane Fairfax 
(p. 325). She reassures Mr Knightley, ‘Indeed I do you justice my good 
friend. Under that peculiar sort of dry, blunt manner, I know you have 
the warmest heart. As I tell Mr E., you are a thorough humourist’ 
(p. 387).
Emma’s trajectory from the idealist exclusivity of Hartfi eld towards 
a more integrated mode of social interaction requires a rejection of 
her sense of interiority as location of privileged knowledge, authoris-
ing the right to speak and decide for others. This process is narrated 
as a movement from the vertical hierarchies of place to the horizon-
tal motility of space, from metaphor to metonymy, and from subjec-
tive idealism to social being. Emma is fi rst impelled beyond the social 
exclusivity of Hartfi eld by an invitation from the Coles to admire 
the new pianoforte. After much hesitation she is forced to recognise 
that her former ‘dignifi ed seclusion’ no longer compensates for the 
denial of social interchange, even if some of those contacts are vul-
gar. She agrees to dine with a large socially mixed party of Highbury 
folk at the Coles, although she still condones this to herself in terms 
of patronage: ‘She must have delighted the Coles – worthy people, 
who deserved to be made happy’ (p. 249). From this point her shift 
of orientation towards Highbury continues until her brother-in-law, 
John Knightley, can point out, ‘There can be no doubt of your being 
much more engaged with company than you used to be [. . .] Your 
neighbourhood is increasing, and you mix more with it’ (p. 337). 
Through this expansion beyond the boundaries of Hartfi eld, Emma 
slowly learns to move beyond her solipsistic complacency, exchanging 
a vertical perspective on others for a horizontal ability to enter into 
viewpoints that differ from her own and to accord them validity. Her 
extended recognition dramatises a redistribution of the perceptible.
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This entails a radical transformation. When Mr John Knightley 
perceptively warns her of Elton’s romantic interest in her, Emma 
laughs to herself at his mistake in terms which are much more 
applicable to herself: ‘She walked on, amusing herself in the consid-
eration of the blunders which often arise from a partial knowledge 
of circumstances, of mistakes which people of high pretensions to 
judgement are for ever falling into’ (pp. 120–1). With such comical 
self-certainty, it takes considerable time and some painful experi-
ence before she is able to recognise the narrow partiality of her own 
construct of reality. She is reluctantly forced to concede that from 
Mr Elton’s perspective a very different notion of truth might have 
seemed reasonable. ‘Emma was obliged in common honesty to stop 
and admit that her own behaviour to him had been so complai-
sant and obliging [. . .] if she had so misinterpreted his feelings, she 
had little right to wonder that he, with self-interest to blind him, 
should have mistaken hers’ (pp. 147–8). What Emma begins to 
move towards here is a shift into the perspective of others, as advo-
cated by Adam Smith (TMS, p. 157). For Smith, it is this capacity 
for extended consciousness that promotes and sustains a just and 
humane community.
Throughout the story, Harriet is the recurrent victim of Emma’s 
delusions of Olympian knowledge of others. The fi nal catastrophe is 
when she again imposes her own perspective upon Harriet’s mind and 
mistakenly gives approval to Harriet’s inclinations for Mr Knightley. 
It is this fi nal shock to her sense of self-security that drives home to 
Emma the harmful folly of presuming the right to know and direct 
the lives of others. ‘With insufferable vanity had she believed herself 
in the secrets of everybody’s feelings; with unpardonable arrogance 
proposed to arrange everybody’s destiny [. . .] She was proved to 
have been universally mistaken’ (p. 449).
For much of the novel, Miss Bates forms a striking contrast with 
Emma’s patrician self-suffi ciency. For Miss Bates, no-one is beyond 
or beneath the range of her sympathetic recognition. Her being is 
almost wholly social, a continuous metonymic fl ow from self to oth-
ers. Her unstoppable discourse is sometimes likened to that of Mrs 
Elton but, in fact, it represents the opposite pole from egoistic self-
assertion. Miss Bates’s speech is largely responsible for the narrative 
constitution of the imagined community of Highbury; it teems with 
the presence of others. ‘I do not care for myself’, she declares at 
the beginning of one of those voluble outfl ows that moves without 
pause from Jane, to Mrs Weston, to Mrs Stokes, to Mr Woodhouse, 
to Mr Dixon and Colonel Campbell and so on (p. 348). If Mrs 
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Elton’s speech represents the acquisitive centripetal energy of indi-
vidualism, Miss Bates’s discourse represents the centrifugal force of 
social being. Austen’s representation of Miss Bates gives audibility 
to those who are indeed part of the national community but who are 
unheard and unseen within the privileged consensus of who consti-
tutes England.
She goes further than this. Miss Bates becomes the agency by 
which Emma begins to radically adjust her vertical system of val-
ues towards a perception of egalitarian mutual esteem. Miss Bates, 
a woman without money, status, husband, beauty or youth becomes 
an active determinant upon the course of Emma’s privileged life. On 
Box Hill, Emma thoughtlessly sacrifi ces Miss Bates’s feelings for the 
sake of exhibiting her own wit. As Mr Knightley insists, just for ‘the 
pride of the moment’, Miss Bates is humiliated in front of her friends 
(p. 408). The truth of this accusation strikes home. Emma ‘felt it at 
her heart. How could she have been so brutal, so cruel to Miss Bates!’ 
(p. 409). The starkly physical language registers embodied shock as 
Emma takes in the inhumanity of her conduct. Her enclosure within 
an imaginary realm of self-complacency is shattered. Miss Bates 
had, up to then, no tangible presence for her. Social distinction, like 
Emma’s, does not lead to shared consciousness of others as fellow 
beings; rather it renders others imperceptible, of no consequence. In 
Adam Smith’s words Emma has to accept that she is ‘but one of the 
multitude and in no respect better than any other in it’ (TMS, p. 158). 
When the consequence of her brutality is brought home to her, Emma 
commits herself to a complete transformation of attitude: ‘it should 
be the beginning, on her side, of a regular, equal, kindly intercourse’ 
(p. 410, emphasis added).
Robert Martin is the other character whom Emma regards as 
existing beneath the level of the perceptible. Ironically, he, too, like 
Miss Bates, measures the transformation of Emma’s viewpoint from 
vertical distance to horizontal respect. When Harriet fi rst mentions 
Robert Martin, Emma’s dismissal of him is unequivocal, ‘A young 
farmer [. . .] is the very last sort of person to raise my curiosity,’ she 
says haughtily, ‘The yeomanry are precisely the order of people with 
whom I feel I can have nothing to do [. . .] a farmer can need none of 
my help, and is therefore in one sense as much above my notice as in 
every other he is below it’ (p. 29). At this point in the story, Emma 
can only envisage social relations in terms of bestowing patronage. 
Her use of the already somewhat old-fashioned term ‘yeomanry’ 
also suggests the backward-looking perspective she is adhering to. It 
echoes the perspective of those nostalgic for a mythical ‘old England’.
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Emma’s enforced further considerations of Robert Martin serve 
in the text to challenge conservative opinion as to what constitutes 
a gentleman and claims to gentility. Austen’s representation engages 
actively with current debates in the public sphere as to who consti-
tutes ‘the people’ of a modern nation. It was a confl ict between two 
regimes of the perceptible, the one structured upon a traditional ver-
tical order and the other on an emergent possibility of social inclu-
sion. Robert Martin represents the growing, heterogeneous public 
realm of the literate and informed. Indeed, Emma’s class prejudices 
are most strongly challenged by the articulacy of Robert Martin’s 
letter proposing marriage to Harriet. Emma is compelled to recog-
nise that it is a composition that ‘would not have disgraced a gentle-
man’, grammatically correct, using strong, unaffected language and 
expressing ‘good sense, warm attachment, liberality, propriety, even 
delicacy of feeling’ (p. 53). Faced with such unimpeachable mate-
rial evidence of admirable human qualities, Emma uneasily admits 
surprise. She quickly reasserts her superiority, however, through the 
assumption of knowledge, ‘Yes, I understand the sort of mind’ (p. 
53). Soon she is happy to ignore the physical substance of the letter. 
She reverts to her mental preconception, reconsigning Robert Martin 
to those who can be dismissed from visibility and audibility as ‘the 
society of the illiterate and vulgar’ (p. 56). The stark contradictions 
within Emma’s judgements here are further foregrounded by the sub-
sequent ill-natured and affected behaviour of Mr Elton, whom she 
has been holding up to Harriet as the gentlemanly model against 
whom Robert Martin must be found wanting.
Mr Knightley’s consistent praise for Robert Martin also sus-
tains the text’s questioning of what is meant by ‘gentleman’ and 
‘gentility’ within a changing social order. When Emma insists that 
Harriet ‘knows what gentlemen are’ and will not be satisfi ed with 
less, Mr Knightley retorts, ‘Robert Martin’s manners have sense, 
sincerity and good-humour to recommend them; and his mind has 
more true gentility than Harriet Smith could understand!’ (p. 69). 
In contrast to Emma’s snobbish rigidity in asserting she can have no 
curiosity about Robert Martin since she can be of no use to him, 
Mr Knightley communicates with him as a friend. What is more, 
he overthrows the relations of patronage by readily admitting his 
dependence upon Martin’s good sense (p. 516). The complete trans-
formation of Emma’s view of social possibilities is confi rmed in her 
acknowledgement that ‘It would be a great pleasure to know Robert 
Martin’ (p. 519). Knowledge of others, she recognises, at last, does 
not reside in the Olympic perspective conferred by privileged place, 
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but arises out of the horizontal processes of non-hierarchical social 
interaction in a space of possibility.
It needs to be stated that while the narrative structure of Emma 
points to the possibility of a new inclusive representative regime 
of who constitutes the nation, it in no way contemplates a redis-
tribution of wealth or property. Sandie Byrne rightly points out 
that despite Austen’s depiction of a ‘mobile and consumerist soci-
ety [. . .] Robert Martin is not invited to the Donwell strawberry-
picking [. . .] anymore than he is to the ball or the Box Hill expedi-
tion’.24 Of course, the fact that he is a busy working farmer would 
deny him the leisure for the fi rst and last of these events. What the 
novel seems to advocate is a shift of recognition from the rules of 
vertical exclusion to a more horizontal and egalitarian engagement 
with the perspectives of a wider social interaction. In advocating 
this new regime of perceptibility, Austen engages dialogically in 
the more progressive, inclusive discourse of ‘the people’ and ‘the 
public’ of the post-Revolutionary era. Like them, she welcomes the 
prospect of the nation as a less hierarchical community, a view of 
social interaction at odds with an idealist version of ‘old England’. 
The several references in Emma to England and Englishness are 
striking. Yet while Austen joins in the criticism of rank and patron-
age, as expressed by liberal journals like the Edinburgh Review, she 
saves her harshest satire for the new force of competitive individu-
alism, as exemplifi ed by Mrs Elton. As against both exclusivity of 
birth and the aggressive dominance of self-interest, Austen holds 
out the possibility or prospect of horizontal social interaction as a 
basis of self and of England. What is more, the vehicle of this radi-
cal transformation is a young woman, Emma.
The novel is set in motion by a marriage and it concludes with 
one. Since marriage instigates change it is reasonable to ask what 
kind of values will be inaugurated in the union of Emma and Mr 
Knightley. Claudia Johnson argues persuasively that Mr Knightley 
represents a modern, business-like, untraditional hero; that he is ‘in 
some respects a new man’.25 Yet, some readers and critics have been 
uneasy about Emma’s apparent capitulation into wifely domesticity 
at the conclusion of the story. Emma certainly expresses deep humili-
ation at her conduct and acknowledges the superiority of Knightley’s 
judgement in regard to Robert Martin, yet her sense of the ridiculous 
cannot sustain prolonged moral penitence, ‘there was no preventing 
a laugh’ (p. 519). Similarly to Woolf, laughter, for Austen, is a radi-
cal force against presumption and power. Indeed, the strongest bond 
between Emma and Knightley resides in their egalitarian willingness 
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to tease and challenge each other. ‘Do you dare suppose me so great a 
blockhead,’ Knightley cries with mock masculine outrage, ‘What do 
you deserve?’ Emma’s reply, ‘Oh! I always deserve the best treatment 
because I never put up with any other’ does not suggest a wife willing 
to subordinate herself (p. 517). This point is underlined more seri-
ously by the narrator’s comment that Mrs John Knightley’s ‘extreme 
sweetness of temper must hurt his’ (p. 100).
Emma’s readiness to argue for her opinions and point of view 
ensures no such dominance of one perspective over the other’s. After 
a typical confl ict of views, Knightley says, ‘let us be friends’, a word 
denoting equality of respect (p. 106). The contrast with her sister’s 
and John Knightley’s mode of marriage also suggests that domestic 
privacy will not be the ideological ethos of Emma’s and Knightley’s 
partnership. The narrative is at pains to represent Knightley as more 
sociable and communicative than his brother, John, and while her 
brother-in-law’s self-suffi cient attachment to home at the expense 
of sociability is awarded respect by Emma, she is luke-warm in her 
approbation (p. 104). This suggests she and Knightley will inhabit 
a location that has more of the openness of a space than the verti-
cal proprieties of a private, domestic place. The marriage, after all, 
locates change at the very heart of Hartfi eld.
Perhaps the national ‘prospect’ represented by the union of Emma 
and Knightley is fi gured imaginatively in the moment of shared vision 
(of both sight and thought) when Emma comes across Mr Knight-
ley teaching Harriet about agricultural matters (surely a challenge to 
gender divisions) at the end of the lime avenue at Donwell overlook-
ing Abbey-Mill Farm: ‘It was a sweet view – sweet to the eye and the 
mind. English verdure, English culture, English comfort, seen under 
a sun bright, without being oppressive’ (p. 391). It is ‘a sweet view’ 
of a horizontal prospect of the nation, bringing together Harriet of 
illegitimate birth, Robert Martin, tenant farmer, Knightley, landed-
proprietor, and Emma of ancient stock. It is a scene in which oppres-
sion is absent, one uniting the needs of eye and mind, the physical 
equally with the mental, and associated with Emma’s and Knightley’s 
good-humoured tolerance of their differences of perspective.
 It is, though, a mental prospect or idea of the nation only, with-
out material evidence to substantiate it. It shimmers as a possibility, a 
vision. It is signifi cant, perhaps, that almost the last word in the novel 
is awarded to Mrs Elton as voice of the new force of individualistic 
competitive consumption: ‘Very little white satin, very few lace veils; a 
most pitiful business! Selina would stare when she heard of it’ (p. 528).
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Chapter 4
The Waves: Blasphemy of 
Laughter and Criticism
The Waves (1931) is widely acknowledged as Woolf’s most ambitious 
and achieved modernist work.1 Woolf herself appears to underwrite 
the critical consensus as to its radical break with past conventions, 
most notably realism. In her diary entry, setting out her aims for 
the new novel, she writes, ‘I mean to eliminate all waste, deadness, 
superfl uity [. . .] this appalling narrative business of the realist: get-
ting from lunch to dinner: it is false, unreal, merely conventional.’2 
The impression that, in The Waves, Woolf is relentlessly excluding 
the social and material in order to focus upon the subjective and 
spiritual realms of experience is strengthened by further comments 
in her diary as to the novel’s genesis. Her remarks are undeniably 
couched in what seems the language of idealist interiority. She writes, 
on 28 September 1926, of experiencing, while at Rodmell, an intro-
spective, melancholy mood that she recognises as the intimation of 
a new novel. The solitude of Rodmell, she says, allowed expansion 
of ‘this odd immeasurable soul’ so that ‘one goes down into the well 
and nothing protects one from the assault of truth’ (Diary, 3.112). 
A month later, she notes in her diary that the new work is to be a 
‘dramatisation of my mood at Rodmell. It is to be an endeavour 
at something mystic, spiritual; the thing that exists when we aren’t 
there’ (Diary, 3.114). And yet this ‘thing’ that exists in our absence is 
not otherworldly or immaterial. Adding some remarks ‘on the mysti-
cal side of this solitude’, she concludes, ‘it is not oneself but some-
thing in the universe that one’s left with’ (Diary, 3.113).
The bypassing of self and focus upon the physical universe here 
is crucial. The Waves is, indeed, a supremely ambitious work. 
Stylistically and thematically, Woolf moves radically beyond both 
individualist psychological realism and actualist social realism. Her 
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aim is to produce a comprehensive materialist vision of existence. 
It is a vision that bases understanding of human life upon the fact 
of self as embodied and thus in metonymic continuity with the vast 
scale and duration of the physical world. This worldly realism pro-
duces a new egalitarian regime of the perceptible. The language of 
The Waves ranges horizontally and inclusively from the motility of 
atoms, nerves and fi bres to the movement of tides and solar system. 
Politically, this practice of worldly realism launches a comprehensive 
attack upon all the sacred tenets of idealist ideology. In Mrs Dalloway, 
Woolf indicts the collaboration of idealist modes of thought with the 
working of the social and political system ‘at its most intense’ (Diary, 
2.248). In The Waves, she turns her attention to the complicity of 
idealist views of culture with structures of power and inequality. She 
attacks the culture system at its most intense. In Mrs Dalloway, the 
heterogeneity of life that Clarissa Dalloway celebrates in the space of 
London streets is threatened by an authoritarian desire for discipline 
and regularity. In The Waves, the imposition of a vision of authori-
tarian conformity looks to globalised technology as a means of con-
scripting universal space into its own regulated order.
Two events during the time Woolf was thinking about and writ-
ing The Waves would have intensifi ed her concern with the cultural 
and political threat of idealism, reminding her, if that were neces-
sary, of the perils of vision not challenged by fact. In 1927, follow-
ing his death, a second edition of F. H. Bradley’s Ethical Studies was 
published and in 1928, Clive Bell published Civilization: An Essay, 
with a dedication to ‘Dearest Virginia’. In his preliminary address 
to Woolf, Bell recalls their early friendship in the pre-war days when 
‘we were mostly socialists’ and before he had considerably modi-
fi ed those youthful ideas.3 Certainly there is little of socialism or 
even of egalitarianism in the 1928 essay, but Bell’s understanding of 
‘civilization’ and ‘culture’, as expressed in that work, shares much 
common ground with Bradley’s idealism. Both texts are imbued 
with what Woolf, in Mrs Dalloway, understands as ‘the spirit of 
religion’, the urge to venerate an immaterial ideal at the expense 
of bodily life. Both Bradley and Bell subscribe to a regime of the 
perceptible as a vertical order, regulating who and what counts as 
worthy of notice and what is other and undistinguished within the 
nation and beyond. In subjecting the values and institutions they 
revere to the blasphemy of laughter and criticism in The Waves, 
Woolf expands the scope of her critique of idealist structures of 
thought to encompass global and scientifi c forces well beyond the 
elitist mental worlds of those like Bell and Bradley.
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Both Bell and Bradley elevate an intensely individualistic notion 
of self. For each, the only purpose of human existence is spiritual 
and intellectual self-realisation.4 For Bell the aim is ‘complete self-
development and complete self-expression’ (p. 98). Bradley writes, 
‘the end and the standard is self-realization’.5 Drawing upon the tra-
dition of Edmund Burke, Bradley sees self-fulfi lment solely in terms 
of a conscious, intellectual and spiritual identifi cation with the ‘soul’ 
of the nation as inhering in its culture, social order, laws and institu-
tions. ‘But the child is not merely the member of a family,’ he declares, 
‘he is born a member of the English nation’ (Ethical Studies, p. 169). 
This willed identifi cation of self with an ideal of the nation entails 
acceptance of the duties that inhere in the station in life into which 
one is born. The religious reverence inculcated in the self’s identifi ca-
tion with the nation as a vision of the Good entails within it the logic 
of sacrifi ce. Bradley writes, the heart of the nation, ‘rise[s] high and 
beat[s] in the breast of each one of her citizens, till her safety and 
her honour are dearer to each than life [. . .] and death seems a little 
thing to those that go for her to their common and nameless graves’ 
(Ethical Studies, p. 184). This total merging of self with nation even 
resolves the apparent antithesis between despotism and individual-
ism, Bradley claims. ‘The truth of despotism is saved, because, unless 
the member realises the whole [nation] by and in himself, he fails to 
reach his own individuality’ (Ethical Studies, p. 188).
Certainly Clive Bell cannot be accused of chauvinistic glorifi cation 
of the state. ‘Nationalism is a terrible enemy to civility’, he claims 
(Civilization, p. 109). His focus upon civilisation rather than nation 
as the location of self-realisation seems to comprehend a more expan-
sive view of human achievement. Yet this turns out not to be the case. 
Bell’s defi nition of civilisation constitutes a more highly individualis-
tic focus upon interiority at the expense of the material world even 
than Bradley’s. It is also entirely Eurocentric. Like idealists generally, 
Bell sees education as the primary means of fostering the perfection 
of the inner life. Indeed, education is the gateway to inner nobility, 
but Bell’s view of education invokes no sense of wider national life. 
‘Civilized people’, he asserts, value knowledge ‘as a means to exqui-
site spiritual states’ of mind (Civilization, p. 92). ‘Without educa-
tion [. . .] [there is wanting] the key to the inner palace of pleasures’ 
(Civilization, pp. 170–1). Given this exclusive focus upon interiority 
it is not surprising that his ideal of civilisation encompasses only the 
mental realm of those with access to an elite, public school, clas-
sical education. No aspect of the material world attaches to Bell’s 
view of a civilised national community. ‘Civilization’, he writes, ‘is 
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the fl avour given to the self-expression of an age or a society by a 
mental attitude; it is the colour given to social manifestations by a 
peculiar and prevailing point of view. Whence comes this colour-
ing view of life [. . .]? From individuals of course’ (Civilization, 
p. 165). A civilised society, therefore, depends upon the existence of 
a group of highly cultivated individual people of suffi cient infl uence 
and number ‘to affect larger groups and ultimately whole communi-
ties’ (Civilization, p. 166).
A state ‘may be held to have become highly civilized’, Bell claims, 
‘when an appreciable part of the mass, though barbarous enough 
[. . .] has yet absorbed a tincture of the precious dye’ (Civilization, 
p. 191). This absorption of mental values by the community at large 
does not imply any progress towards political, social or economic 
equality, however. The need to provide for material wants is wholly 
inimical to the development of highly civilised minds. The poor, ‘so 
long as to be poor means to be unfree and uneducated, are con-
cerned actively with civilization only in so far as by their labours 
they make it possible’ (Civilization, p. 71). A civilised society, Bell 
maintains, requires a leisured class and ‘a leisured class requires the 
existence of a class of slaves’ or, more preferably ‘willing servants 
[. . .] people content to make sacrifi ces for an ideal’ (Civilization, 
p. 205). For that reason, he argues, democracy and civilisation 
are incompatible: ‘There has never been a civilized democracy’, he 
declares (Civilization, p. 220). Moreover, he suggests, sweetness 
and light have certainly ‘radiated from the courts of tyrants and 
usurpers’ (Civilization, p. 226). In the present age, the example of 
Mussolini and Lenin may well spread across the world, Bell says, 
‘And I do not know that civilization stands in the long run to lose 
by the change’ (Civilization, p. 224).
Bell’s gender politics are no more democratic than his class sympa-
thies. In the perceptible cultured community as he constitutes it, women 
are as mute and invisible as workers. In the highly civilised society of 
fi fth and fourth century Athens, Bell notes, the only roles available 
to women were that of wife and mother or of hetaerae. Among the 
latter, most were common prostitutes, but a privileged few were culti-
vated enough to become companions and mistresses of highly civilised 
Athenians (Civilization, pp. 234–5). Bell implies that for present day 
British women the options are even more limited; ‘they must become 
either wives or old maids’ (Civilization, p. 236). For the former, once 
she is mistress of a house and mother of children, it is diffi cult for her 
to ‘keep her place in the fi rst fl ight’ (Civilization, p. 237). Spinsterhood 
leads to an even worse fate. ‘The peculiar intelligence and sensibility 
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of youth fade [. . .] her understanding shrinks [. . .] I sometimes won-
der whether an old maid is fi t for anything less than the kingdom of 
heaven’ (Civilization, p. 238). The actual importance that Bell attaches 
to women’s role in fostering a civilised nation is indicated in the mere 
eight pages he devotes to the subject, clearly as an afterthought at the 
end of his essay.
Even if Woolf did not read the second edition of Bradley’s Ethical 
Studies when it was published in 1927, she would have been famil-
iar with its ideas and teaching since these were widely discussed 
and dispersed throughout the intellectual and political domains. She 
most certainly read Clive Bell’s Civilization, which Leonard Woolf 
dismissed as ‘very superfi cial’ (Diary, 3.184). The Waves constitutes 
a ‘blasphemous’ rebuttal, by means of criticism and ironic laughter, 
of the idealist glorifi cation of self as cultured interiority and of a 
Burkean nation as revered tradition and guarantor of civilisation. 
Woolf overturns the vertical hierarchy of spirit over matter and 
thereby challenges the myths of individualism, interiority and spiri-
tuality that are sustained by it. The Waves insists upon the material-
ity not the spirituality of the self. No other novel can be so crammed 
full of descriptions of bodily sensation. Other novelists may well 
deal in more graphic detail with bodily excretions, tortured fl esh 
and visceral experiences. Yet in most cases these details are signifi -
cant in terms of the individual character to whom they happen and 
are more usually represented as part of extreme events and height-
ened moments within the narrative. In The Waves, the focus upon 
embodied matter is much more impersonal and is represented as the 
norm of life, not the exception; it is there for its own sake as part of 
the continuum of physical existence.
Whereas idealists, like Bell, impute value to human life only in 
so far as it attains ‘exquisite states of mind’, Bernard, in The Waves, 
recognises that we are all ‘undifferentiated blobs of matter’.6 Instead 
of a vertical social order, this wholly unelevated view of human exis-
tence contributes to the novel’s emphasis upon the communality of 
the body, as Gillian Beer points out.7 As in Mrs Dalloway, interi-
ority is often experienced by the characters in The Waves not as 
private thought but as shared consciousness, as a metonymic move-
ment through different perspectives. Poetry and culture, more gen-
erally, are shown, in The Waves, to depend upon the here and now 
of the common life of bio-social being. While education is valued by 
idealists as the primary means of transmitting civilised mental being, 
Woolf recognises it as a mechanism that conscripts the body into 
subjection. ‘Civilisation’ is depicted as a euphemistic abstraction 
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that spins an idealised veil over the imposition of coercive material 
practices and structures. Woolf’s own vision wholly lacks the nostal-
gia and religiosity that typify both Bradley’s and Bell’s imagining of 
ideal or civilised national communities. It is a perspective she shares 
with Leonard Woolf: a futuristic recognition of the development 
of technological, global capitalism, the ultimate system of abstract 
macro idealism, and one capable of conscripting global space into 
the hierarchical order of a place.
Finally, through the ambitious scale of her novel, Woolf chal-
lenges limited views, like Bell’s, of women’s potential within the 
world of culture and the public sphere. In defi ance of canonical tra-
dition, Woolf sets out to discover a new empirical poetics. Her aim is 
to articulate a celebratory vision of the immensity and power of the 
universe that contains human life. Yet it will be a vision stripped bare 
of idealist religiosity and consolation. Woolf explores this ambition 
for a new artistic distribution of the perceptible in a series of essays 
written while she was preoccupied with The Waves. In all of these 
essays she calls for a rejection of the vertical hierarchy of novelis-
tic form that lavishes attention on psychological individuality and a 
shift, instead, towards a wider, horizontal vision of human existence, 
as a continuity with the physical universe. Clearly there is a risk here 
of simply displacing subjective idealism with the macro idealism of 
universalism. In her essays Woolf counters this danger by insisting 
that the moment of comprehensive vision can only arise in the here 
and now of lived experience, that vision and fact must co-exist.
In her essay ‘The Cinema’ (1926), for example, she writes that 
the estranging effect of cinema which allows us to behold events ‘as 
they are when we are not there’ produces a more comprehensive 
vision of existence, the ability ‘to generalise, to endow one man with 
the attributes of a race’.8 Yet this process of abstraction must be 
continually dissolved in the motility of actual existence in the here 
and now. ‘We get intimations’, she writes, ‘only in the chaos of the 
streets, perhaps, when some momentary assembly of colour, sound, 
movement, suggests that here is a scene waiting a new art to be 
transfi xed’ (Essays, 4.595).
In ‘Poetry, Fiction and the Future’ (1927), Woolf again expresses 
the need to encompass the immediacy of actuality within a gener-
alising vision. She praises Shakespeare’s ability to move without a 
hitch ‘from philosophy to a drunken brawl; from love songs to an 
argument; from simple merriment to profound speculation’ (Essays, 
4.431). She argues that the novel will evolve to comprehend both 
particularity and ‘the wide, general ideas which civilization teaches’ 
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(Essays, 4.434). This new form will focus very little upon individu-
alising details of ‘the houses, incomes, occupations of its characters 
[. . .] but [instead] it will give the relation of the mind to general 
ideas’ (Essays, 4.435). Yet this philosophical vision derives from 
immersion in the material world. The ‘democratic art of prose’ is ‘so 
humble that it can go anywhere; no place is too low, too sordid, or 
too mean [. . .] It can lick up with its long glutinous tongue the most 
minute fragments of fact and mass them into the most subtle laby-
rinths’ (Essays, 4.436). It is from facts that the vision evolves.
In ‘Women and Fiction’ (1929) Woolf again argues that the new 
novel ‘will cease to be the dumping ground for personal emotions’ 
(Essays, 5.34–5). It will observe men and women ‘as they cohere 
and clash in groups and classes and races’. Future women writers 
‘will look beyond the personal [. . .] to the wider questions [. . .] of 
our destiny and the meaning of life’ (Essays, 5.34). In the extended 
version of this essay, given as a lecture at Girton and published as A 
Room of One’s Own (1929), Woolf chooses to end with a ringing 
rejection of individualism and the limited perspective this ideology 
imposes upon any art that embraces it. ‘I am talking’, she says, ‘of 
the common life which is the real life and not the little separate 
lives we live as individuals [. . .] we [shall] escape a little from the 
common sitting-room and see human beings not always in their 
relation to each other but in relation to reality; and the sky, too, 
and the trees.’9
There is no doubt that Woolf was personally preoccupied, during 
the period in which she was writing The Waves, with the nature of 
the physical universe and of the relationship of human life to that 
immensity. She recounts an intense experience that occurred one eve-
ning in February 1926, as she walked through Russell Square. She 
evokes a metonymic movement beyond the individuality of self out 
to the vastness of the physical world: ‘I see the mountains in the sky: 
the great clouds; and the moon which is risen over Persia; I have a 
great and astonishing sense of something there, which is “it”’ (Diary, 
3.62). With this recognition of immensity comes also a sense ‘of my 
own strangeness, walking on the earth [. . .] of the infi nite oddity of 
the human position’. Two years later, she describes a similar expe-
rience that begins with a feeling of loneliness and terror in which 
she ‘got then to a consciousness of what I call “reality” [. . .] some-
thing abstract; but residing in the downs or sky’ (Diary, 3.196). It 
would seem that this intense experience of the infi nitesimal compass 
of a single human life in the scale of the life of the universe is what 
urges her shift of focus from the individual to human kind generally. 
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She writes, ‘How little one counts, I think: how little anyone counts; 
how fast and furious and masterly life is; and how all these thou-
sands are swimming for dear life’ (Diary, 3.201). A vision of tran-
sient human life as metonymically part of the continuity of universal 
life offers a compassionate transcendence that is rooted in material-
ity rather than idealism. ‘It may be’, she suggests, ‘that though we 
change; one fl ying after another, so quick so quick, yet we are some-
how successive, and continuous − we human beings’ (Diary, 3.218).
Woolf recognises these experiences as in some sense metaphysical. 
This is the term also used by Peter Walsh, in Mrs Dalloway, to describe 
Clarissa’s sense of self as extended out into the wider world. Yet Peter 
also concedes that Clarissa Dalloway is ‘one of the most thorough-
going sceptics he had ever met’ (Mrs Dalloway, p. 66). The language 
Woolf uses to recount her intense sense of connection to the larger 
universe evokes that of another determinedly anti-religious poetic 
sceptic: Lucretius. His poem, De Rerum Natura, was long regarded as 
the most dangerously blasphemous work of the classical writers. It is 
indicative of the high claim Woolf is implicitly making, contra Bell, for 
the role of women within cultural life that The Waves is a palimpsest 
of De Rerum Natura and of Shelley’s unfi nished poem, The Triumph 
of Life. Her choice equally declares the antipathetic position to the 
‘great tradition’ she is occupying. Shelley, like Lucretius, is notoriously 
at odds with established authority.
All three ‘blasphemous’ texts open with a powerful poetic invoca-
tion to a totally non-spiritual, natural creative force, the engendering 
light of the rising sun. Throughout The Waves there are echoes of 
imagery from The Triumph of Life, especially in the words of Rhoda. 
Yet the primary importance of Shelley for Woolf’s ambition in The 
Waves is that he unites poetic vision to worldly politics. Indeed, as 
Harold Bloom points out, Shelley shares the same philosophical heri-
tage as Woolf. ‘Shelley’, Bloom claims, ‘is the most Humean poet 
in the language [. . .] and it is Hume, not Berkeley or Plato, whose 
view of reality informs Prometheus Unbound and poems that came 
after.’10 In The Triumph of Life only the fi gures of Aristotle and 
Bacon among the great and famous of the world appear uncorrupted 
by false beliefs and illusions of power. Both are usually regarded as 
the originators of empirical materialism. The poem contrasts the 
grotesque triumphal procession of life with interludes of dream-like 
platonic vision but implies that both dystopic and idealist perspec-
tives are illusionary. In The Waves, each of the six main characters 
describes the life in city streets as a procession. Woolf uses the dis-
crepancy between these views of ‘reality’ to point to the subjective 
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screen habitually imposed upon the empirical world by subjective 
mental values and attitudes. So Jinny declares, ‘This is the trium-
phant procession; this is the army of victory’ (p. 161). Rhoda, how-
ever, contemplates the scene with revulsion, ‘This is Oxford Street. 
Here are hate, jealousy, hurry and indifference frothed into the wild 
semblance of life’ (p. 132).
Not only does Lucretius open De Rerum Natura with an 
image of the sun as source of life, like Woolf, he associates this 
creative force with a female image rather than a masculine solar 
deity. Throughout the poem, Lucretius’ language, like Woolf’s, 
foregrounds power and movement. The rising sun, Lucretius 
writes, will ‘envelop and fl ood the whole world with [. . .] 
light [. . .] and [its heat] beats its way, so to speak, through waves 
of air’.11 Lucretius’ poetic imagination, like Woolf’s, is particu-
larly responsive to vast skyscapes of ‘great caverns’ and immense 
clouds ‘swimming through the air’ (DRN, pp. 513, 291). There 
is, in the language of both, a sense of the plenitude of the physical 
universe. Woolf even seems to have transplanted the descrip-
tion Neville gives of boyish comradeship lying in the long 
grass watching cricket straight from De Rerum Natura where 
Lucretius enthuses on the simple delight arising ‘when stretched 
forth in groups upon the soft grass beside a rill of water under the 
branches of a tall tree men merrily refresh themselves at no great 
cost, especially when the weather smiles’ (DRN, p. 97).
Like Shelley (whose poem is also a palimpsest of De Rerum 
Natura) and like Woolf, Lucretius fuses celebration of physical life 
with political critique. His passionate aim in writing the work was 
his desire to free human beings from the fetters of false belief in 
otherworldly powers by expounding the Epicurean materialist phi-
losophy of the universe. At present, Lucretius writes, human life lies 
‘foully grovelling upon the ground, crushed beneath the weight of 
Superstition’ (DRN, pp. 7–9). The abject fear spawned by thought 
of non-existent powers and deities is cause of most of the greed, 
cruelty, ambitions and wars that curse human existence, Lucretius 
claims. He points specifi cally to idealism and its imposition of sub-
jective mental visions upon the object world. ‘We see in marvel-
lous fashion’, he writes, ‘many things [. . .] which all try as it were 
to break the credit of our senses’ (DRN, p. 313). They deceive us 
‘because of opinions of the mind which we bring to them ourselves’ 
(DRN, p. 313). Lucretius’ arguments against idealism, along with 
his atomic theory of matter, in which chance collisions ‘heedless, 
without aim, without intention’, produce the entire universe had 
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renewed relevance for Woolf’s generation in the wake of Einstein’s 
atomic theory (DRN, p. 177). In 1918, for example, H. Woods 
published a defence of materialism with the Lucretian title On the 
Nature of Things.12
What most outraged religious authority through the ages was 
Lucretius’ insistence upon the materiality of the soul. The mind, he 
says, ‘which we often call the intelligence [. . .] is part of man, no 
less than hands and feet and eyes are parts of the whole living being’ 
(DRN, p. 195). Lucretius declares that only by means of the con-
joined physical existence of body and mind is sensation and feeling 
possible (DRN, p. 213). Since both are material, both are mortal 
(DRN, p. 221). Woolf, too, attacks any spiritualised view of human 
life and subjectivity. Throughout The Waves, there is repeated focus 
upon the material basis of sensation and feelings. Subjective emo-
tions and responses, normally taken as indication and guarantee of 
the uniqueness of individual sensibility or soul, are located in the 
corporeal system. Bernard comments on the feeling of domestic con-
tentment at breakfast time with his wife, ‘Muscles, nerves, intestines, 
blood-vessels, all that makes the coil and spring of our being, the 
unconscious hum of the engine, as well as the dart and fl icker of 
the tongue, functioned superbly’ (pp. 217–18). Jinny describes the 
heightened sensations arising after the dinner to bid farewell to Per-
cival in bodily terms: ‘our senses have widened. Membranes, webs of 
nerve have [. . .] spread themselves’ (p. 110). Similarly, in A Room 
of One’s Own, Woolf writes, ‘heart, body and brain [are] all mixed 
together and not contained in separate compartments’ (p. 14). The 
soul situated ‘half-way down the spine’, kindles to a warm glow as a 
direct effect of good food and wine (p. 9).
De Rerum Natura combines scathing critique of the degrada-
tion of human existence in thrall to false beliefs with an expansive 
poetic celebration of the physical universe. Woolf’s artistic ambition 
in The Waves is similarly two-fold. The narrative sections consti-
tute a critical and ironic examination of the pretensions, inequalities 
and oppressions that result from veneration of false idealist beliefs. 
The interludes, by contrast, express a powerfully imagined evoca-
tion of the majestic sweep and immensity of physical life. Whereas 
Clive Bell locates a mythic ideal of civilisation in an elite subjective 
realm, Woolf sets out a wholly communal materialist vision of the 
universe. She focuses persistently upon the shared materiality of self 
and culture. Instead of the Burkean veneration of the nation as inher-
ited traditions and institutions, Woolf calls attention to the processes 
whereby the self as a body is conscripted into the fetters of coercive 
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belief systems. To be embodied, she shows, is always already to be 
the site of cultural practice. Idealism needs to be rejected as an ideol-
ogy because it veils corporeal forms of subjugation behind an ele-
vated metaphysical rhetoric of spiritual self-realisation and cultural 
glorifi cation.
Woolf’s anti-idealism, her insistence upon the materiality of 
body and mind, accounts for the unusual narrative method and the 
structure of The Waves. It is a stylistics that constitutes a radically 
horizontal regime of the perceptible, replacing vertical hierarchies. 
The use of the word ‘said’ rather than ‘thought’ to distinguish the 
personal accounts given by the different characters underlines the 
embodiedness of each. Thought is the register of subjectivity. To 
speak is a physical act, engaging tongue, lips, throat and breath, ‘the 
dart and fl icker of the tongue’, as Bernard says. Speech is thus one 
of those liminal sites where there occurs a metonymic transaction 
across the porous boundaries of self and world, the biological and 
the cultural; it is the recurrent enactment of bio-psycho-social being. 
The structure of the novel is also metonymic, expressing the hori-
zontal co-extension of physical and social existence. The descriptive 
interludes move from sea and sky, operating as metonymies for the 
larger whole of the physical universe, to the house, with its table of 
plates and cutlery, as metonymies of the wider social and cultural 
world. To fi nd ‘lodgement’, an embodied place in the social world, is 
a recurrent motif in the novel. Yet the plates, set out ready for food, 
point to the corporeal basis of cultural life, while the windows of 
the house transact the movement backwards and forwards between 
the two interconnected realms. The garden where the children’s fi rst 
social experiences are laid down is another metonymic site of cul-
tural and physical contiguity.
‘What have you made of life?’ Neville asks on behalf of all six 
characters (p. 176). It is the question or compelled urgency that 
drives the idealist goal of individualist self-realisation. The novel 
radically undermines the ideological myth of self-making as an 
endeavour of innate mental will. Self emerges, is realised, as embod-
ied being. Bernard describes how at bath-time water squeezed from 
the sponge ‘pours down the runnel of my spine. Bright arrows 
of sensation shoot on either side. I am covered with warm fl esh’ 
(p. 19). Later in the novel Bernard expresses a wish that children 
might be spared that inscription into fl eshly being (p. 200). The bio-
graphical narratives of the six characters have a strikingly Lockean, 
anti-idealist opening. The fi rst word of the fi rst sentences initiates 
the grammar of separation as the subject registers the sensations of a 
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world external to the self, ‘“I see a slab of pale yellow,” said Susan.’ 
Later in the novel, Bernard again documents the empirical process 
of self-realisation, ‘I am not part of the street – no, I observe the 
street. One splits off, therefore’ (p. 94). The production of a facti-
tious self from fl eshly being, ensures, as Elizabeth Hamilton pointed 
out at the beginning of the nineteenth century, a residual fear of 
dissolution.13 As Louis says, ‘But if I do not nail these impressions 
to the board and out of the many men in me make one [. . .] then 
I shall fall like snow and be wasted’ (p. 141). Self-realisation as 
Louis suggests here, is an impulse driven more by fl eshly vulnerabil-
ity than by willed intellectual or spiritual seeking after perfection.
What is notably absent in the fi rst section of the novel is the Freud-
ian family. The self, as Woolf represents it, is not produced by indi-
vidual psychology so much as by socio-physical forces. The children’s 
early and formative traumas derive from the shock of those events 
in which the social collapses back into the physical: violent death, 
sexual love, putrefaction. Bernard describes the process of individu-
ation wrought by these encounters with brutal aspects of physical 
being, ‘The wax – the virginal wax that coats the spine melted in 
different patches for each of us. The growl of the boot-boy making 
love [. . .] the dead man in the gutter [. . .] the rat swarming with 
maggots [. . .] our white wax was streaked and stained differently 
by each of these [. . .] We suffered terribly as we became separate 
bodies’ (p. 202). In make-believe play and story-telling, the cultural 
is shown as already at work transforming physical actuality into a 
socially produced realm. Although the children impose the exotic 
adventures of imperialism on the English garden, their preoccupa-
tion is still the trauma of emergence of self from fl esh and the fear of 
dissolution back into matter: ‘We are in a swamp now; in a malarial 
jungle. There is an elephant white with maggots, killed by an arrow 
shot dead in its eye [. . .] that is a hooded cobra [. . .] with a festering 
brown scar to be mauled by lions’ (p. 16). It is perhaps signifi cant 
that loss of secure identity boundaries – swamp, jungle, putrefaction, 
wounds, death − is transposed to a non-English geography, the other-
ness of a space to be colonised.
In the narrative sections that follow early childhood, the char-
acters speak as if they are making autonomous individual choices 
and pursuing interior personal goals. Yet their words equally suggest 
that far from self-realisation they are being made by the unrelent-
ing pressures that constitute the continuity of physical and cultural 
being. Later in life, Neville says, ‘We have chosen now, or sometimes 
it seems the choice was made for us – a pair of tongs pinched us 
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between the shoulders’ (p. 178). By the end of the novel there is little 
sense of chronological progression in the six lives. Their stories are 
more a series of repetitions like the waves on the shore than a lin-
ear trajectory towards self-realisation. Even Susan’s narrative, which 
most approximates to the conventional Bildungsroman of unhappy 
childhood leading to eventual marriage and motherhood, is denied 
any sense of individual fulfi lment.
Readers of The Waves sometimes complain that it is diffi cult to 
distinguish between the different characters. That would seem to 
be the anti-individualistic aim for a new form of novel that Woolf 
calls for in her essays of the time. Frequently, characters in The 
Waves express a sense of extended or shared consciousness. Neville 
says, ‘As he approaches I become not myself but Neville mixed with 
somebody’ (p. 67). Bernard, the character who is most attracted 
to imaginative identifi cation with others, speaks of the desire ‘to 
embrace the whole world with the arms of understanding [. . .] Am 
I not, as I walk, trembling with strange oscillations and vibrations 
of sympathy, which, unmoored as I am from a private being, bid me 
embrace these engrossed fl ocks’ (p. 93). In her diary of 1926, Woolf 
writes of what she terms the screen making habit: ‘If we had not 
this device for shutting people off from our sympathies, we might, 
perhaps, dissolve utterly. Separateness would be impossible. But the 
screens are in the excess; not the sympathy’ (Diary, 3.104). The 
Waves, then, can be read as an anti-Bildungsroman. It is Woolf’s 
attempt to replace the self-centredness of the traditional realist novel 
with a worldly realist distribution of the perceptible foregrounding 
the material common life and culture of shared physical being and 
intersubjective consciousness. It is typical that Bernard’s moment of 
extended sympathies is perceived by him as physical sensation, as 
oscillations and vibrations.
The Waves, thus, sets out an alternative sense of community to 
that of identifi cation with the nation as spiritual ideal and location 
of abstract values demanding reverence. It constitutes a more radi-
cal recognition of the common life of shared fl eshly being, in which 
the sympathies arising from the fellowship of physical existence are 
not totally screened off by self-preserving individualistic separate-
ness. In the novel, all six characters experience moments when the 
boundaries of self give way to horizontal fl ows of consciousness. 
This shared commonality has its being in physical bodily events like 
eating. Neville describes how he loses ‘all knowledge of particulars 
as I eat’. The occasion is one of the shared meals where they all 
meet up together. The experience causes even Louis to confess that 
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the ‘attempts to say, “I am this, I am that”, which we make, com-
ing together, like separated parts of one body and soul, are false’ 
(p. 112). Bernard, as so often, sums up, ‘We have come together, at 
a particular time, to this particular spot. We are drawn into this 
communion by some deep some common emotion’ (p. 103).
Equally, though, the body forms the basis of social division and 
separation; distinctions are infl icted upon the fl esh. Judith Butler 
draws attention to those reiterative practices, those habitual physi-
cal rituals and actions, which, through their constant repetition, 
inscribe a gendered identity upon the body.14 Woolf, too, fore-
grounds the way routine bodily events determine the gendering of 
self. Bernard recounts the behavioural rituals of leave-taking that 
accompany departure for boarding school, differentiated into ‘this 
hand-shaking ceremony with my father’ and ‘this gulping ceremony 
with my mother’ (p. 22). The masculine suppression of tears is 
enforced early in life. Later in his narrative, Bernard refers to the 
daily male ritual of ‘shave, shave, shave’ and a visit to the barbers 
is one of the fi nal ‘ceremonies’ enacted in the story (pp. 153, 233). 
Louis’ reiterative hanging up his coat and placing his cane on enter-
ing his offi ce constitutes a daily reinscription of masculine authority 
(p. 166). Susan recites as an incantation the habitual female prac-
tices of her daily life: ‘I knead; I stretch; I pull, plunging my hands 
in the warm inwards of the dough’ (p. 80). As she grows older she 
assures herself that ‘my body has been used daily, rightly, like a 
tool by a good workman, all over’ (p. 179). Jinny’s womanly self 
is continuously produced by the bodily sensation of her ‘silk legs 
rub[bing] smoothly together’ while her feet are pinched in her fash-
ionable shoes (p. 81). Later, the practice of applying powder and 
lipstick sustains her identity against physical changes infl icted by 
age (p. 162). Even Rhoda teaches her body to do ‘a certain trick’ (p. 
185). The emergent embodied self, the novel suggests, is, from the 
beginning, a process of simultaneous material and cultural produc-
tion. Susan’s rooted, maternal, country life is as unnatural in that 
sense as Jinny’s city existence.
The physical inscription of a gendered identity is consolidated by 
differential educational experiences. In the early section and continu-
ing throughout the narrative the six characters form three pairs, shar-
ing very similar qualities. Both Rhoda and Louis are fearful, solitary 
and poetic. Bernard and Susan conform most to the normal social 
expectations of marriage and family. Jinny and Neville are epicure-
ans in taste and promiscuous in pursuit of sexual encounters. Yet by 
the time they reach adulthood the social status of the woman in each 
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pair is utterly different from that of her male counterpart. Louis, 
Bernard and Neville are at the centre of public life, secure in com-
mercial, intellectual and social approval and success. The women are 
marginalised from that public world. The novel suggests that educa-
tion is the means by which women’s exclusion is effected and it is an 
exclusion taught to the body as much as the mind.
For Clive Bell and for British idealists, education is seen as the 
main vehicle for progression towards the highest form of mental self-
realisation. For Bell it offers the key to ‘the inner palace of plea-
sures’ (Civilization, p. 171). In A Room of One’s Own, Woolf had 
already satirised the telling contrast between the splendour of din-
ing in a male college and the scantiness of provision at the college 
for women. In The Waves, she represents a similar stark difference 
in the facilities of the school attended by Rhoda, Jinny and Susan. 
It could hardly be further from a ‘palace of inner pleasures’, offer-
ing no higher aspirations than that of embroidery and occupations 
as nurses or missionaries for the empire (pp. 24, 31). The meagre 
and ugly material conditions of the school preclude any entry into 
a more inspirational mental realm. Susan records her hatred of the 
‘wind-bitten shrubs’ and ‘the ugly, the encaustic tiles’ (pp. 24, 31). 
The dining-room smells of meat, the corridors of carbolic and the 
schoolrooms of chalk (pp. 34, 48). Unsurprisingly, no attachment 
is formed to this impoverished mental and physical experience. 
Women need to fi nd other spaces within the social world that will 
provide them with a sense of physically belonging. The only posi-
tions on offer are those designated by their female bodies. For Jinny, 
a sexual milieu of entertainment and parties creates a sense of being 
bodily at home. ‘This is my world [. . .]’ she says, ‘I am a native here’ 
(p. 82). In domesticity, Susan fi nds ‘a dwelling-place made from time 
immemorial after an hereditary pattern’ (p. 179). Rhoda, in denial 
of her bodily self, is condemned to a hopeless search for the security 
of embodied belonging: ‘I wish above all things to have lodgement’ 
(p. 107). In these three characters Woolf ironically depicts the place 
allotted women in Clive Bell’s view of their roles within civilized 
society: mothers, hetaerae, old maids.
Bernard, Louis and Neville, by contrast, experience school physi-
cally as a world that is spacious, generous of provision and endowed 
with dignity. ‘A noble Roman air hangs over these austere quad-
rangles’; there are a courtyard and statue, library and laboratories, 
and playing fi elds with towering elms (p. 23). A material world, in 
other words, that fosters an embodied sense of entering into posses-
sion of cultural heritage. ‘I come like a lord to his halls appointed’ is 
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Neville’s initial response (p. 23). ‘Above all, we have inherited tradi-
tions’, Louis thinks gratefully and Bernard describes the ceremonies, 
like taking breakfast at the headmaster’s table, by which the neces-
sary routines sustaining physical life are transformed into elevated 
cultural rituals (pp. 45, 46). There are no distasteful smells of soap 
and meat here to register corporal being as mean and repugnant. The 
school lends itself to an idealist interpretation as embodiment of a 
spiritual community. All three men come to assume they will achieve 
entry into the great tradition as writers and play a full and ambitious 
part in national and international life.
In A Room of One’s Own, Woolf turns from the exclusion of 
women to wonder whether ‘it is worse perhaps to be locked in’ and 
asks what the effect is of ‘the safety and prosperity of the one sex 
[. . .] and [. . .] of the effect of tradition’ (p. 19). The Waves is an 
exploration of the cultural, political and social costs, both for self 
and for others, of mental enclosure within privileged entitlement to 
revered traditions. For idealists, national culture, tradition and heri-
tage constitute the expression of the nation’s best soul. Inculcation of 
these values is therefore the means of achieving spiritual realisation 
of the best self for those members of the community who are most 
in harmony with the highest form of national life. For idealists it 
is pre-eminently education that fosters this process of identifi cation 
between individual best self and the nation as ideal community. It 
is this sense of privileged unity between self and nation that allows 
the material realities of sacrifi ce, coercive authority, colonial enforce-
ment and even despotism to be veiled by a rhetoric of reverence, 
sanctity and nobility.
In The Waves, the factual reality that underlies and upholds 
a privileged vision of national identity is represented as that of a 
hierarchical, divisive and ultimately brutal order. The public school 
education of the three male characters interpellates them into mutu-
ally reinforcing value systems of religion, nationalism, heroism and 
sacrifi ce.15 Despite the ‘spiritual’ nature of these ideals, they are 
literally embodied in the material practices of school routine. Ide-
ology is both naturalised and sanctifi ed in bodily experience: the 
communal processions into chapel, the half-holiday on the playing 
fi elds in honour of the Duke’s birthday, buckling on cricket pads 
and the physical adoration of sporting heroes like Percival. It is not 
individuality, certainly not elevated interiority, that is nurtured by 
this corporal regime but the conformity of homo-erotic tribalism. 
This fi nds expression in competitive nationalism as the boasting 
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boys brag of a father who has scored a century at Lords or an uncle 
who is the best shot in England (pp. 36, 23).
The dark underside of this glorifi cation of physical prowess is an 
ethics of brutality. The boasting boys ‘make little boys sob in dark 
passages’ and leave butterfl ies with their wings torn off (p. 36). In 
the late 1920s, fascism and Hitler were on the march in Germany 
and Mussolini was dominating Italian politics. ‘The world is pass-
ing through an era of dictatorship’ commented a writer in The 
New Statesman on 9 October 1927.16 While Woolf was writing, 
Mussolini was conscripting boys in Italy into fascist youth organ-
isations. In The Waves, the boasting boys are ‘marching in troops 
with badges on their caps; they salute simultaneously passing the 
fi gure of their general’ (p. 36). The analogy could not be clearer. 
In A Room of One’s Own, Woolf equates all forms of adversarial 
competitiveness with the ‘private-school stage of human existence 
where there are “sides”, and it is necessary for one side to beat 
another side’ (p. 80).
In The Waves, Woolf suggests that even national culture is impov-
erished by an idealist regime of the perceptible that devalues the 
embodied self and its continuity with the material world, elevating 
instead a dream of spiritual community. She overturns this vertical 
ordering, claiming that poetry demands a living, horizontal connec-
tion of the self to social and physical realms. It is through the voices 
of Rhoda and Louis that she explores the damaging effects of enclo-
sure within an idealist vision and the consequent loss of connection to 
the common life of bio-social being. Both characters are in search of 
timeless verities not inhering in material existence. Rhoda dreams of 
‘a world immune from change’ (p. 86). Louis sees himself as the com-
panion of Plato (p. 76). In her essays, Woolf often speaks admiringly 
of poetry as the most universalising of literary forms but, she adds, 
the vision must be balanced by detailed observation of the actual. In 
the diary entry recording her aims for The Waves, she expresses her 
impatience with the particulars of routine life, the ‘appalling narra-
tive business of the realist’ (Diary, 3.209). Poets, she continues, suc-
ceed by simplifying so that ‘practically everything is left out’. So in 
Mrs Dalloway, the idealist dreams that ‘all this fever of living were 
simplicity itself; and myriads of things merged in one thing’ (p. 49). 
Woolf rejects this desire for idealist simplicity in The Waves, declar-
ing, ‘I want to put practically everything in’ (Diary, 3.210).
Rhoda and Louis are the two characters in The Waves most 
closely associated with poetry. Both attempt to impose a subjective 
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screen upon actuality, shutting out what they do not want to see. 
‘So terrible was life’, says Rhoda, ‘that I held up shade after shade. 
Look at life through this, look at life through that’ (p. 170). The allu-
sions in their speech to Shelley’s representation of Keats in Adonais 
suggest that both see themselves as wounded by contact with a hos-
tile material world (pp. 78, 86). As in Mrs Dalloway, Woolf implies 
that the idealist impulse, despite its rhetoric of elevated spirituality, 
is frequently motivated by fl ight from physical reality perceived as 
distasteful, even repulsive, especially in the mass. Rhoda voices a vis-
ceral fear of and disgust for human life generally. ‘Oh, human beings, 
how I have hated you! [. . .]’ she cries, ‘I have been stained by you 
and corrupted. You smell so unpleasant, too, lining up outside doors 
to buy tickets’ (p. 169). She equally disavows her own ‘clumsy [. . .] 
ill-fi tting body’ (p. 85).
This rejection of the corporeal prevents her from embracing mate-
rial existence. Instead, Rhoda seeks to impose a subjective idealist 
vision of a perfect but inhuman world upon imperfect actuality. It 
would be a world without ‘compromise and right and wrong on 
human lips’ (p. 192). In total contrast to Woolf’s view that the men-
tal screens are in excess not the sympathy, Rhoda’s would be a world 
without compassion, with no sense of continuity with the shared 
common, embodied life of physical existence. So fanatically does 
Rhoda pursue the dream of perfection, she fails to notice physical 
suffering, ‘the poor hold[ing] out matchboxes in wind-bitten fi ngers’ 
(p. 164). Ultimately, her Romantic visions of icy caverns and marble 
columns where the swallow dips her wing are beautiful but ethereal, 
bereft of life (p. 85). Bernard records, ‘The willow as she saw it grew 
on the verge of a grey desert where no bird sang’ (p. 210).
The allusion to Keats’s La Belle Dame sans Merci implies 
that words shrivel into silence in an uninhabited place. Despite 
her shrinking from the world, Rhoda senses that poetry requires 
a shared, living community that can only exist among embodied 
beings. It is not spirit alone that nurtures art, it needs equally the life 
of the body. After reading Shelley’s poem, ‘The Question’, Rhoda 
dreams of gathering a garland of unworldly fl owers to present: ‘O! 
to whom? [. . .] to whom shall I give all that now fl ows through 
me, from my warm, my porous body?’ (p. 44). In addition to a 
living audience, poetic inspiration, Rhoda recognises, draws nour-
ishment from a shared bodily life. Art is inherently democratic not 
exclusive, or otherworldly, or dwelling in palaces of the mind. ‘I am 
drawn here across London to a particular spot, to a particular place 
[. . .]’, Rhoda says, ‘to light my fi re at the general blaze of you who 
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live wholly, indivisibly and without caring’ (p. 107). ‘What can one 
make in loneliness?’ she asks, and acknowledges that even the most 
heightened poetic pilgrimages ‘start always in your presence, from 
this table, these lights, from Percival and Susan, here and now’ 
(pp. 133, 114).
As David Hume had said much earlier, artistic inspiration is a hor-
izontal not an individualistic force; it ‘runs along the earth; is caught 
from one breast to another’.17 Woolf echoes Hume in A Room of 
One’s Own: ‘masterpieces are not single and solitary births; they 
are the outcome of many years of thinking in common, of thinking 
by the body of the people, so that the experience of the mass is behind 
the single voice’ (p. 49). Cultural vitality cannot be nurtured when 
it is locked within the subjective self or constitutes a purely mental 
vision whether individual or national; it requires also the democratic 
motility of ongoing embodied social life. Bernard describes the red 
carnation on the table at the farewell meal for Percival. The single 
fl ower has become ‘a seven-sided fl ower, many-petalled [. . .] a whole 
fl ower to which every eye brings its own contribution’ (p. 104).
Rhoda’s voice articulates a powerful refutation of exclusionary 
class and gender prescriptions, like those of Clive Bell, for the pres-
ervation of an exquisite spiritual ‘civilization’ for the privileged few. 
Unable to accept the embodied womanly identities prescribed, Rhoda 
never succeeds in fi nding a sense of belonging and thus a living, as 
opposed to an imaginary, audience. She represents one fate of the 
woman artist in a ‘civilization’ that extols only an exclusive gender 
and class tradition. She is denied cultural heritage and is bereaved of 
recipients for her song. Conversely, national culture remains unnur-
tured by her woman’s voice and perspective. Within an elite regime 
of the perceptible she is invisible and mute.
The critique of Louis’ idealism is both harsher than that of 
Rhoda’s and a more direct challenge to the political consensus. Louis’ 
Australian origins and accent are the source of a sense of vulnerabil-
ity and exclusion that renders him eager to identify with values and 
institutions that command reverence. The disciplined procession into 
chapel pleases him in its imposition of homogeneity upon the vari-
ety of boys in the school (p. 25). In the fi gure of the headmaster he 
secures for himself an imaginary sense of empowerment: ‘my heart 
expands in his bulk, his authority’ (p. 26). Whereas Rhoda’s poetic 
vision screens out the material messiness of physical life, Louis’ 
poetic aim, like that of the idealist in Mrs Dalloway, is to bring all 
the ‘fever of life’, the ‘myriad things’ into a formal unity, to impose 
a regime of the proper upon the unregulated (Mrs Dalloway, p. 49). 
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His desire is ‘to make a steel ring of clear poetry that shall connect 
the gulls and the women with bad teeth, the church spire and the 
bobbing billycock hats’ into one vision (p. 105). There is something 
more than a little worrying about the steeliness of Louis’ image of 
poetry’s function here. Louis recognises that the ‘disorderly proces-
sion’ of physical city life, the ‘vapourish smell of beef and mutton’, 
the commonplace conversations, waitresses with trays of apricot 
and custard constitutes ‘the central rhythm [. . .] the common main-
spring’ of existence (pp. 75–6). Yet he remains always an outsider 
to this common life, lacking sympathetic, embodied extension into 
the being of those he watches and overhears. They remain for him 
an alien, physical animality, nothing but bodies, ‘twitching with the 
multiplicity of their sensations’ (p. 75).
Neville recognises that Louis’ idealism renders him unable to 
share ordinary human hopes, anxieties and sorrows because he is 
‘too cold, too universal’ (p. 39). He is unable to respond sensuously 
to the grass and trees of the playing fi eld, admitting that they only 
‘hint at some other order, and better, which makes a reason everlast-
ingly’ (p. 30). His solemn conviction remains that ‘the discrepancies 
and incoherences [. . .] must be resolved’ (p. 167). ‘I have tried’, he 
says, revealingly, ‘to draw from the living fl esh the stone lodged at the 
centre’ (p. 167). Bernard, in his fi nal soliloquy, sees Louis as ‘without 
those simple attachments by which one is connected with another’ 
(p. 204). Louis himself admits that ‘so imperfect are my senses that 
they never blot out [. . .] the serious charge that my reason adds and 
adds against us’ (p. 182). Lacking the capacity for sensuous response 
to the materiality of embodied life, Louis is trapped in his own men-
tal universe. He is, he concludes, ‘happiest alone’ (p. 183). Louis’ 
reiterated ‘I, I, I’ reminds one of Woolf’s comment in A Room of 
One’s Own that the egoistic dominance of the letter ‘I’ in much male 
writing produces an aridity in which nothing will grow, and in which 
‘the fountain of creative energy’ is blocked and shored up ‘within 
narrow limits’ (p. 76). Far from nourishing civilisation, the idealist 
tradition of the individual talent risks producing an unsympathetic 
cultural sterility.
There is, however, a greater cost and danger than that of loss 
of cultural vitality inhering in the compulsion, as represented in 
Louis, to press the multiplicity of life into a subjective vision of an 
orderly, disciplined ideal. His assertion, in response to the varied 
mass of city life, ‘I will reduce you to order’, articulates both a 
poetic and a political vision (p. 76). As has been recognised, Woolf 
modelled Louis, at least in part, on T. S. Eliot.18 Eliot wrote his 
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doctoral thesis on F. H. Bradley’s philosophy. In The Waves, Louis’ 
values are extremely close to those of Bradley. Through the char-
acter of Louis, Woolf explores the complicity of ideals of culture 
with forms of national and international capitalist domination. The 
linkage of poetry and world capitalism may seem unlikely. It com-
prehends, however, Woolf’s radical insight into idealism as a system 
of thought frequently driven by a desire to impose control and con-
formity upon what is perceived as unregulated and different to the 
self. It is a desire, that, as she says in Mrs Dalloway, is prepared to 
smite roughly out of the way ‘the dissentient or dissatisfi ed’ (Mrs 
Dalloway, p. 85). The privileged educational heritage offered to the 
three male characters in The Waves does not constitute a generous, 
egalitarian ideal of national community, as shared human fellow-
ship. Rather, as Woolf represents it, it entails the subscription of 
self into the repressive cultural hegemony of a brutal nationalistic 
masculinity. It is a heritage adapted for those it so trains to impose 
national and colonial rule.
Clive Bell was not the only one within the Bloomsbury circle 
to write on civilisation in 1928. In that same year, Leonard Woolf 
published Imperialism and Civilization. The title indicates Leonard 
Woolf’s very different perspective from that of Bell’s backward-
looking classicism. Leonard Woolf’s is a perspective devoid of rev-
erence and idealism. Indeed, he recognises the way the rhetoric of 
cultural and intellectual superiority is used to justify the imposition 
of Western imperial rule. The fact behind this vision, he insists, is a 
rapacious and ruthless exploitation of the colonised world.19 Woolf 
points specifi cally towards the infl uence of British idealism when he 
argues that national self-interest is elevated into a form of religion in 
which the state becomes a glorifi ed object of worship.
The revered conception of national culture not only serves to 
cover aggressive colonial expansionism with a veil of glory. The 
imposition of Western culture upon colonised peoples inculcates a 
sense of grateful inferiority in any so interpellated. As Jane Marcus 
points out, in a pioneering realist reading of The Waves, it is a novel 
primarily ‘concerned with race, class, colonialism’.20 The novel addi-
tionally asserts that national culture, identifi ed as civilisation per se, 
is the prime means of perpetuating these various forms of subor-
dination. Challenges to Western cultural domination were certainly 
being voiced by colonised peoples themselves during the time that 
Woolf was writing The Waves.21 This was especially true of India and 
Leonard Woolf points to Ghandi as demonstration of ‘the renaissance 
of Asiatic civilization in its confl ict with the imperialist civilization 
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of Europe’ (Imperialism, p. 58). Woolf challenges the Eurocentrism 
of idealists like Bradley, here, reminding them that Asia, too, has its 
traditions of civilisation.
The contrast between growing resistance to cultural imperialism 
in countries like India and the attitude adopted by white supremacist 
colonialists in Australia is stark. During the late 1920s, Australian 
politics and media were characterised by a passionate and vocifer-
ous insistence upon total identifi cation with British culture and tra-
ditions. An article in The New Statesman, on 17 September 1927, 
comments, ‘The vindication of British blood which repeats itself in 
numberless perorations is no mere frill of patriotic oratory: the peo-
ple is intensely, almost alarmingly British.’22 It seems likely that in 
the character of Louis, Woolf ironically represents Australian desire 
for British hegemonic identity. Her purpose is also serious. Leonard 
Woolf refers to Australian white supremacists in the context of his 
discussion of South Africa and the southern states of America. All 
three are cultures typifi ed by a repressive determination to exclude 
peoples regarded as other and hence potentially contaminating of the 
purity of ‘blood’ sustained and made evident in traditions of cultural 
ideals. A subjective but pervasive myth of white, Western identity is 
held in reverence even as it functions brutally to coerce and discipline 
a recalcitrant racial diversity.
For Leonard Woolf, civilisation, far from being identifi ed with 
cultural superiority, is inseparably linked to fi nancial, industrial and 
technological expansion and dominance. In The Waves, Virginia 
Woolf, too, draws attention to those systems of transport, commerce 
and communication that form the infrastructure of empire. Often 
these references are linked to ideas of control and power. Early on in 
the narrative, Bernard approaches London by train and he compares 
the capital with that of the classical world. ‘Not even Rome herself 
looks more majestic’, he says. Yet the London he sees is not charac-
terised by classical architecture but by industry and technology, ‘by 
gasometers, by factory chimneys’ (p. 91). The image Bernard uses to 
describe the impact of the hurtling train into the city is, disturbingly, 
that of invasion and violence, military and sexual. It is ‘like a missile 
[. . .] about to explode in the fl anks of the city like a shell’ (p. 91). 
Shells are part of new, deadly forms of industrially mass-produced 
weaponry underwriting Western global supremacy.
Travelling in the novel is a recurrent experience of all the char-
acters, as they cross and recross national and international space, 
in a way that inevitably shrinks its imagined dimensions. The text 
further suggests the way technology diminishes the scale of the 
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world, bringing it within a systematised order. As Bernard answers 
the telephone, unregulated space becomes place, namely the British 
Empire. Technology, simply by the invisibility of its means, enhances 
the sense of intellectual mastery so that, ‘my mind adjusted itself to 
assimilate the message – it might be [. . .] to assume command of the 
British Empire [. . .] [and] had created, by the time I had put back 
the receiver, a richer, stronger, more complicated world in which 
I was called upon to act my part’ (p. 218). Undoubtedly there is 
irony in the presentation of Bernard, here, since he is the least com-
manding and coherent character. The same is not the case with Louis 
who also looks to technology as a means of imposing his personal 
control impersonally across the vastness of global geography. ‘I am 
half in love with the typewriter and the telephone,’ he says ‘with 
letters and cables and brief but courteous commands on the tele-
phone to Paris, Berlin, New York’ (p. 138).
Louis aspires to follow in the footsteps of statesmen like William 
Pitt, First Earl of Chatham, who oversaw British colonial expansion 
and is credited with the birth of the Empire. Percival represents the 
heroic romance of an ideal of empire as venerated in public school 
traditions.23 Louis points to the future form of global rule: fi nancial, 
technological and cultural domination. ‘I roll the dark before me,’ 
he claims, ‘spreading commerce where there was chaos in the far 
parts of the world’ (p. 139). Louis’ language, here, not only makes 
the racist identifi cation of darkness with chaos, his boast of the uni-
versalism of commerce is indistinguishable from current neo-liberal 
rhetoric. Louis’ response to chaos, both at home and abroad is ‘I will 
reduce you to order’ (p. 76). The order that he seeks to impose, like 
that of British idealists such as Bradley, is hierarchical and male, an 
order in which each fulfi ls the duties of his station. Workmen should 
earn ‘two pound ten a week at the command of an august master’ 
while the corridors of power resound to ‘the heavy male tread of 
responsible feet’ (pp. 139, 140).
Woolf brings the blasphemy of mockery to bear on Louis’ pride 
in Western sanitary ware, as he boasts of toilets, swimming baths 
and gymnasiums exported to those unhygienic, dark places of the 
world (p. 183). Yet there is serious critique too. International trade in 
Western industrially-produced goods inevitably brings, along with 
those material things, the value systems, ways of life, structures and 
institutions inhering in their forms. A study of the introduction of toi-
letry goods to Zimbabwe, for example, revealed how this consumer 
innovation instituted new demands and norms into the society that 
‘once established, acquired a life and a legitimacy of their own’.24 
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In effect, global heterogeneity is traded, quite literally, for fi nancial, 
commercial and cultural homogeneity.25 The space of a multiply var-
ied world becomes a homogenised place. As Louis explains, those 
superior mental attributes of the will, ‘assiduity and decision’, have 
imposed system upon physical geography. It is their force that has 
‘scored those lines on the map [. . .] by which the different parts of 
the world are laced together’ (p. 139). Louis astutely recognises, as 
the thorough-going idealist that he is, that dominion works most effi -
ciently when the order of the perceptible is a naturalised consensus; 
one world in which patterns of consumption and the vertical values 
of status and life style they sustain are accepted as inevitable. ‘The 
weight of the world is on our shoulder,’ Louis asserts, ‘its vision is 
through our eyes’ (p. 140).
In The Waves, Woolf articulates a vision of reality that challenges 
the dominant regime of the perceptible as propagated by idealists 
like Louis. She reverses the vertical hierarchy that elevates Western 
subjective individualism and abstract universalism. Her counter 
vision is that of worldly realism: the horizontal, inclusive continuum 
of embodied selves, social and physical worlds. The structure of the 
novel formalises Woolf’s Lucretius-scale ambition to present a wholly 
materialist account of the universe that is two-fold in expressing 
both critique and celebration.26 The narrative sections of The Waves 
follow Lucretius in showing that coercive idealist modes of thought 
are responsible for much of the cruelty, domination and exclusion 
that human beings suffer and infl ict upon bodily life in the name of 
glorifi ed cultural and national myths. The deities of Woolf’s modern 
world are the venerated abstractions of nation, culture, civilisation, 
religion, commerce and technology that coerce the world into a regu-
lated place by means of the subordination of bodies.
While Woolf subjects these venerated forms of authority to mock-
ery and to criticism she moves, in the interludes between the narra-
tive, to a poetic celebration of the immensity and motility of global 
space. The language of the interludes is frequently described as lyri-
cal. It is even suggested that Woolf’s writing in these sections can 
be thought of in terms of the unconscious, or of the semiotic drive 
set out in Julia Kristeva’s theory.27 Yet, in the main, the language of 
the interludes is emphatically empirical.28 It is in the mode of the 
children’s fi rst responses to the world: ‘The stalks are covered with 
harsh, short hairs,’ said Jinny, ‘and drops of water have stuck to them’ 
(p. 5). This could be understood as Woolf’s intent. Just as children 
come fresh and indiscriminately to experiences, so she evokes a new 
regime of the perceptible in which the physical world is as much 
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regarded as the mental. ‘I want to put everything in’, she declares 
of The Waves. And indeed, the novel stretches the fi eld of the per-
ceptible from the life of intestines to the unbounded distances of 
skyscapes and oceans.
The writing directly challenges the idealist contention (and more 
recent anti-realist ones) that knowledge of the world beyond the self 
is unattainable. This is not to suggest that Woolf naively assumes the 
transparency of language or the total objectivity of knowledge. As 
Bernard says, words ‘hide with thickness instead of letting the light 
through’ (p. 239). Despite the rejection of idealism, Woolf is very 
clear that to describe the world without a self, although desirable, is 
actually impossible. Within the interludes, the constitutive and inter-
pretive function of language is foregrounded by means of frequent 
deployment of the comparative phrase ‘as if’. This draws attention 
to the subjective element brought to all acts of observation and their 
cognitive assimilation. Strikingly, the comparisons are made between 
some aspect of the larger physical universe and a homely domestic 
object, somewhat in the way a child might express it. In the fi rst 
interlude, for example, ‘the sea was slightly creased as if a cloth had 
wrinkles in it’, the dark horizon gradually lightens ‘as if the sediment 
of an old wine bottle had sunk’ and the unrisen sun burns below the 
horizon ‘like the smokey fi re that roars from a bonfi re’ (p. 3).
This linguistic pattern of comparison effects a repeated syntac-
tic continuum between the two material worlds that constitute the 
universe: that of culture, in the widest sense, and that of the physi-
cal realm. It invokes, moreover, a temporal continuum between the 
here and now of ordinary life and the widest sweep of existence. 
In addition, the phrase ‘as if’ provokes a sense of the active sensa-
tion of observing and semantically ordering what is being observed. 
This linguistic tracking of the physical act of perception is further 
emphasised by the use of very precise notation as if for the purpose 
of scientifi c empiricism. ‘The sun had now sunk lower in the sky. 
The islands of cloud had gained in density and drew themselves 
across the sun so that the rocks went suddenly black’ (p. 151). The 
impression produced is of meticulous attentiveness to the scene and 
things in themselves as perception changes continually in the fading 
light. The aim is to convey the physical world without the screen of 
subjective self.
This does not imply the attainment of objectivity devoid of any 
human perspective. The prose of the interludes frequently uses deic-
tic formulations such as ‘now’. Deictics are a recurrent stylistic fea-
ture of Woolf’s writing, as they are also of Jane Austen’s. In The 
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Waves such features are particularly striking. By defi nition, deictics 
are always particular, and function to anchor discourse in an immedi-
ate temporal and spatial context. In The Phantom Table: Woolf, Fry, 
Russell and the Epistemology of Modernism, Ann Banfi eld suggests 
that Woolf’s use of ‘here/now’ deictics within past tense discourse ‘is 
crucial in creating perspectives whose language is subjective without 
being psychological’.29 Woolf’s experimental use of language in the 
interludes thus suggests a way of perceiving and representing reality 
that acknowledges the subjective, constructed nature of all denota-
tion. Yet because of the immediacy and intensity of the ‘here and 
now’ focus, the objects observed impinge themselves, rather than 
the observing subject imposing the screen of self upon the external 
world, as idealists tend to do. One problem with abstraction and 
universals is that they lack the sharpness of what is experienced by 
the senses. Woolf’s artistic achievement in the interludes is to convey 
a celebratory vision of universal life that is intensely realised even 
while it is temporally and spatially unbounded. This unlimited spa-
ciousness provides a stark contrast to the regulated inscription of the 
globe by empire and capitalism.
It is perhaps somewhat easier to evoke a poetic, empirical vision 
of the physical universe than it is to see individual life in similar 
celebratory terms. Human existence as a physical fact lacks immen-
sity, duration and power. ‘Our fl ame, the will-o’-wisp that dances 
in a few eyes, is soon to be blown out, and all will fade’ Bernard 
observes in his closing monologue (p. 229). It is the apparent ‘form-
less imbecility’ of life, as Neville terms it, that drives an emergent 
being to magnify the idea of self by imposing its desires for gran-
deur, power and identity upon the actuality of the world. Yet these 
interpretive screens function to separate the self from a grander 
view of human life that is common, non-individualistic and con-
tinuous with the whole of physical reality. In her autobiographical 
writing, Woolf suggests that a sudden shock that disrupts the fl ow 
of quotidian existence often produces a momentary loss of social 
self and thus allows an almost impersonal awareness of human life 
in its relationship to the universe.30
In The Waves, Bernard experiences two such moments. The fi rst 
is produced by a sudden perceptual estrangement at the sight of two 
fi gures turned away so that they lack individuality. ‘There are fi g-
ures without features robed in beauty’ (p. 226). ‘Thus in a moment,’ 
he says, ‘in a drawing room, our life adjusts itself to the majestic 
march of day across the sky’ (p. 227). The death of Percival produces 
another such moment. Alienated from the process of living going 
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on all around him, Bernard is able ‘to see things without attach-
ment, from the outside, and to realize their beauty in itself [. . .] 
pretence and make-believe and unreality are gone, and lightness has 
come with a kind of transparency, making oneself invisible’ (p. 220). 
Woolf’s language is precise here. This is not a moment of inwardness, 
of subjective vision of an ideal truth. It is a sharp sense of materiality, 
of things in their own being freed from the neediness of self. Bernard 
quickly recognises the danger of trying to immortalise this moment, 
to imbue it with veneration and thereby impose transcendent mean-
ing. ‘So the sincerity of the moment passed;’ he notes, ‘so it became 
symbolical; and that I could not stand. Let us commit any blasphemy 
of laughter and criticism rather than exude this lily-sweet glue; and 
cover him with phrases’ (p. 221).
The blasphemy of laughter and criticism is, I suggest, a good way 
of describing Woolf’s worldly realism in its antagonism to idealist 
structures of thought, and to the spirit of religion and reverence that 
idealism seeks to impose.31 Bernard’s response to religious ritual, 
with its trumpets, ceremonies and coats of arms, and to Louis’ desire 
to ‘roof us all in [. . .] confi ne us, make us one, with his red ink’ 
(p. 235), is to seek out some curious gargoyle, some battered nose or 
absurd tombstone. Like Septimus, in Mrs Dalloway, Bernard turns 
to things and their incongruities for the sanity of laughter. The dis-
solution of the idealist urge for authority, fi xity and conformity, held 
in place by the lily-sweet glue of veneration, is enacted earlier in 
the novel when the headmaster’s sonorous benediction, bidding the 
boys acquit themselves like men, is disrupted by the random, incon-
gruous importunity of a bee (p. 46). Laughter and the challenge of 
the empirical world of things are the two forces that idealist absolut-
ism, in all its forms, fi nds most diffi cult to withstand. The continu-
ous, dynamic process both of the origin of vision and its dissolution 
in the motility of life are, for Woolf, equally the means of art and 
of human knowledge. The ludic impulse that is inevitably inscribed 
in the very fact of a bio-psycho-social self is also the ground of the 
vision, of the utopian possibility of change. There is always an alter-
native viewpoint.
At the end of the novel, Bernard is reluctantly hauled back into 
embodied being by the reiterative process of pulling his coat on over 
his arms. As he steps out into the darkened streets it is as if ‘the can-
opy of civilization is burnt out’ (p. 247). A canopy is traditionally the 
emblazoned cloth held over a sovereign or priest, emblematic of their 
majesty and power and protecting them from the physical world. 
For idealists, ‘civilization’ functions as a canopy imbuing a sense of 
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power and authority and protecting those inside its enclosure from a 
larger reality. It is, in Rhoda’s words, ‘so vast a bubble that the sun 
might set and rise in it and we might [. . .] escape from the here and 
now’ (p. 187). Bernard’s escape from that bubble or canopy allows 
for a momentary utopian vision, but it is a vision grounded in the 
physical cycles of the world and perceived in terms of a common life: 
‘There is a sense of the break of day [. . .] some sort of renewal [. . .] 
Another general awakening’ (p. 229).
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Guns and Plumbing
5215_Morris.indd   137 30/11/16   10:32 AM
5215_Morris.indd   138 30/11/16   10:32 AM
Chapter 5
Persuasion: Fellow Creatures
Austen frequently condenses into the opening of her novels intima-
tions of the themes and ideological debates that will structure the 
entire narrative. Nowhere is this condensation of narrative concerns 
achieved with more effective economy than in the fi rst paragraph of 
Persuasion (1816) where the fi nal phrase ‘ELLIOT OF KELLYNCH-
HALL’ circles back, mirror-like, to repeat the opening words.1 This 
narcissistic formation comically fi gures Sir Walter’s essentialist pride 
in the accidents of appearance and title while the subsequent four 
repetitions of ‘there’ within the single sentence point to the solipsistic 
fi xation of Sir Walter’s imagined idea of self as in every sense entitled. 
The circularity of the paragraph structure mimics Sir Walter’s denial 
of time and change within his own mental world, expressed by him 
as contempt for those unable to resist the material depredations of 
empirical temporality. By contrast, the actual physical vulnerability 
of all creaturely life and the processes of change to which it is neces-
sarily subject are relentlessly foregrounded by the many accidents and 
illnesses that recur throughout the narrative. Mrs Clay’s hypocritical 
assumption of elitist hauteur when she declares that only those not 
obliged to work hold the blessings of ‘health and good appearance 
to the upmost’ is more literally true than she perhaps realises (p. 23).
The recognition of life as physically embodied derives from 
Enlightenment thinkers like David Hume, David Hartley and 
Elizabeth Hamilton, a perception that challenges the Cartesian 
mind−body hierarchy. It is this materialist perception of human 
nature that informs Austen’s radical representation of self and con-
sciousness as a biological, emotional, rational and social dynamic. 
In so doing, she inaugurates a redistribution of the perceptible. In 
the representation of Sir Walter she turns into caricature the idealist 
verisimilitude which, Jacques Rancière claims, ‘asserts a naturalised 
affi nity between characters, situations and forms of expression’.2 
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Sir Walter’s class essentialism constructs an absolute congruence 
between self, rank, physical body, speech and action. In opposition 
to this myth of congruent identity, the novel asserts a heterogeneous, 
biological and communal recognition of human existence. Rancière 
claims that a new inclusive regime of writing institutes a form of 
realism embraced by modernist writers. Undoubtedly, Austen’s inno-
vative realism, especially in Persuasion, looks directly forward to 
Virginia Woolf’s equally materialist perception and representation of 
the horizontal continuities of consciousness and world.
It is not only the idealism of the classic self that Austen rejects. 
She is also highly critical of the solipsistic enclosure of any self-
contained social world. The looking-glass constitution of Sir Walter’s 
class-bound mentality, within the fi rst paragraph, is repeated in 
other mental worlds represented in the text that are cut off from 
and unchallenged by larger empirical realities. The shallow surface 
implication of the mirror image, moreover, suggests the emptiness, 
the lack of substance, beneath the pride of title, rank and estate. 
Kellynch-hall rests upon debt; the metaphoricity of ‘place’ as inher-
ited order, in this fi nal completed Austen novel, has been hollowed 
out. The idealist claims of enduring honour, reverence and dignity, 
associated by Edmund Burke with a landowning, patrician order, no 
longer endure.
Given the ridicule directed at Sir Walter in the story, it is not sur-
prising that many critics have read the novel as expressing a radi-
cal change in Austen’s social views. David Monaghan, for example, 
argues that Persuasion deals with Austen’s painful realisation that the 
social order upheld by her previous novels is ‘fi nally falling apart’.3 
Roger Sales even suggests that ‘Persuasion [. . .] casts doubt on the 
benefi ts to be derived from male lines of descent’.4 Mary Poovey also 
believes that Austen intends the moral bankruptcy of Sir Walter to be 
read as condemnatory of the entire patriarchal landed class and Tony 
Tanner emphasises what he sees as the fragmentation of commu-
nity and language in the social world that Austen represents.5 This 
sense of radical change in Austen’s perception of the social order is 
not a consensual view of the politics of Persuasion, however. Alistair 
Duckworth warns that ‘one should be careful not to overemphasise 
the modernity of Persuasion’.6 Austen is not rejecting the ethical val-
ues of a conservative social morality, he argues, but rather displacing 
those values from the estate onto the character of her heroine. David 
Spring substantiates this non-radical view of the novel in a reading 
that emphasises the many social continuities between the traditional 
country gentry class, as represented by the Musgrove family, and the 
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naval offi cers that some critics have claimed to be a new progressive 
order.7 John Wiltshire agrees with Spring’s reading of Persuasion as 
expressing continuity of Austen’s social values rather than any break, 
suggesting that ‘radical’ readings are motivated by a critical need to 
‘vindicate or explain Jane Austen’s status as a canonical or classic 
author’ by attributing to her an interest in social theory which is 
unwarranted by the texts.8
One recurrent weakness within this debate as to Austen’s conser-
vatism or radicalism is a lack of precision in discussing the fl uid social 
and political allegiances and divisions of Austen’s world: for instance, 
the interpenetration of city fi nance with landed wealth as represented 
in Sense and Sensibility, or the intermix of emulation and rivalry 
in Mrs Elton’s approach to Emma Woodhouse. The deployment of 
terms like ‘gentry’, ‘middle class’, or ‘landowners’ in discussions of 
Austen’s novels are at times too static and homogeneous in implica-
tion to comprehend the complex dynamics of the social world that 
the fi ction represents. This world is not that of idealised rural seclu-
sion as favoured in ‘heritage’ interpretations of her novels. Neither is 
it constituted of a stark binary opposition between patrician values 
and middle-class ambition. As Robert Clark and Gerry Dutton show, 
Jane Austen’s father was not simply a rural rector. Much of the family 
income was tied up in his farm and hence dependent on the fl uctuat-
ing price of corn and sheep, prices that were at the centre of some 
of the most contested politics of the era. Consequently, ‘Jane Aus-
ten’s mentality was formed in a household very much [. . .] engaged 
with the shaping forces of the British economy.’9 Nicholas Roe claims 
Austen’s novels ‘typically focus on sections of English society that 
inhabit the vulnerable cusp or borderline between different groups 
and classes, so that we are always aware of the extraordinary mobil-
ity of English society.’10 Moreover, this social mobility is inseparable 
from and shaped by transformations in material forces: agricultural 
innovations, the explosion of consumerism, improved transport, 
technology and industrial expansion.
My argument throughout this study is that Austen’s novels per-
sistently enact the inevitability of change and dramatise this process 
in the narrative experience of her female protagonists, encompassing 
a transition from stability to mobility, from social homogeneity to 
social heterogeneity. Undoubtedly, this transition grows increasingly 
marked in the later novels but it does not entail any radical break 
in Austen’s social perspective. Land, for Edmund Burke, represents 
permanence, it embodies the eternal order of the nation.11 Alistair 
Duckworth aligns Austen with Burke in her representation of the 
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estate as ‘symbolic of an entire inherited culture’ (The Improvement, 
p. 55). The properly run estate, Duckworth claims, functions in the 
novels as ‘an objective paradigm of order’, a source of stability (The 
Improvement, p. 184). For John Wiltshire, Persuasion ‘is a study in 
the moral atmosphere of place’ (Jane Austen, p. 161). Traditional, 
inherited place does undoubtedly operate in the metaphorical mode 
throughout Austen’s fi ction, embodying idealist values of settled 
order, hierarchy, exclusion and privilege, but ‘place’ in this meta-
phorical sense is criticised in the writing as associated with fi xity, 
disavowal of change and fear of embodied realities.
In Emma, Hartfi eld represents, in the person of Emma as well 
as Mr Woodhouse, a determined adherence to a traditional vertical 
social order, a resistance to the new. Persuasion not only offers the 
mocking caricature of Sir Walter Elliot’s absurd pretension that he 
literally embodies an order immune to change, it also represents the 
heroine’s life before she leaves Kellynch as arrested in time due to 
her refusal of the risky change that marriage to Wentworth would 
have entailed. Emma moves socially from the paradigmatic values of 
Hartfi eld to engage fully with the metonymic structure of Highbury 
with its horizontal, non-hierarchical, reciprocal relationships based 
upon the interactive social perspectives of a shared world.
Anne Elliot is initially resistant and negative as to her move to 
Bath. Despite this reluctance, however, and even before the reunion 
with Wentworth, she becomes immersed there in more heteroge-
neous social networks, more energetic and egalitarian modes of 
social interaction and a cultural environment much closer than the 
‘sameness’ and ‘elegance’ of Kellynch-hall to the prerequisites of 
‘good company’ as she lists them to Mr Elliot: ‘clever, well-informed 
people, who have a great deal of conversation’ (pp. 9, 162). Accord-
ing to Paul Langford it is wrong to understand places like Bath nos-
talgically in terms of an embalmed world of Regency aristocratic 
glamour. The success of Bath ‘was based upon its appeal to the broad 
mass of the propertied public [. . .] Aristocratic patronage, commer-
cial exploitation, and the new social aspirations of bourgeois Eng-
land were closely bound up in the new trends.’12 In Sanditon, the 
heroine is immediately precipitated out of the stasis of her parents’ 
time-resisting rural seclusion into a new society actively embracing 
rapid change.
To insist upon this recurrent narrative transition from stability to 
mobility and from hierarchical homogeneity to horizontal heteroge-
neity is not to claim for Austen a radical, let alone revolutionary, class 
politics. Indeed, her greatest hostility is directed towards emerging 
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ideologies of individualism. There is no wholesale rejection of tra-
ditional values in her fi ction. In particular, earlier forms of sociabil-
ity, even when ironised, are represented warmly, as in the case of 
Mrs Jennings in Sense and Sensibility, Mr Weston in Emma and the 
Musgrove family in Persuasion. Austen recognises that this tradition 
of sociability can be insensitive in its non-admission of private space 
for the self, but her most hostile critique is of those characters, like 
Lucy Steele, Mrs Elton and Mr Elliot, who typify the cold-hearted, 
self-interest of the new force of competitive individualism.
What is radical, both artistically and politically, is the rigorous 
materialism of Austen’s representation of her world and her perva-
sive critique of idealist modes of thought that inform elitist visions 
of social order and of self. It is this worldly realist perception that 
brings about a revision of the perceptible in her writing. In opposi-
tion to the ideology of both subjective and competitive individual-
ism, Austen, through the mobility of her heroines, seeks a transition 
from earlier traditions of sociability towards a modern identity for 
the self as embodied and social. Self, as represented within Austen’s 
worldly realism, exists as a dynamic part of a continuous, chang-
ing social, cultural and material universe. Jacques Rancière claims 
that around the end of the eighteenth century a classical, vertical, 
hierarchical order of representation gave way to a new regime of 
the perceptible that brought into the fi eld of visibility an egalitarian 
recognition of equality between people, things and biological mat-
ter (Politics of Literature, p. 26). This new regime of representation 
foregrounds process, horizontal continuities and inclusive multiplic-
ity. Within British literature, Austen is undoubtedly a practitioner of 
a radical new mode of representation that has many points in com-
mon with Rancière’s designation. Her writing brings into visibility 
the micro horizontal intersections of material, social and psychologi-
cal forces that comprise macro processes of change.
David Spring is literally correct in pointing out that the naval offi -
cers in Persuasion are similar, in terms of social class, to other more 
traditional characters in the story. Yet Austen’s representation of the 
navy undoubtedly does suggest new possibilities of social relations. 
In Persuasion, the navy, like Highbury in Emma, acts as a synecdo-
che for a more inclusive, mutually caring community, ordered hori-
zontally rather than vertically. Moreover, it represents the largeness 
of actual geographical space as opposed to the enclosed mental pro-
vincialism of Kellynch and Uppercross. Mrs Croft enthusiastically 
lists her travels to Cork, Lisbon, Gibraltar and the West Indies and 
the offi cers refer to a whole variety of geographic postings around 
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the world. The naval characters also represent the horizontal fl ow 
of temporal continuity; they both perpetuate and transform the tra-
ditional values of sociability. Like Sir John Middleton in Sense and 
Sensibility, the elder Musgroves at the Great House maintain the 
tradition of open hospitality expected of and enjoyed by the rural 
squirearchy over generations. The Musgroves ‘were visited by every 
body, and had more dinner parties, and more callers, more visitors 
by invitation and by chance, than any other family. They were more 
completely popular’ (p. 51). When the younger Musgroves and Anne 
visit Lyme they encounter similar sociability in the ‘kindly hospi-
table’ invitation they receive to dine with Captain and Mrs Harville. 
Anne contrasts this genuine pleasure in receiving guests as an act 
of friendship with the ‘usual style of give-and-take invitations and 
dinners of formality and display’ (p. 105).
Anne is thinking here of the stilted fashionable form of enter-
tainment preferred by those like her father and elder sister whose 
invitations are motivated competitively by the desire to impose their 
entitlement to privilege and admiration on their carefully selected 
guests. The parties at the Great House lack any such urge to impress 
or aggrandise, yet there is a signifi cant difference between Mr and 
Mrs Musgrove’s sociability and that of the Harvilles. As its name 
implies, the Great House has the amplitude to accommodate large 
numbers of people without any inconvenience to its owners. By 
contrast, Anne has a moment of astonishment when she enters the 
Harvilles’ house to fi nd ‘rooms so small as none but those who 
invite from the heart could think capable of accommodating so 
many’ (p. 106). This represents a temporal transition beyond the 
traditional sociability that goes with a generous sense of the dues 
of inherited position. The sociability practised by the Harvilles is 
untied from rank: it is informal, reciprocal and egalitarian.
As this suggests, the representation of naval characters in Persua-
sion continues the critique, made in Emma, of traditional deference 
to gentility and birth. In contrast to vertical hierarchy, the navy stands 
for greater social movement and inclusiveness. The brilliant career of 
Nelson from relatively humble origins to national hero meant that, 
in the popular imagination, at least, the navy was perceived as less 
infl uenced by patronage and rank than other professions. Sir Walter 
voices deep offence at the way the navy brings into social visibility 
those who should remain beneath notice. The navy is ‘the means of 
bringing persons of obscure birth into undue distinction, and raising 
men to honours which their fathers and grandfathers never dreamt 
of’, he complains (p. 21). A writer to Gentleman’s Magazine makes a 
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similar point, deploring the way naval and military offi cers take pre-
cedence over gentlemen. ‘How should we like to see’, the writer asks, 
‘the son of a tailor, a stonemason [. . .] rank before a man [who] [. . .] 
partakes of the blood of the noblest families?’13 Sir Walter insists, 
again just like the correspondent to Gentleman’s Magazine, that the 
term ‘gentleman’ belongs exclusively to ‘a man of property’. Without 
that inherited connection to land and birth a person can be dismissed 
as a ‘nobody’, denied even the visibility of physical existence (p. 26). 
With her deferential prejudice for rank, Lady Russell makes a simi-
larly dismissive judgement of Captain Wentworth, commenting with 
unwitting irony that he is ‘a young man, who had nothing but him-
self to recommend him’, lacking alliances and connections (p. 29).
Anne’s narrative progress integrates her into the world of hori-
zontal, social mobility. In contrast to the frozen immobility of her 
father’s and sister’s world, Anne embraces reciprocal friendships 
with the Harvilles, living in reduced circumstances due to Captain 
Harville’s injury, with Charles Hayter, heir to insignifi cant property 
and living upon a curate’s stipend, and with Mrs Smith, an impov-
erished widow renting what Sir Walter describes as ‘paltry rooms’ 
in an unfashionable part of Bath (p. 171). Anne’s egalitarian sympa-
thies are demonstrated when she refuses the company of Dowager 
Viscountess Dalrymple and her daughter to keep a promised visit 
to Mrs Smith. In contention with Captain Harville as to the merits 
of women’s or men’s affections, Anne exclaims passionately, ‘God 
forbid that I should undervalue the warm and faithful feelings of 
any of my fellow-creatures’ (p. 256). The whole sentiment is striking 
in the inclusivity of respect Anne asserts here. But the term, ‘fellow-
creatures’ is especially egalitarian in its evocation of a commonality 
based upon shared creaturely being in a novel that insists on the 
physical vulnerability of all bodily life.
Far from extolling the virtues of tradition and stability, in Persua-
sion Austen goes so far as to insist upon the necessity of change for 
mental and physical well-being. The experience of the naval char-
acters in the text demonstrates that the health of embodied crea-
tures depends upon activity and varied social interaction. Hence the 
greater restrictions placed upon women are damaging to their physi-
cal and mental resilience. Anne fails to recover her vitality after the 
loss of Wentworth because ‘no aid had been given in change of place 
[. . .] or in any novelty or enlargement of society’ (p. 30) and when 
she moves to Uppercross, her ‘spirits improved by change of place 
and subject’ (p. 50). Later in the story, Wentworth offers sympathy 
for the suffering of spirit she must have experienced at Lyme, but she 
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disagrees, ‘So much novelty and beauty! I have travelled so little, that 
every fresh place would be interesting to me’ (p. 200). Even her sis-
ter Mary’s querulous spirits are raised when she experiences change 
from the routines of the small family circle of Uppercross.
It is Mrs Croft, however, who makes the novel’s point most explic-
itly: ‘The only time that I ever really suffered in body or mind, the 
only time that I ever fancied myself unwell, or had any ideas of dan-
ger, was the winter I passed by myself at Deal’ (pp. 76–7). By con-
trast, Wentworth is able to mitigate the suffering he experiences when 
Anne rejects him by throwing himself into activity and exertion: ‘It 
was a great object with me, at that time, to be at sea, − a very great 
object. I wanted to be doing something’ (p. 70). The implication of 
all this must be that any small social world, like that of rank, closed 
off from the horizontal dynamics of change and social heterogeneity, 
will be stagnant and unhealthy, both physically and mentally.
Austen’s representation of the husband and wife relations of Admi-
ral and Mrs Croft offers a radically alternative ideal of marriage to 
the conservative ideology of separate spheres, and even more so of 
any hierarchical ordering of the sexes. Not only does Mrs Croft share 
her husband’s dangerous sea-going life, Anne also recognises that 
Mrs Croft’s active interventions into the Admiral’s steering of their 
carriage offers ‘no bad representation of the general guidance of their 
affairs’ (p. 99). I have suggested that, in both Sense and Sensibility 
and Emma, Austen disassociates the concluding unions from any 
support for domestic ideology with its emphasis upon privacy, indi-
vidualism and consumerism. The marriage of the Crofts is equally at 
odds with the prevailing idealisation of the home as site for displays 
of taste, wealth and thus individualised identity. Mrs Croft declares 
she was just as happy in her early, small, draughty home in North 
Yarmouth as in her present occupancy of the grandeur of Kellynch. 
Her sociability is enacted as much in the public sphere of Bath as 
in the domestic interior. Anne sees her constantly with the Admiral 
greeting friends as they walk about Bath, forming into little knots for 
eager conversation with ‘Mrs Croft looking as intelligent and keen as 
any of the offi cers around her’ (p. 183). The fact that Anne views this 
behaviour as ‘a most attractive picture of happiness’ not only under-
writes the warmth of Austen’s representation of the Croft marriage 
but must also suggest that it is the progressive ideal Anne will expect 
of her own married life.
Critical readings that dissent from a feminist interpretation of 
Mrs Croft’s presence in the text tend to focus upon Wentworth’s 
opposition to his sister as to women’s presence on board ship. His 
5215_Morris.indd   146 30/11/16   10:32 AM
assertion that they have no place at sea due to the fact that they 
cannot be accommodated with the degree of comfort that as women 
is their due, suggests he harbours a stereotypical view of women’s 
‘femininity’ as demanding protection from physical rigours and 
hardship (p. 74). This would account for his readiness to condemn 
Anne’s refusal of him as ‘weakness and timidity’, attributes typically 
associated with the frailty of a womanly mind and body, indeed, 
even demanded of women in many conduct books at the time.14 
Wentworth’s quarrel with his sister, however, takes place before he 
has learned to look more searchingly into his own values and behav-
iour and to recognise the errors in his thinking. The text ironically 
subjects Wentworth to what can be seen as a stereotypical feminine 
narrative, a staple of conduct literature, in which wilful, over-confi -
dence in self by a young woman leads to error, a humbling sense of 
contrition and reformed behaviour.
This ironic plot structure of Persuasion is part of a wider exami-
nation in the story of what had commonly been deemed opposing 
masculine and feminine virtues. As with the essentialist myth of 
a totalised congruent identity deriving from rank, so, too, gender 
essentialism insists upon the necessary affi nity of a womanly or 
manly identity with forms of feeling, speech and action. In contest-
ing these stereotypes, the novel focuses interrogatively upon qualities 
like steadfastness, courage, tenderness and compassion. These words 
recur throughout the text in ways that suggest these emotions are not 
fi xed attributes of gender identity but rather exist in a constant state 
of fl ux in both sexes irrespective of imposed boundaries. With his 
critical perception of Anne’s ‘weakness’ in mind, Wentworth calls for 
‘fortitude and strength of mind [. . .] decision and fi rmness’ when he 
speaks with Louisa Musgrove as to her sister’s attachment to Charles 
Hayter (p. 94). Anne seeks to encourage Captain Benwick ‘to fortify’ 
his mind against a persistence of tenderness that borders on self-
indulgence (p. 109). Unlike Wentworth, Anne is self-ironically aware 
that her own feelings throw her precepts into question. Wentworth 
learns that in the case of Louisa, strength of mind and fi rmness may 
be fl attering terms for stubbornness but he takes longer to bring these 
accusations against himself in relation to his treatment of Anne.
Steadfastness, tenderness, fortitude and strength of affection are 
the terms of the debate Anne engages in with Captain Harville that 
concludes with her assertion of the equality of feeling in all human 
creatures. This assertion answers Harville’s claim that women’s senti-
ments, like their bodies, are more feeble than those of men (p. 253). 
Anne had earlier voiced her dissent from this stereotypical viewpoint 
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when Admiral Croft speaks somewhat disparagingly of Captain Ben-
wick’s ‘soft sort of manner’. In disagreeing with the Admiral, Anne 
is intent ‘to oppose the too-common idea of spirit and gentleness 
being incompatible with each other’ (p. 187). The text as a whole 
underwrites Anne’s position demonstrating that men’s and women’s 
feelings and emotions, as fellow creatures, are interchangeable and 
that gender identity is by no means a bounded and destined opposi-
tion. This bold claim for masculine tenderness and female strength, 
challenging dominant gender ideology, is equally asserted in the text 
by the compassion and caring shown by the naval personnel to each 
other in times of trouble.
Again overturning essentialist expectations, it is Anne who is able 
to react with ‘strength and zeal’ at the moment of Louisa’s accident, 
while Wentworth is wholly incapacitated, turning desperately to 
Anne for leadership (p. 119). Later, in Bath when he fears Anne is 
attached to Mr Elliot he suffers all the imposed passivity and impo-
tency that is more normally the lot of women. ‘But to be waiting so 
long in inaction, and waiting only for evil, had been dreadful’ he tells 
her (pp. 264–5). Until he is sure of Anne’s true feelings, Wentworth’s 
behaviour is indecisive, fearful and agitated, all that is opposite of 
fi rmness and resolve. His language when he fi nally declares himself 
is emotional and exclamatory: ‘You pierce my soul. I am half agony, 
half hope’ (pp. 257–8). From a traditional representational point of 
view, one would term this feminine discourse and Austen uses the 
term ‘he cried’ rather than ‘he said’ again indicative of over-wrought 
emotionalism (p. 268).
The reconciliation of Anne and Wentworth at Bath repeats the 
same reversal of stereotypical attributes of courage and fear exhib-
ited by them both at Lyme. In Bath, as in Lyme, Anne is represented 
as taking control with fi rmness and courage, rather similar to Mrs 
Croft’s fi rm guidance of her husband’s driving. In the expectation 
of meeting Wentworth at the benefi t concert in the presence of her 
family she resolves, ‘as to the power of addressing him she felt all 
over courage’ (p. 195). When he appears in the entrance to the con-
cert hall, ‘she instantly spoke’ and by taking the initiative she gives 
him courage to stop and talk with her, a reversal of normal gender 
rules of behaviour (p. 197). In the fi nal episodes representing their 
reunion, it is Anne who is awarded the attributes that have been 
so variously investigated in the narrative. Anne ‘grew steadfast and 
fearless in the thankfulness of her enjoyment’ (p. 266). It is Anne 
who dryly points out that Wentworth has been largely the cause of 
his own unhappiness: ‘I should have thought’, said Anne, ‘that my 
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manner to yourself might have spared you much or all of this’ (p. 
266). While Anne insists ‘I must believe that I was right’, Wentworth 
not only has to acknowledge the weakness of his long-harboured 
resentment, he also has to accept the loss of his individualistic belief 
in his own masculine self-suffi ciency.
It is not only through her representation of the navy that Austen 
challenges the traditional vertical regime of the perceptible with new, 
more fl uid, horizontal ways of seeing social relations and human 
nature. In Chapter 3, Mr Shepherd, Sir Walter’s agent, recommends 
Admiral Croft as a suitable tenant for Kellynch-hall, reporting that 
the Admiral would be glad of the hunting rights to the estate. The 
Admiral, however, seems an indifferent sportsman, having said 
that ‘he sometimes took out a gun, but never killed’ (p. 24). In his 
Introduction to the Oxford edition of the novel, Claude Rawson 
comments that this sentence has ‘an odd eruptive force’ disturb-
ing the insipid surface of the lawyer’s recital. The word ‘kill’, espe-
cially, ‘announces a small sudden violence’.15 The negative force of 
Austen’s language in this context of guns and shooting is echoed 
later in Chapter 6 in the comment that ‘the Mr Musgroves have their 
own game to guard, and to destroy’ (p. 46). Again the unexpected 
violence of the word ‘destroy’ is striking within the calm, quotidian 
details of life at Uppercross. There is, in fact, a metonymic chain of 
references to guns and shooting running through the text, many, but 
by no means all, relating to Charles Musgrove’s overriding ‘zeal’ for 
the sport (p. 47).
Austen’s worldly realism is nowhere more evident than in her 
awareness of ‘things’ as foci of identity formations, discursive ideo-
logical networks, residual and emergent social relations and forces of 
production and consumerism. Things in her novels are ‘gatherings’ 
in Bruno Latour’s sense of material objects as substantially imbued 
with the dynamic heterogeneity of historical processes.16 In Jacques 
Rancière’s terms, Austen subtly allows mute things to talk. In Per-
suasion guns point metonymically to transitions within consumer-
ism, technological innovation and masculine identity. Use of guns 
was also a shaping force within the dynamics of class tensions and 
solidarities during Austen’s lifetime. Additionally, discourses around 
issues of violence to animals engage with notions of sensibility and 
what constitutes human nature.
The production of guns was a highly skilled, prestigious craft. In 
the eighteenth century the main purchasers of quality guns were aris-
tocrats whose propensity for duelling ensured they demanded weap-
ons of the highest possible technical excellence. As duelling became 
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increasingly discountenanced, the consumerist enthusiasm for fi ne 
guns shifted into a new passion for shooting as sport. Masculinity 
was no longer tied up with notions of honour, but with more rug-
ged images of prowess on the sporting fi eld. The invention of ‘fl ying 
shooting’, that is aiming at birds on the wing, demanded the technical 
innovation of fast fi ring mechanisms. The era during which Austen 
was writing brought to the fore a constellation of brilliant gunsmiths 
whose weapons have been likened to Rolls-Royces in their desirabil-
ity, mechanical brilliance and cost.17 William Lesley Richards opened 
his gun production enterprise in 1812, Thomas Boss also began in 
1812 and James Purdey in 1814.
The competitive innovation among such elite gunmakers was 
intense and led to rapid improvement in gun technology, including 
the quicker fi ring mechanism of the two barrelled gun. In Persuasion, 
Charles Musgrove, as a connoisseur of fi ne guns, has an appointment 
with a gunmaker in Bath who has ‘promised me the sight of a capital 
gun he is just going to send off [. . .] By his description, a good deal 
like the second-sized double-barrel of mine’ (p. 261). It may seem 
surprising that Austen is so obviously well-informed about current 
improvements to gun manufacture, but, like Woolf, she is acutely 
aware of the ramifying material implications of technological inno-
vation, whether of fi replaces, pianos or guns. According to historian, 
R. K. Webb, a true sporting enthusiast, such as Charles is certainly 
represented to be, ‘devoted an enormous proportion of his income to 
keep up the apparatus of sport’.18 The novel certainly suggests, nega-
tively, that Charles’s pursuit of this ‘manly’ outdoor activity involves 
excessive expenditure of his time and energies regardless of fi nancial 
extravagance (p. 47).
The technological improvements to guns, brought about by con-
sumer demand like that of Charles Musgrove, made possible a new 
pattern of leisure for land-owning men, the rituals of shooting as 
sport. In turn, this popular activity became central to a class-specifi c 
constitution of masculinity. Guns and shooting, therefore, interlink 
with the text’s interrogation of gender essentialism that attributes 
fearlessness to men and timidity to women. In contrast to Charles’s 
obsession with guns (he only visits Bath because the shooting season 
is over and he has nothing to do), others of the younger generation 
of men decline opportunities to shoot. Charles is critical and disap-
pointed that although his cousin, Charles Hayter, has been preferred 
to a living ‘in the centre of some of the best preserves in the king-
dom [. . .] he will [not] value it as he ought [. . .] Charles is too cool 
about sporting. That’s the worst of him’ (p. 236). Captain Benwick 
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also turns down Charles’s invitation to shoot at Uppercross, say-
ing that ‘he never shot’ (p. 141). This indifference to manly sport 
clearly causes unease, and Charles’s misgivings about Captain Ben-
wick are put to rest only when he joins in a morning of rat-hunting. 
‘He played his part so well’, Charles says, ‘that I have liked him the 
better ever since’ (p. 237). Charles calls Benwick a ‘brave fellow’ for 
the way he acquits himself killing rats. Bravery, for men like Charles 
Musgrove, is essentially associated with the ability and willingness 
to kill. By contrast, Anne Elliot insists that spirit and tenderness are 
compatible.
The new passion for shooting also had a signifi cant determining 
effect upon class relations during the fi rst three decades of the nine-
teenth century, as well as upon the physical shape of the countryside. 
Although game preservation went back to the eighteenth century, it 
only became rigorous and widespread in the early nineteenth century. 
F. M. L. Thompson notes that the spread of root-crop husbandry 
and the cultivation of grain crops ‘provided a farming environment 
increasingly palatable to the pheasant and partridge’.19 The enclo-
sure and consolidation of estates was in part motivated by a desire 
to make preservation more feasible and policeable. In Persuasion, 
Charles Musgrove refers admiringly to game preserves ‘surrounded 
by three great proprietors, each more careful and jealous than the 
other’ (p. 236). Charles speaks here as a future landed proprietor 
himself with his own game to ‘guard and destroy’. F. M. L. Thomp-
son claims that preservation rights were a means of consolidating 
political relations between landowners and the higher gentry, those 
comprising the magistrate class, by means of invitations to shoot on 
their land (English Landed Society, p. 140). Charles Musgrove is 
certainly generous with his invitations to Captains Wentworth and 
Benwick to join him in sporting activity.
The more serious impact of game preservation and especially 
of the laws that protected those rights, however, was to exacerbate 
class tensions between landowners and the unlanded classes, even 
those with a claim to be classed among the gentry. According to Paul 
Langford, ‘the game laws, condemned even by Blackstone, offended 
many of middling status, not least the tenant farmers who found 
themselves potential law-breakers on their own farms’.20 Historian 
Richard Price sees the game laws as a ‘fl ash-point for social rela-
tions’.21 The game laws, confi rming hunting rights for those owning 
land, went back to 1671, but during the eighteenth and into the nine-
teenth century the penalties and the rigorous pursuit of transgression 
became ever more draconian. Known as the Black Acts, the game 
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laws made poaching a transportable offence, thereby prohibiting the 
rural poor from supplementing their scanty diets with the odd rabbit 
or hare. This exacerbation of hardship became even more conten-
tious during periods of acute distress in rural areas, as after the failed 
harvest of 1815. Tenant farmers, like the Reverend Austen, were 
legally prevented from protecting their crops from the depredations 
of game birds and rabbits. As the laws were made progressively more 
severe, even to be caught carrying a gun after dark became a capital 
offence. The right and willingness to kill were rigorously maintained 
class entitlements. The game laws were not reformed until 1830 but 
during Austen’s time there was vociferous debate on the subject both 
in Parliament and the media.
In his detailed account of the Black Acts in Whigs and Hunters, 
E. P. Thompson cites a prosecution in 1814 when an Essex labourer, 
William Potter, was executed under the game laws for cutting down 
the orchard of a neighbouring miller.22 The savage sentencing caused 
‘surprise’ even to the magistrate involved. It may, perhaps, have been 
in response to this extreme penalty that a correspondent to Gentle-
man’s Magazine, in 1815, informed readers that legal punishments 
for robbery of fruit in an orchard include ‘fi nes, imprisonment, whip-
ping and the pillory’ but, contrary to general opinion, ‘orchard tres-
pass [is] not covered by the severity of the Game Laws’.23 A property 
owner, the writer continues, is therefore not justifi ed in shooting 
and killing anyone seen at night trespassing in his garden orchard 
to steal fruit. These details provide an informative context for the 
complaint made in Persuasion by Mr Shepherd against Mr Went-
worth, the curate at Monkford, who refused to prosecute a ‘farmer’s 
man [caught] breaking into his orchard – wall torn down – apples 
stolen’ (p. 25). Mr Shepherd fi nds this leniency in applying the law 
very odd, but it would seem that subtly throughout the text Austen 
disassociates a signifi cant section of the younger generation from the 
legal, class and gender ideology inhering in the material substance 
and practice of guns and killing.24 By this means, Austen looks pro-
gressively to a future society ordered by more compassionate values 
and fellow-feeling.
She was not alone in this. Growing public opposition to the game 
laws was not only due to concern over exacerbation of class confl ict 
in the post-revolutionary era. Criticism of harsh legal punishments 
was part of a much wider shift in public sentiment towards a more 
humanitarian concern for all forms of creaturely life. This movement 
gave rise to any number of poetic effusions lamenting the loss of 
a favourite cat and even the inadvertent death of worms and fl ies. 
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Nevertheless, the humanitarian movement for greater compassion 
and respect for all physical creatures had infl uential and eloquent 
support in public fi gures like William Wilberforce and William Cow-
per, one of Austen’s favoured poets. Cowper wrote movingly about 
hares he had saved from the hunt and kept as pets. In Animal Rights, 
Political and Social Change in Britain since 1800, Hilda Kean sug-
gests that by the nineteenth century ‘the way in which people treated 
animals became a distinguishing feature of being humane’.25 Heated 
and polarised debates within Parliament during attempts to enact 
legislation for animal welfare kept the topic very much alive within 
the public sphere during the early decades of the nineteenth century, 
resulting in the establishment of the Society for the Prevention of 
Cruelty to Animals in 1824.26 Within this context of heightened 
awareness, the violence of Austen’s verbs ‘kill’ and ‘destroy’, rather 
than the more obvious and neutral ‘shoot’, seems very likely to be 
judgemental.
Evangelical critics of animal cruelty, like Wilberforce, drew analo-
gies with the cruelties infl icted upon human sufferers of the slave 
trade.27 This comparison points to a radical shift under way in the 
conception of human life. Instead of the vertical privileging of human 
beings as different in kind from other living creatures on account of 
the possession of divine souls and rational minds, horizontal continu-
ities were increasingly recognised across human and animal life. This 
constitutes a movement towards empirical ways of understanding 
human nature as opposed to religious idealism. It was not, however, 
a rejection of divinity but rather a continuation of David Hartley’s 
religiously infl ected materialism in which physical life is understood 
as integral to God’s benign moral order.
It is within this mode of thinking that a writer to Gentleman’s 
Magazine, in 1814, makes the argument for humane treatment of 
animals in terms of both empirical observation and of shared crea-
turely life. ‘Creature’ was, indeed, the preferred term within this new 
humane discourse. Notably, too, the reviewer’s claims rest upon a 
dynamic sense of the indivisibility of physical and mental being:
Conscious, however, of being endowed with perpetual sensibility and 
thought, and not less so that the ordinary movements of our bodies 
are no other than the immediate result of our mental perceptions and 
volitions, it becomes morally impossible for us, when we observe in 
the motions of other creatures phenomena precisely similar to those 
which are exhibited in the voluntary movements of our own limbs, 
not to ascribe to those creatures [. . .] the possession of a nature at 
least equally sentient and self-directive with that of man.28
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In a similar vein, the Monthly Review, in 1815, carried an account 
of Joseph Alphonse’s An Essay on the Spirit of the Education of the 
Human Race which again demonstrated a belief in the shared nature 
of all living things. As well as encompassing the whole ‘human race’, 
the book includes a chapter on the education of domestic animals. 
The reviewer writes approvingly that Alphonse successfully shows 
how animals’ minds and intellects, like those of humans, are greatly 
invigorated when they ‘endeavour to understand hints rather than 
blows’.29
While certainly understood within a religious framework, rec-
ognition of continuities between human and animal nature and 
consciousness, based upon empirical observation, is, nevertheless, 
implicitly anti-idealist. The vertical regime of mind over matter is 
replaced by a more horizontal recognition of the body−mind con-
tinuum and of the continuities of physical life shared by all creatures. 
A similar inclusive view of reality underpins Austen’s critique of the 
human propensity to construct closed mental realms at the expense of 
broader worldly perspectives. Throughout her fi ction, over-reliance 
on their own subjective constructions leads characters into folly, 
confusion and error as they mistake what they desire for what is. In 
Persuasion, it is not only Sir Walter Elliot who inhabits a solipsistic 
looking-glass world of self-delusion, although he is undoubtedly the 
most extreme case. As Anne moves from Kellynch to Uppercross and 
then from Uppercross back to Lady Russell’s home at Kellynch she 
is, each time, quickly ‘sensible of some mental change’; each small 
world is largely the product of the inhabitants’ own minds (p. 134). 
‘Every little social commonwealth’, Anne realises, has ‘its own mat-
ters of discourse’ (p. 46). In language reminiscent of Adam Smith in 
The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Anne recognises that experience 
of different mental worlds offers a valuable sense of ‘our own noth-
ingness’ (p. 45).30 This lack of self-centredness facilitates the capac-
ity to move horizontally across the different perspectives of fellow 
creatures to become what Smith calls the impartial observer. It is this 
fl uidity of consciousness that underpins a communal attainment of 
justice, equality and compassion. Throughout the narrative, Anne, 
like Elinor in Sense and Sensibility and Emma more painfully, dem-
onstrates this capacity to share the consciousness of others, recognis-
ing it to be ‘highly incumbent on her to clothe her imagination, her 
memory, and all her ideas’ in the world she currently inhabits (p. 46).
Anne says sombrely, ‘What wild imaginations one forms, where 
dear self is concerned! How sure to be mistaken!’ (p. 218). This is 
the anti-idealist teaching of all of Austen’s novels. In particular, belief 
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in their own rationality frequently blinds characters to the actual 
desires driving their behaviour. It is unclear whether Austen herself 
had indicated the choice of Persuasion as the title for the novel but 
it is certainly appropriate. Some of the fi nest comic scenes are those 
where characters earnestly seek to persuade others of the absolute 
rightness of their mental perspectives. Thus Mary seeks Anne’s help 
in persuading Charles that she really is in ill-health, the various Mus-
groves also turn to Anne with their views on Mary’s handling of her 
children and her servants, while Mary is equally certain of the errors 
committed by the Musgroves. Self-persuasion is also treated comi-
cally as when Mary convinces herself that her nerves are too fraught 
for her to stay at home with her sick child or when Henrietta Mus-
grove rehearses to Anne the good reasons why Dr Shirley should give 
up his parish duties to enjoy well-deserved retirement. This would, 
of course, leave a vacancy for Charles Haytor (pp. 61, 110). Apart 
from Anne, none of these persons is able to enter into the subjective 
perspectives of the others or recognise their own mixed motivations. 
Lady Russell complains of the noise made by the children at Upper-
cross, but the cacophony of traffi c as they enter Bath raises her spirits 
(p. 146). ‘How quick come the reasons for approving what we like!’ 
comments the narrator earlier of Lady Russell’s arguments in favour 
of Bath (p. 17).
David Hume initiated this scandalous dethronement of rational-
ity when he declared that reason is always the slave of the passions. 
A similar willingness to displace reason as the defi ning attribute of 
humanness and morality informs Austen’s radical revision of both 
emergent ideologies of self: the competitive, acquisitive self and the 
self of interior sensibility. Instead of interiority, Austen gives percep-
tibility to physical energies and feelings. The retrospective view of 
the ‘age of reason’, read through Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism 
and its nineteenth-century proselytisers (and by current, selective 
neo-liberal emphasis on Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations), tends to 
identify competitive self-interest entirely with rationality. The only 
course of action for wholly reasonable individuals, according to utili-
tarian and neo-liberal thinking, is that which preserves and enhances 
the well-being of self.
Austen might seem to subscribe to this view of self-interest as 
directed solely by rational choice. In Sense and Sensibility, for 
example, those characters like Fanny Dashwood, whose behaviour 
and motivation are entirely selfi sh, are almost invariably described 
as cold-hearted, dominated by sense rather than sensibility. But the 
opposition between sense and sensibility in Austen is very far from 
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being an opposition between selfi shness and benevolence. Characters 
exhibiting either an excess of self-interest or of sensibility are equally 
represented by Austen as driven by what Elizabeth Hamilton termed 
the compulsion to enlarge the factitious idea of self.31 This can take 
the form of competitive greed, as with Fanny Dashwood, the desire 
to possess as much of the world as possible. Alternatively, the self can 
be empowered and enlarged by imposing its subjective desires upon 
the external world, as is the case with Marianne Dashwood, Emma 
and Sir Walter.
In most of her novels, Austen’s representation of characters domi-
nated by competitive self-interest is striking in the physical sense she 
conveys, especially in their speech, of rapacious embodied energies, 
very different from rational calculation. Fanny Dashwood, Lucy 
Steele, Mrs Norris and Mrs Elton seem wholly compelled by the hun-
gry passions of self. With Mr Elliot in Persuasion, however, Austen 
appears to move into new psychological and social territory. If earlier 
representations reveal the passions driving rational self-interest, in 
Mr Elliot Austen explores the more dangerous force of systematised 
rationality. There is absolutely no indication of outlandish energy or 
excess in the representation of his urbane demeanour that gains the 
approval even of Sir Walter. Indeed the only fault that Anne Elliot 
can fi nd in him is an absence of strong feeling. His manner is pol-
ished, easy, agreeable: ‘There could be no doubt of his being a sen-
sible man [. . .] His tone, his expressions, his choice of subject, his 
knowing where to stop, − it was all the operation of a sensible, dis-
cerning mind’ (p. 155).
Nothing in Mr Elliot’s speech or behaviour hints that his only 
guiding principle is total selfi shness. It is Mrs Smith who reveals the 
chilling and comprehensive nature of his self-interest. Mr Elliot, she 
says, ‘is a man without heart or conscience; a designing, wary, cold-
blooded being, who thinks only of himself; who, for his own inter-
est or ease, would be guilty of any cruelty, or any treachery [. . .] he 
has no feeling for others [. . .] he is totally beyond the reach of any 
sentiment of justice or compassion’ (p. 215). This must be one of the 
most damning verdicts against a character in all of Austen’s novels. 
It is, of course, the judgement made by another character with just 
cause for resentment. Nevertheless Anne Elliot underwrites this view 
of Mr Elliot, concluding, ‘It was a dreadful picture of ingratitude and 
inhumanity’ (p. 227).
The problem for many readers of Persuasion is that this ‘dreadful 
picture’ is not conveyed with the dramatic immediacy and vivacity 
that almost everywhere typifi es Austen’s representation of character. 
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The device of Mrs Smith’s detailed revelations seems clumsy, a means 
of resolving the narrative rather than an integrated element of the 
fi ctional dynamics. One cause of this problem may be the diffi culty 
of the task Austen set herself in her innovative perception of what we 
may now call the ‘banality of evil’. Mr Elliot, like many calculating 
and callous people, is only unnatural in his lack of singularity. Lady 
Russell warms to him because he never defi es public opinion and is 
never run away with by spirits (p. 159). Anne condemns him on the 
same grounds: ‘There was never any burst of feeling, any warmth of 
indignation or delight’ (p. 175). Such a character presents a diffi cult 
challenge for representation. Mr Elliot is pleasantly unexceptionable 
to everyone with whom he wishes to be on politely sociable terms: 
‘he pleased them all’ (p. 175).
There is no suggestion in the text that he knows himself in any 
different aspect from that of outward civility or that he is driven by 
hidden passions. It is perhaps the normality of Mr Elliot in his ruth-
less pursuit of self-interest that is Austen’s point. By the early nine-
teenth century, self-interest was being hailed not only as a rational 
virtue in individuals, it was also being extolled as the morally benefi -
cent driving force of national prosperity. Competitive individualism 
was becoming a totalising system of belief ordering perceptions of 
reality. It is this consensual normalisation of selfi shness that the rep-
resentation of Mr Elliot points to and is made chillingly explicit in 
Mrs Smith’s explanation, ‘I must own I saw nothing reprehensible in 
what Mr Elliot was doing. “To do what is best for himself,” passed 
as a duty’ (p. 218). When a specifi c vice becomes reconceptualised 
throughout society as unexceptionable behaviour, even as a duty, it 
becomes diffi cult to satirise.
To suggest that, in addition to attacking competitive individual-
ism, Austen also undermines the ideal of subjective individualism 
is, perhaps, more contentious. This is especially so in the case of 
Anne Elliot. She is often seen as the most subjective of Austen’s hero-
ines and as marking a shift in Austen’s psychological representation 
away from ironic treatment of romantic sensibility to endorsement 
of it. The heroine’s emotional identifi cation with seasonal change, 
the ‘tender and underisive’ treatment of her love for Wentworth, and 
the extensive use of free indirect discourse throughout the narrative, 
it is argued, all indicate increased infl uence of romantic subjectiv-
ity upon Austen’s artistic practice.32 Not all critics agree with this 
assessment. William Galperin claims that while ‘the fi nal ending of 
Persuasion nicely justifi es the novel’s designation as the most subjec-
tive of Austen’s texts’ and while ‘the focus on Anne’s interiority at the 
 Persuasion: Fellow Creatures  157
5215_Morris.indd   157 30/11/16   10:32 AM
158  Jane Austen, Virginia Woolf and Worldly Realism
novel’s close necessarily accords with the ideology of individualism’, 
the narrator’s perspective subtly disassociates itself from that of the 
heroine.33 John Wiltshire also recognises an increased emphasis on 
interiority in Persuasion, but rejects a romantic Austen. He argues 
that the novel ‘depicts Anne Elliot attempting to live the life of the 
Christian stoic. She feels deeply, but she seeks means, through the 
exertion of “reason”, to combat her feelings’ (Jane Austen and the 
Body, p. 175).
Wiltshire sees the transparency with which Austen presents inva-
sions of feeling in Persuasion as an artistic achievement, allowing her 
to represent the heroine’s struggle for rational control over emotion, 
in other words, as a reassertion of the mind−body hierarchy. There 
is an important distinction to be made here. In Sense and Sensibility, 
Marianne learns to submit her subjective views of the world to the 
external evidence of empirical reality. This is very different from dis-
ciplining self to submit to a religious or spiritual moral system such 
as Christian stoicism. To read Persuasion as either an endorsement of 
romantic sensibility, the ideology of individualism, as Galperin terms 
it, or, alternatively, to read it as advocacy of an abstract principle of 
self-discipline would necessarily imply a radical rejection by Austen 
of her earlier critique of the cult of subjective individualism. Both 
stoic rationalism and romantic subjectivity look inward, stressing an 
ideal of interiority. In so doing, they augment an idea of self domi-
nant in the classical regime of representation structured vertically by 
the mind−matter hierarchy. It is a regime that demotes from notice 
embodied social being and diminishes the self’s interaction with the 
world it inhabits.
Austen’s worldly realism, by contrast, represents self as a dynamic 
continuum of social, emotional, rational and physical energies. 
Deriving from the empirical psychology of Hume and Hartley, this 
new perception of the self is brought into fullest visibility in Per-
suasion, especially in the representation of Anne Elliot. It is this 
extended view of self, challenging the separation of reason from 
feeling and mind from matter that propels Austen’s most innova-
tory writing practice. In Persuasion, even more than in earlier nov-
els, she emphasises the entangled inseparability of emotional, social 
and intellectual responses. This emphasis is marked throughout the 
text by recourse to near oxymorons as when Anne leaves Kellynch-
hall ‘in a sort of desolate tranquillity’ or when Lady Russell listens 
to news of Wentworth’s probable attachment to Louisa ‘in angry 
pleasure, in pleased contempt’ (pp. 38, 135). Moreover, the artistic 
transparency with which Anne’s feelings and responses are depicted 
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functions ironically to undercut stoic moral pretensions rather than 
illustrate them. Anne’s reasoning is at fault at least as often as her 
feelings, and usually it is near impossible to disentangle the rational 
from the emotional. Until very near the end of the story Anne, like 
so many Austen heroines, is the victim of her own mistaken self-
persuasion. Like Emma, her mind is sometimes more faulty than her 
embodied feelings.
The language used to describe Anne’s relinquishment of Went-
worth – the decision that propels the whole narrative − foregrounds 
the treacherous slipperiness with which rational, social and emo-
tional feelings intertwine. The double epistemological uncertainty 
of the verbs ‘persuade’ and ‘believe’ subtly suggests that when ‘she 
was persuaded to believe the engagement a wrong thing’ this is very 
far from a rational acceptance by Anne of any material or moral 
grounds for that judgement (p. 30). This ambivalence is reinforced 
by the shaky implications of the verb ‘imagined’ to depict Anne’s 
self-persuasion that she is consulting Wentworth’s own good in 
ending the affair. And the repetition of ‘belief’ as the term for her 
thought that she puts Wentworth before her self inserts a further 
implicit questioning of the status of that ‘belief’ which forms ‘her 
chief consolation’. The near impossibility of teasing out the impulses 
of emotional and social pressures from those of rational thought in 
this passage is compounded by the irresolvable uncertainty of where 
narrative discourse fl ows into free indirect discourse.
Throughout most of the narrative, the representation of Anne’s 
responses dramatises a similar confused interfl ow of reasoning with 
emotion, emotion depicted as wholly embodied. In many cases, as 
with the initial refusal of Wentworth, the attempt at rationalis-
ing seems driven by the need for consolation or avoidance of pain 
rather than a stoic acceptance of truth. Indeed, Anne’s and Went-
worth’s confl icting feelings need to be related to the novel’s inves-
tigation of emotions like timidity, prudence, fearfulness and their 
opposites. Thus, after meeting Wentworth again for the fi rst time 
after their separation, Anne ‘began to reason with herself, and try 
to be feeling less’ (p. 64). She represents to herself the absurdity of 
‘resuming the agitation’ after an interval of eight years. Yet almost 
instantly she falls into wondering what his feelings had been on see-
ing her again, jumping to the enticing thought that his being there 
does not suggest he wishes to avoid her. The next moment she is 
‘hating herself for the folly which asked the question’ implying as it 
does a wishfulness on her part that would leave her open to further 
hurt (p. 65).
 Persuasion: Fellow Creatures  159
5215_Morris.indd   159 30/11/16   10:32 AM
160  Jane Austen, Virginia Woolf and Worldly Realism
Much later, when she is in Bath and expecting another imminent 
reunion with Wentworth she is still attempting to scold herself back 
to reason. Nevertheless, she gives way to ‘a great inclination’ to look 
out into the street to see if it rained, arguing with herself, ‘Why was 
she to suspect herself of another motive? [. . .] one half of her should 
not be always so much wiser that the other half, or always suspecting 
the other of being worse than it was’ (p. 190). This passage comically 
belies any possibility of wholly rational self-knowledge. The idealist 
identifi cation of moral rectitude with the struggle for rational under-
standing and discipline of baser desires was to become the driving 
force of plot structure in much subsequent Victorian psychological 
realism. In contrast, what Persuasion does so brilliantly is dramatise 
the dynamic, self-persuasive, tangled powers of imagination, emo-
tion and reason in simultaneously masking and pursuing desire. The 
congruence of classical verisimilitude is wholly undone.
In addition to challenging any privileging of abstract reason, Aus-
ten’s writing foregrounds the dominance of the physical and social 
worlds in the constitution of self. It is not a stoic attempt at self-
control that the representation of Anne suggests, in the early part 
of the novel, but physical depression. Anne has lost ‘bloom’ and the 
word precisely evokes the glow and fl ourishing that derive from the 
vitality of the whole embodied being. Anne is fi rst described in 
the text as ‘nobody’ and the literalness of this epithet, lacking bodily 
existence, is driven home by her unacknowledged physical presence 
in the early episodes of the novel. Her very fi rst comment comes as a 
small shock to the reader, so unnoticed has her presence been in the 
text. She speaks only three sentences in the fi rst three chapters, her 
words having ‘no weight’ with her family. She is indeed a non-entity, 
effectually rendered invisible and mute. The telling contrast is with 
Mrs Croft, who ‘had a squareness, uprightness, and vigour of form, 
which gave importance to her person’ (p. 52). Here, again, Austen’s 
language insists upon a sense of the indivisibility of physical, psycho-
logical and social identity.
Embodied identity cannot be derived from subjective introspec-
tion. A sense of bodily presence and social worth are constituted only 
in and by the regard of others, as Adam Smith had taught. Anne, 
it is made clear, has lacked the recognition from others that pro-
duces, in a fundamental sense, self-possession. Although a skilled 
piano player, ‘she had never, since the age of fourteen, never since the 
loss of her dear mother, known the happiness of being listened to’ 
(p. 50). Similarly, her attention to the needs of others brings no sense 
of self-worth through their expressions of recognition and gratitude. 
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Her sister declares that ‘nobody will want her’ during their removal 
to Bath and her other sister, Mary, confi rms this negative judgement 
of Anne’s uselessness: ‘Dear me! What can you possibly have to do?’ 
(pp. 36, 41). Anne’s narrative trajectory, therefore, not only chal-
lenges gender hierarchy, it also enacts the injurious bodily and men-
tal effects of social invisibility as enforced by vertical, discriminatory 
regimes of the perceptible.
Anne’s acquirement of visible embodied self-possession is medi-
ated by physical interaction and eye contact with others. The transi-
tion from nobody to somebody is traced as acknowledgement of her 
embodied visibility. When Wentworth arrives at Uppercross Cottage, 
Anne only half meets his eye (p. 64). Thereafter they avoid direct 
engagement with each other. This physical and social alienation is 
breached by the intimacy of touch. Wentworth releases Anne from 
her nephew by unfastening the ‘sturdy little hands [. . .] from around 
her neck’ (p. 86). The sturdiness of the child’s hands draws attention 
to the act of physical touching involved. Shortly after this, Went-
worth again comes to Anne’s aid in a directly physical act when he 
lifts her into his sister’s carriage. Once more Austen’s language fore-
grounds Anne’s awareness of bodily contact: ‘Yes, − he had done it 
[. . .] his will and his hands had done it’ (p. 98).
Apart from touch, the most powerful form of direct interaction 
with others is that of eye contact. Intersubjective perspective consti-
tutes the shared world. Those denied notice are denied community. 
There is justifi ed criticism of women’s subjection to the male gaze 
and a similar objection could be brought against Austen’s depic-
tion of Anne Elliot as the subject of male admiration. This seems an 
unduly negative reading in the context of Austen’s concern with the 
embodied self which is produced only through the recognition and 
approval of others. The description of Anne’s appearance as admired 
by Mr Elliot focuses upon her renewed physical vitality, her ‘bloom’, 
‘freshness’ and ‘animation’, rather than upon any stereotypical femi-
nine attributes. The text makes clear that Anne knows she is admired 
and recognises this with pleasure, not with the inhibited modesty 
prescribed for young women. Moreover, the incident provides Anne 
with a double affi rmation of her visible, embodied presence. She is 
alive to Wentworth’s recognition of the admiration she is receiv-
ing, resulting in a moment of conscious eye contact between them, 
‘a glance of brightness’ on Wentworth’s part (p. 112). This phrase 
superbly evokes the continuity of physical and emotional energies. 
Anne’s sense of self-worth continues to fi nd reassurance in the affi r-
mation she receives from Mr Elliot’s notice at Lyme. When Lady 
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Russell, too, compliments her on her improved looks, she connects 
this ‘with the silent admiration of her cousin [. . .] hoping she was to 
be blessed with a second spring of youth and beauty’ (p. 134). Anne 
is amused at her own susceptibility to Mr Elliot’s approving gaze, 
but her growing acceptance of her bodily person as respected and 
admired by others is marked by her easy willingness to believe herself 
the object of Captain Benwick’s affections, a striking reversal of her 
earlier invisibility (p. 145).
Alongside embodied self-possession, Anne acquires the recog-
nition and approval of others necessary for full perceptibility as a 
social being. The negative ‘What can you possibly have to do?’ of 
the early chapters is ironically transformed across the narrative to 
a general appreciative recognition of her strength and support in all 
contingencies. At Lyme, when Louisa lies unconscious, her brother 
Charles turns instinctively to Anne, crying, ‘what is to be done next?’ 
and shortly afterwards Wentworth is declaring, ‘none so proper, so 
capable as Anne!’ (pp. 120, 123). By the time she comes to leave the 
Musgroves, her departure was ‘an event they all dreaded. “What 
would they do without her?”’ (p. 132). In the fi nal part of the story, 
Anne is so far from being a nobody that she is ‘claimed as part of the 
family’, part of a perceptible community (p. 239).
Austen’s representation of Anne Elliot’s achievement of visible, 
embodied self-possession, therefore, is not informed by the ideolo-
gies of either stoic or religious disciplinary conceptions of self and 
neither is it derived from romantic privileging of subjectivity. Rather 
it is informed by Austen’s worldly, materialist understanding of the 
inseparability of physical, social and mental being, a perception she 
derives from eighteenth-century psychology. Roy Porter suggests that 
David Hume’s early episode of self-monitored sickness convinced 
him that ‘thinking could not divorce itself from sensation, and sen-
sation was rooted in the senses, in the body’.34 In David Hartley 
on Human Nature, Richard Allen argues that for Hartley, ideas ‘are 
not simply the responses of the disembodied mind [. . .] rather they 
are the meanings an embodied, active, and speaking being develops 
through interaction with its social and physical environment’.35 ‘The 
continuing processes of sensation, perception, feeling, action, and 
thought, understood both physically and subjective, are the mind’ 
for Hartley, Allen claims (p. 189). This could stand as a description 
of Austen’s representation of consciousness as inherently physical as 
well as mental.
In Persuasion, Austen drives home her radical sense of the physi-
cality of human life by the startling recurrence of accidents, illnesses 
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and mortality suffered by so many characters. Creaturely being, 
the text implicitly claims, subsists in the fl eshly life common to all. 
Mental well-being is shown to be dependent upon healthy physi-
cal activity. The innovative originality of Austen’s worldly realism 
derives from the regime of visibility she brings to the physical basis 
of human subjectivity and social relations, and to the cultural force 
of the world of things. Typically, the Elliot family’s pursuit of status 
is depicted by means of Mary’s obsession with who takes precedence 
in walking into rooms; social privilege has to be literally performed 
in physical space by the physical body. For Sir Walter, bodily appear-
ance is visible manifestation of inherent social superiority, carried in 
the aristocracy of blood. Moreover, Austen’s language in Persuasion 
utilises strikingly physical and concrete phrases to evoke the embod-
ied aspect of responses and emotions. Anne thinks of the rooms and 
groves of Kellynch as ‘beginning to own other eyes and other limbs’ 
and on leaving Uppercross she looks back at ‘some breathings of 
friendship and reconciliation’ with Wentworth (pp. 51, 133).
For materialists, like Hartley, all subsequent emotions and desires 
derive from the earliest physical experiences of pleasure and pain in 
infancy. Whereas idealist notions of sensibility are commonly associ-
ated with spiritual sensitivity and mental refi nement, Austen’s lan-
guage insistently locates emotion in bodily sensation. It is, indeed, 
rare to fi nd accounts of inner response that are not described physi-
cally. Her writing, thus, brings interiority into the realm of the per-
ceptible, relocated from individualised privacy to a shared creaturely 
world. When Wentworth assists Anne into the Crofts’ carriage, she 
experiences ‘emotions so compounded of pleasure and pain, that she 
knew not which prevailed’ (p. 98). Mrs Croft’s declaration in favour 
of short engagements sends a ‘nervous thrill all over her’ (p. 251). 
Rather than refi ned sensibility, Austen’s writing foregrounds the phys-
ical violence involved in processes of feeling. Anne’s experience on 
seeing Wentworth again in Bath is ‘overpowering, blinding, bewilder-
ing [. . .] It was agitation, pain, pleasure, a something between delight 
and misery’ (p. 191). The word ‘agitation’ occurs again and again 
in the text to express the inseparability of the physical and the emo-
tional. The bodily intensity of inner feeling is registered in power-
ful physical language, as in ‘a gnawing solicitude never appeased’, 
‘breath too much oppressed’ and eyes that ‘devoured’ the words of 
Wentworth’s confessional letter (pp. 247, 256, 257).
The perception of emotional and mental life, as embedded in and 
deriving from the physical world, forms the basis of Austen’s strik-
ingly innovative depiction of consciousness in Persuasion. Austen 
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expands the fi eld of the perceptible, representing consciousness not 
as a hidden personal possession, denoting individual moral worth, 
but as much fuller and more astonishing than such traditional ideal-
ist conceptions. Consciousness, in Persuasion, is simultaneous com-
prehension of and response to a single moment alive with multiple 
forces: social interaction, physical location, cultural implications and 
a fl ux of bodily and emotional sensations. When Captain Wentworth 
presents himself for the fi rst time at Uppercross Cottage, the elec-
tric rush of Anne’s heightened awareness is caught in the rapidity of 
Austen’s syntax and use of hyphens and repetitions. In the same 
instant, Anne hears Wentworth’s voice, judges the propriety of what 
he says to those present, all within the confusing physical swirl of a 
room full of persons and voices (p. 64).
This radical new recognition of the speed and fullness with which 
consciousness comprehends a moment of psycho-social and physi-
cal reality is even more intensely realised in the representation of the 
meeting between Anne and Wentworth as they attend a concert. Anne 
simultaneously registers the noises in the room, ‘the almost ceaseless 
slam of the door, and ceaseless buzz of persons walking through’, is 
acutely tuned in to every word Wentworth utters, fl ooded with a rush 
of intense, confused emotions and aware of bodily sensation, of ‘begin-
ning to breathe very quick’ (p. 199). Such dynamic worldly realism 
pushes open the boundaries of how we perceive the motility of self in 
its continuities with the fl ux of socio-physical reality. Within Austen’s 
fi ction, human existence is that of embodied, sentient creatures shar-
ing consciousness of the common socio-physical world. Her writing, 
therefore, constitutes a total rejection of the idealist hierarchy elevat-
ing mind over material being and inaugurates a new egalitarian rep-
resentative order in which everything can be visible and audible. This 
democratic shift in the perceptible brings into being a writing practice 
that looks directly towards Virginia Woolf’s artistic materialism.
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Chapter 6
The Years: Moment of Transition
There seems a pleasing comic irony in setting the conclusion of 
The Years (1937), a novel charting the disintegration of the bour-
geois family, in the offi ce of an estate agent. This location accords 
with Woolf’s own anti-individualist ambition for the future of 
the novel, that it will ‘escape a little from the common sitting 
room’.1 As I have suggested, from Sense and Sensibility through 
to Persuasion, Jane Austen propels her female protagonists out 
from the patriarchal place into ever wider, more socially hetero-
geneous spaces. A similar process can be traced in Woolf’s fi ction. 
In To the Lighthouse and Mrs Dalloway, a culminating meal or 
party in the private home is the location for the dropping away of 
individualism, division and differences in an experience of shared 
commonality, a moment of common life. In The Waves, this expe-
rience of shared being occurs in the public space of a restaurant 
among those who have no family ties. The culminating party in 
The Years is located in a commercial offi ce whose sole function 
depends upon social mobility. The occasion produces no moment 
of shared communality among the heterogeneous guests. This is 
perhaps unsurprising since in The Years, Woolf explores the chal-
lenges as well as the desirability of the common life, underpinned 
by shared creaturely necessity.
That the greater part of the ‘Present Day’ section of The Years 
takes place amidst sales notices for desirable domestic properties 
would have been taken by Woolf’s fi rst readers as indicative of the 
novel’s topicality. During the whole of the 1930s, housing was an 
issue rarely out of the news. ‘We are all housing reformers now’, 
declared the New Statesman in 1935. Also in 1935, the Arch-
bishop of York spoke out on the subject of housing conditions, as 
did the Prince of Wales in 1933 and H. G. Wells, Rose Macaulay 
and Hugh Walpole in a letter to the New Statesman that same year.2 
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Maynard Keynes put forward a proposal to set up a National Housing 
Corporation also in 1933.3 Parliament, newspapers and multiple 
public bodies conducted an energetic and endless debate on issues of 
housing throughout the decade. By common consent the most urgent 
problem was that of the appalling conditions and over-crowding of 
working-class housing. Almost as contentious was the ribbon devel-
opment of new, identical dwellings for the property-aspiring middle 
class along arterial roads, but also in areas of slum clearance within 
urban centres and inner suburbs.
The language of Woolf’s novel at times parodies the language 
of estate agents. Martin, the most money-minded of the Pargiter 
children, designates Digby’s home in Browne Street ‘a house of char-
acter’ and Abercorn Terrace as a ‘convenient family mansion’.4 But 
Woolf is not just having fun or being merely topical. The house as a 
physical thing forms the location of transitional exchange between 
human existence as creaturely beings subject to bodily necessity – 
need for shelter from the elements, even if only a cave, as Sara points 
out – and as socio-cultural creators (p. 170). ‘I was going to have 
thanked this house,’ says Nicholas towards the end of the story, 
‘which has sheltered the lovers, the creators, the men and women of 
good will’ (p. 383). This duality of bodily−cultural being is, indeed, 
a major theme of The Waves, an insistence underwriting Woolf’s 
attack upon idealism in that text. The need of shelter by all embod-
ied creatures points to the basis of common life in shared physical 
vulnerability.
Yet the house that arises out of this commonality is also pre-
eminently the site of individualistic privacy and possessiveness, as 
Martin’s comments above indicate. Woolf’s materialist imagination 
understands the house not only as a point of exchange between the 
biological and the social but also as a nexus or gathering of com-
plex structural forces and processes. The house demarcates the divi-
sion of public from private, it provides the physical geography of 
gender and class inequalities and hence the DNA of self-identity. 
‘Better than any other symbol,’ John Burnett writes in A Social 
History of Housing 1815–1970, ‘the house conferred and announced 
status.’5 The house, Burnett goes on to suggest, is the stage on 
which the social codes of middle-class respectability and domestic-
ity are repeatedly performed and reinforced. Thus at the beginning 
of The Years, Woolf depicts Milly imitating a grown-up voice as 
she reproves Martin for his language and Rose for her dirty dress, 
thereby reimposing across the generations the division of the proper 
from the improper (p. 10).
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But if the house has a conservative function in perpetuating the 
embodied conduct and demeanour whose reiteration preserve gender 
and class divisions, it has a proactive role in generating the consumer 
demand that drives capitalist expansion and hence social change. 
Woolf has an acute grasp of the ramifying political and social impli-
cations of technology as substantiated in things. In Mrs Dalloway, 
cars function as a complex metonymy of new disciplinary systems 
of mass control and conformity. In The Waves, Woolf recognises 
the way communication technology and consumer capitalism fur-
ther modern economic imperialism. In The Years, she foregrounds 
the house as agent of change. The 1930s saw a massive increase in 
house building and thus constituted a moment of transition in which 
invisible consumables, like gas, electricity and water, underwent vast 
expansion with radical consequences for the relations of the public 
and private realms, of the state to its citizens, of class relations and 
even of self-identity.
In The Years, Eleanor, aboard a bus, notes, as the district of shops 
turns into one of housing, ‘there were big houses and little houses; 
public houses and private houses [. . .] Underneath were pipes, wires, 
drains’ (p. 90). Beneath the surface difference of big and little, private 
and public distributions of property and wealth, in other words, there 
is testimony to common human needs. The demand for domestic 
supplies of gas, electricity and water inevitably involved state inter-
vention in the previously privatised housing sphere. It also brought 
into being a new expanded public realm in that local authorities 
increasingly replaced private providers. As early as 1903, the Met-
ropolitan Water Board was formed in response to public indignation 
at the inability of the nine private companies to provide adequate 
supplies of water to the capital. The ‘water famines’, as they were 
called, brought to public attention the contradictory nature of water 
supply: water is a physical necessity of all living creatures, a basic 
requirement for common life, yet it is also a commodity. In 1926, 
the Electrical Supply Act set up the Central Generating Board and 
the National Grid. In 1933, the New Statesman wrote approvingly 
that in its annual report for 1932, the Central Electricity Board had 
announced that the ‘grid’ was now nearly complete. This meant that 
‘Britain’s experiment in the new method of socialisation, by means of 
public corporations, is fully established.’6
This ‘socialisation’ shaped a new understanding of local and 
national communities. Despite differences of wealth and divisions 
of class, people increasingly became sharers of common utilities 
that were coming to be seen as absolutely necessary to physical 
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well-being. Embodied life was the interface with infrastructure. 
The common life seemed about to be joined up, given substance, in 
pipes and wires. Yet, like all social processes, this was a transition 
characterised by contradictions. Basic bodily needs for hygiene and 
food became drivers of a vast new realm of capital enterprise. Sup-
pliers of electrical goods, in particular, were quick to seize upon the 
potential of such a huge market, especially in relation to women 
as consumers. At the beginning of the novel, the Pargiter women 
struggle to get a primitive kettle to boil; at the end, Eleanor admits 
she could not do without hot water and electricity (p. 297).
The Electrical Association for Women was founded in 1924 by 
the manufacturers, who also published a journal entitled Electrical 
Age for Women. In 1930, the upmarket furniture store, Heals, exhib-
ited an all-electric ‘Bachelor Girls’ fl at.7 Electrical devices freed mid-
dle-class homes from the need for live-in servants but paradoxically 
this actually expanded the domestic responsibilities of middle-class 
wives as they began to undertake the work of cooking, laundry and 
cleaning for themselves. At the other end of the social scale, Labour 
councils were putting cable into working-class districts and offering 
credit schemes to assist with house wiring and installing penny slot 
meters to enable working-class consumers to buy electricity and gas. 
What was being inaugurated alongside the inception of public pro-
vision was a fundamental convergence of life styles, self-image and 
aspiration between the middle and working classes. This could be 
seen as a cultural movement towards recognition of the common life 
as brought about by public provision for shared needs.
On the other hand, the 1930s also marks the moment when 
domestic property became a central feature within national wealth 
fl ow and increasingly a primary fi nancial asset dividing those who 
could buy property from those who had to rent. Because of the 
high demand for houses and despite, or perhaps because of, the 
Depression, borrowing became the widespread means of acquisi-
tion. Building Societies increased rapidly in number during the years 
between the wars, offering credit at relatively low interest and with 
a much-expanded time for repayment. Banks also began to offer 
mortgages for property purchase. Property development and invest-
ment became a new means of speculative wealth creation and expan-
sion, offering the promise of much greater rewards than traditional 
sources of middle-class income. In The Years, Abel Pargiter accu-
mulates more wealth from investment than his brother, Digby, gains 
from his prestigious public career. In London, especially, the fl ow of 
capital and wealth was increasingly channelled through property. 
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When Eleanor tells her sister-in-law, Celia, that the estate agent is 
advising her to cut up the family home into fl ats and just previously 
the house in Browne Street has been snapped up by a ‘party from 
China [. . .] [who] had business in the city’ (pp. 185, 132), Woolf is 
indicating the centrality of property to developing forms of specula-
tive capitalism that present-day inhabitants of London would very 
easily recognise.
The image of the house, recurrent throughout the text and fore-
grounded in the fi nal setting of the ‘Present Day’ section, points 
metonymically to many interrelated and changing worlds: physi-
cal, private, public, domestic, gender and class. The word ‘world’ 
is, indeed, much repeated in the narrative. In 1914, Kitty on the 
sleeper train, heading north, feels she is ‘passing from one world to 
another; this was the moment of transition’ (p. 244). The very fi rst 
paragraph of the novel offers a sweeping horizontal perspective 
of the overlapping and interlinked worlds that constitute human 
existence. Narrative viewpoint is never still, like the weather, it 
is ‘perpetually changing’ (p. 3). It fl ows across the continuum of 
the natural world of sky and clouds to farmers in the countryside 
apprehensive for their crops, to the city streets where shoppers 
shelter under umbrellas. These four worlds – human and physical, 
countryside and city – are held, within the narrative perspective, 
in a relationship wrought by their interdependence upon weather. 
This brilliantly condensed style marks a moving on from The Waves 
in which the life of the universe is separated out structurally from 
the human. In its universal relevance to all of human existence, the 
weather, in the opening of The Years, even provides a shared topic 
of conversational exchange across the class divide between shop 
assistants and lady shoppers.
Within these four larger general worlds, invoked in the fi rst para-
graph, other more specifi c worlds co-exist. Despite the egalitarian 
continuity of narrative perspective, however, these are worlds con-
stituted by social divisions. The separation between them is mapped 
onto actual physical geography. London streets are zoned into East 
and West ends, with the West end being the domain of lady shop-
pers, forming ‘interminable processions’ to department stores like 
Whiteley’s. The East end is the male domain where ‘business men’ 
parade the pavements ‘like caravans perpetually marching’ (p. 3). 
The depiction of gendered worlds continues in the following pages 
with Colonel Pargiter dining in his Piccadilly club with old friends 
who, like himself, have spent lives in the male public sphere as sol-
diers, civil servants, colonial administrators. The world of London 
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opens out, in this sense, to men’s access to the wider intercontinen-
tal spaces of India, Africa and Egypt. Meanwhile, in the far smaller 
female realm of the private house, women preside over tea-tables or, 
like Mira, wait upon the arrival of the men on whom they depend. 
The ingrained frugality this economic inequality produces is indi-
cated in the care taken by elderly spinsters to measure out the exact 
number of teaspoons of tea. The harsh contrast in scale marks out 
the severe limits of the world of women at the end of the nineteenth 
century compared to expansive male horizons.
Relations of both inequality and interdependence also typify two 
other distinct worlds present in the opening paragraph: the world of 
middle-class respectability, money and status and the world of the 
working-class poor. These hierarchically separate domains are sub-
stantiated in vertical physical space. The servant girl brings the silver 
teapot up to the drawing room from the basement that she inhabits. 
Colonel Pargiter looks down upon the teeming traffi c in the streets 
from the panoptic elevation of his club window. While the affl uent 
streets of London’s East and West ends throb with the noise and 
bustle of shoppers, business men and traffi c, in effect, of the fl ow of 
money, the streets where the poorer inhabitants of the city live are 
more accustomed to the cries of street sellers and musicians. Shops 
like the Army and Navy Store, however, constitute a site of interac-
tion between middle and working classes that indicates the presence 
also of a new social world jostling with an older traditional world. 
The space within shops is more horizontal, less hierarchical in so far 
as shop assistants cannot be confi ned to the basement. Moreover, 
shop work provided women with an alternative to domestic service 
which, despite the exacting discipline imposed on the shop fl oor, 
offered female employees more independence and better wages than 
that of the live-in servant. In depicting the less deferential interac-
tion between shoppers and assistants, Woolf marks a moment of 
transition in female employment and autonomy. This new, more 
egalitarian consumer culture contrasts pointedly to the traditional 
world of aristocracy and royalty still decked out in ‘frock coats’ and 
‘bustles’ (p. 3).
Separating out for the purpose of critical commentary, the many 
distinct worlds Woolf indicates within the condensation of a sin-
gle paragraph tends, unfortunately, to render the writing static. In 
fact, the swift motility of narrative viewpoint functions to enhance 
the dominant sense of energy and movement. These are worlds in 
constant fl ux, subject, like the sky, to ceaseless change. The effect 
of Woolf’s worldly realism is to constitute physical existence as 
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kaleidoscopic, comprehensive and wholly non-hierarchic. It is an 
egalitarian regime of the perceptible in which everything is wor-
thy of representation. Single sentences slide from pigeons to ladies 
in many-coloured frocks and from the Princess to servant girls in 
cap and apron. What is conveyed is a horizontal sweep of myr-
iad forms of life. The continuous interaction of one domain with 
another, the physical with the social, is reinforced by the image of 
the ‘mixed light of lamps and setting sun [. . .] refl ected equally in 
the placid waters of the Round Pond and the Serpentine’ (p. 4). The 
concluding sentence of the paragraph expands to encompass human 
life within the impersonal immensity of universal space and time: 
‘Slowly wheeling, like the rays of a searchlight, the days, the weeks, 
the years passed one another across the sky’ (p. 4). The poetic con-
densation of sentences like this, integrated within the text, are per-
haps more successful in evoking the continuum of human life with 
the vast processes of existence than are the separate non-narrative 
interludes in The Waves.
Reading the novels of Turgenev was a critical factor infl uencing 
the powerful sense Woolf has of the novelist’s need to represent the 
most comprehensive sweep of life. In 1933, while busy with The 
Years, Woolf was also writing her essay on his fi ction in which she 
claims him to be one of the few novelists able to combine the truth 
of both fact and vision. Hermione Lee rightly observes that Woolf’s 
reading of Turgenev’s novels strongly infl uenced the writing of The 
Years.8 In her Diary, 16 August 1933, Woolf notes that ‘T, wrote 
and rewrote. To clear the truth of the unessential.’ In the paragraph 
immediately above this she groans of The Pargiters, ‘Oh Lord how 
am I ever going to pull all that into shape! What a tremendous strug-
gle it’ll be!’9 In her essay on Turgenev, she returns to the notion of 
artistic struggle. The novelist achieves his extraordinary complex 
simplicity only by means of ‘a long struggle of elimination’, she 
argues.10 Critics have perhaps tended to read The Years too much 
infl uenced by Woolf’s own despairing comments on her struggle 
to eliminate and rather less in the light of the insights into what 
she wanted to achieve by that struggle and that she gained from 
Turgenev and also from Chekhov. Undoubtedly, the ‘extraordinary 
complex simplicity’ of the fi rst paragraph of The Years is indebted 
to her reading of Turgenev and of Chekhov but she gains more from 
them than formal mastery. She gains a sense of form wrought by the 
needs of a vision of actual life in its substantive fullness.
In her essay on Turgenev she imagines him ‘to be gazing out over 
the houses far away at some wider view’ (Essays, 6.9). She notes 
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approvingly that although his characters are utterly convincing they 
do not exert an individualistic domination over the story, ‘because 
they are not the whole of life, but only part of the whole’ (Essays, 
6.13). This aspect of Turgenev’s art chimes with Woolf’s own artistic 
and political aim to create an anti-individualistic form of the novel 
in which human life is recognised metonymically as part of the much 
greater whole of the physical universe. Woolf, too, wants to look 
beyond the houses. In addition to the experiences of the characters 
in Turgenev’s fi ction, she points out, ‘many other things seem to be 
going on at the same time. We hear the hum of life in the fi elds; a 
horse champs his bit; a butterfl y circles and settles. And [. . .] we 
notice, without seeming to notice, life going on’ (Essays, 6.13). This 
comment articulates the new egalitarian regime of the perceptible 
that Woolf seeks, an inclusive aesthetic, as recognised by Jacques 
Rancière, in which everything is worthy of notice. It constitutes the 
comprehensive, horizontal perspective of worldly realism which, as 
in the opening of The Years, sustains a sense of life, in all its myriad 
forms and sounds, ‘going on’.
There was a production of Turgenev’s play, A Month in the 
Country, at the Westminster Theatre in London in October 1936. 
The appreciative reviewer, in the New Statesman, noted that, as 
always with Turgenev, the invisible protagonist is Time. ‘The play’, 
the reviewer comments, ‘foreshadows Chekhov.’11 Also in 1936, 
there was a much applauded production of Chekhov’s The Sea-Gull, 
starring Edith Evans, Peggy Ashcroft and John Gielgud. The Old 
Vic put on The Three Sisters in 1935. The Cherry Orchard was per-
formed in 1933, to critical acclaim. Desmond MacCarthy wrote a 
long, intelligent review in the New Statesman.12 It seems very likely 
that Woolf would have gone to these productions and she certainly 
went to see The Three Sisters in 1926 (Lee, Virginia Woolf, p. 505). 
Writing of Chekhov’s short stories, Woolf argues that although he 
is clearly appalled by suffering and injustice, subtly analytical of 
human relations, and concerned with the health of the soul, none 
of these aspects seems adequately to convey his effect. Compared 
to English writers, she says, in his work ‘nothing is solved, we feel; 
nothing is rightly held together’ (Essays, 4.185). Yet, ‘as we read 
these little stories about nothing at all, the horizon widens; the soul 
gains an astonishing sense of freedom’ (Essays, 4.185). In contrast 
to this it is ‘the teapot that rules in England; time is limited; space 
is crowded’ (Essays, 4.187). As in Turgenev, Woolf recognises in 
Chekhov a much fuller and more expansive perception of reality 
than that conveyed in English fi ction. The Russian novelists pursue 
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a worldly realist form of writing that refuses to privilege the individ-
ual, positioning human life within a wide scope of time and space.
Alex Zwerdling quotes Woolf’s lament after reading the fi rst 
reviews of The Years: ‘No one has yet seen the point – my point.’ 
Given the failure of most recent critics to appreciate the novel, 
Zwerdling concludes, ‘her fears were well grounded’.13 The major-
ity of critics who regard the novel unfavourably locate the problem 
in Woolf’s failure to artistically assimilate what they take as a real-
ist concern with factuality. In his Introduction to The Pargiters, 
Mitchell A. Leaska sees a ‘deadly confl ict’ between fact and feel-
ing.14 As Anna Snaith points out, in Virginia Woolf, Public and 
Private Negotiations, many of those critics who stress the fl awed 
nature of the text come to it through an examination of the radi-
cal process of cutting and omissions that Woolf imposed upon her 
original material.15 Snaith suggests instead there should be more 
focus upon what Woolf adds to the narrative during the revisions. 
She points to the way Woolf’s research on women’s education devel-
ops and changes through the six years of writing, concluding, ‘Just 
because Woolf leaves out the essays and direct references does not 
mean their infl uence is dissolved or erased’ (Public, p. 101). The 
priority for Woolf, in the fi nal version of the novel, Snaith argues, 
‘is not accuracy but rather the recognition of history as discourse 
itself’ (Public, p. 111).
History, as a temporal process of change, is undoubtedly a 
determining presence in Woolf’s fi ction, as it is in Turgenev’s and 
Chekhov’s. Yet, her priority, like theirs, is with the transformation 
of material forces, literally the nuts and bolts, shaping embodied 
existence. Part of the problem for many recent critics is the nega-
tive identifi cation of ‘facts’ with realism. There is almost a sense of 
embarrassment that Woolf should follow such an iconic modernist 
text, as The Waves, with an apparent retreat to traditionalism. For 
modernist critics, Woolf must either be deemed to have failed because 
she is tempted into a conventional representation of the real world or 
she must be rescued for modernism by recognition that realism is not 
her aim at all. The most ready means to hand for such exculpation is 
to understand her texts as meta-fi ctions about discourse, and history 
‘as discourse itself’. Linden Peach, for example, begins his chapter on 
The Years with an apologetic recognition that ‘it displays at times the 
verisimilitude associated with traditional, social realist fi ction’.16 He 
then redeems the text by reading it dialogically as staging a discursive 
debate that facilitates release from three confl icting and falsifying 
discourses of the family dominating the inter-war years. In addition, 
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he claims, the novel is yet more complicated, driven by awareness ‘of 
the precarious, partial and changing nature of the social and cultural 
archive’ (Woolf, p. 180). Yes, but, one wants to ask, what about the 
changing nature of the material world in which women necessarily 
live out their embodied lives? And how can we judge discourses to 
be false if there is no access to ‘facts’ beyond yet more discourse and 
archives?
Readings like those of Peach and Snaith offer valuable insights 
into Woolf’s concerns as she wrote the novels responding to her own 
times. Historicised studies, such as Snaith’s and Peach’s, have pro-
vided a much richer and more nuanced understanding of the poli-
tics of Woolf’s fi ction. It is certainly the case, moreover, that Woolf 
was acutely aware of the often repressive power of discursive codes, 
especially those perpetuating an idealist regime of the perceptible. 
It is, however, not solely the intertextuality of discourse that Woolf 
seeks to represent. In line with her appreciation of Turgenev’s art she 
wants to convey the textuality of material existence. In her essay on 
Turgenev’s novels, she offers, as an example of his ‘truth to facts’, 
his description of a pair of gloves picked up by a character. They 
were ‘white chamois-leather gloves, recently washed, every fi nger 
of which had stretched at the tip and looked like a fi nger-biscuit’ 
(Essays, 6.11). What such writing brings home to our perception 
is the imprint of the processes of existence upon the very fabric of 
otherwise mute things. The physical is not always voiceless, as the 
worn gloves are not inarticulate. Woolf’s writing is typifi ed by a 
democratic stylistics that comprehends the life of what she memo-
rably calls ‘all breathing beings’, but equally the worlds of plants, 
sky, inanimate objects and molecular existence, fi nding for what is 
mute, a voice.
In a literal sense, a house is an inanimate object, yet in The Years, 
it is shown to exert an active force upon human life. The house can 
be seen as a gathering point out of which radiate, rather in the man-
ner of Eleanor’s doodle on blotting paper, metonymic relations to 
past, present and emerging ideologies, consumer demand, mate-
rial production, fi nancial systems and structures of inequality. The 
specifi c houses inhabited by the fi rst generation of Pargiters in the 
The Years can also be thought of in terms of de Certeau’s distinc-
tion between a place as location of the static, hierarchic order of the 
proper, on the one hand, and of space as the arena of movement and 
possibility on the other.17 Just as Austen represents both Hartfi eld 
in Emma and Kellynch-hall in Persuasion as places hostile to time 
and change, so too Woolf represents the family houses in Abercorn 
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Terrace, Browne Street and Oxford as places perpetuating a stul-
tifying patriarchal order, resistant to time and change. Masculine 
privilege is materialised in house geography. While Eleanor, Milly 
and Delia occupy the drawing room, their presence there is largely 
ordered by a male itinerary: their day is organised around the return 
of brothers and father. In contrast, Abel Pargiter has the privilege 
of a study and Martin the exclusive use of the schoolroom. Rose 
shrinks at the doorway when she wants to speak with him, while he 
threatens her like an intruder. House geography also orders the verti-
cal hierarchy of class. The servants of all three houses are inhabitants 
of the basements, often damp and lacking light. It is only as Crosby 
is leaving the house after all her years in service that Eleanor notices 
‘how dark, how low it was’ (p. 195).
Patriarchal authority is perpetually reiterated in daily routines 
and ceremonies inscribed in the domestic objects of the house, a 
regulatory recurrence which defi es the possibility of change. Martin 
hastily gets out of his father’s designated chair when Abel Pargiter 
is heard entering the house, but it is Martin not the girls who has 
been sitting in it. Only sons can occupy the place of the father. Simi-
larly, Abel is handed tea in the cup that had belonged to his father, 
a ritual of continuity that he upholds even though he dislikes tea. In 
the Lodge at Oxford, the painting of ‘the old gentleman who had 
ruled the college over a hundred years ago’ imposes itself when the 
lamps are lit. To Kitty, the portrait looks singularly like Dr Malone, 
her father, and current Master of the College. The authority that 
seems to be immune to change largely depends upon the material 
power of money and its unequal distribution. When Martin has done 
well at school his father rewards him with sixpence. Immediately 
prior to this, he has responded to Milly’s trip to Whiteley’s by com-
menting sharply, ‘Spending money, eh?’ (p. 12). Mrs Pargiter, on her 
death-bed, is still troubled by the need to account for any spending, 
‘The expense, Delia, the expense – that’s what worries me’ (p. 21). 
In Browne Street, Eugénie may be less subdued by domestic codes 
but she, too, is subject to the pervasive disapproval of her spending 
by Digby, her husband, and, as he sees it, her lack of responsibility. 
His daughters hear him interrogating Eugénie as to whether she has 
locked the house securely, and his voice sounds ‘peremptory [. . .] 
querulous and cross’ (p. 128).
As this suggests, speech is also organised hierarchically within 
the home; audibility is not democratic. Men interrogate women 
and children, holding them accountable. Women’s sphere of speech 
is domestic, the regulation of servants and children. Eugénie never 
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interrupts when Abel and Digby discuss politics (p. 111). Servants 
are rendered almost mute, unable to do more than speak when 
they are spoken to. Kitty wonders irritably of the butler, Hiscock, 
‘Why can’t you talk like a human being?’, failing to recognise that 
he is denied the full visibility and audibility of one (p. 66). Any 
movement over the allotted speech boundaries is met with rebuke 
or ridicule. When a woman guest at a dinner party in Oxford offers 
unsolicited knowledge, she is mocked by ‘the great Dr Andrews’ 
whereupon ‘with a wave of the hand dictated by centuries of tra-
dition, Mrs Larpent drew back her foot, as if she had encroached 
upon one of the chalk marks which decorate academic lintels’ 
(pp. 50–1).
The rigidity of domestic order ensures that the house is expe-
rienced more as a place of repressive decorum than the ideal of 
home perpetuated within middle-class domestic ideology. Martin 
thinks back with dislike on the house ‘where all those people had 
lived boxed up together, telling lies’ (pp. 200–1). Men escape the 
claustrophobia and limitations of the domestic house into the more 
expansive, if more individualistic and competitive, public world 
of school, university, clubs, professions and business. The house 
marks out the boundary of public and private and, by extension, 
the invisible chalk marks that divide what is circumscribed and 
proper from what is excluded from the perceptible as improper 
and dangerously unbounded. As the text makes clear, this is a divi-
sion that bears primarily upon girls and women. Men, like Colonel 
Pargiter and later his son Martin, have licence for improper rela-
tions outside the home.
In the early part of the narrative, women frequently look out 
of and throw open windows, as if in need of greater space. Win-
dows offer glimpses of the world beyond the house but visibility 
is frowned upon as improper for respectable girls. Delia relieves 
her sense of tedium by looking down at the street, calling to Milly 
to join her when a young man gets out of a cab. ‘Don’t be caught 
looking’, Eleanor says warningly (p. 17). Shortly afterwards, 
Crosby comes in to draw the ‘thick sculptured folds’ of the cur-
tains, whereupon the ‘world outside seemed thickly and entirely 
cut off’ (p. 18). Kitty is also oppressed by her sealed-off, stuffy 
room, drawing back the curtains and throwing open the window, 
even while remembering her mother scolding her , ‘Anybody might 
see in’ (p. 54). Edward Pargiter identifi es Kitty with Antigone who 
was immured alive for trespassing beyond the bounds of what is 
deemed proper for women. Kitty, as an adult, goes to the opera, 
5215_Morris.indd   178 30/11/16   10:32 AM
Siegfried, in which the heroine Brünnhilde is imprisoned in a deep 
sleep and encircled by a ring of fi re. Her awakening and release 
depend upon acceptance of marriage to Siegfried and renunciation 
of her improper powers.
The Years enacts the moment of transition or dissensus as women 
begin to rebel against and escape from the imprisoning codes of 
domestic respectability. This entails a rejection of the house as physi-
cal building. Not all the Pargiter women are equally successful in 
escaping from a house-bound life. Delia and Kitty, who had most 
chafed against the limitations of family and dreamt of romantic 
escape to the improper worlds of Irish republicanism and working-
class freedom from propriety, ironically settle for the mirror images 
of their dreams, as Kitty marries the aristocratic Lord Lasswade and 
Delia a staunch defender of Unionism and traditional order. Milly 
does not even want to escape, hoping to and succeeding in perpetuat-
ing the family home in her own married life. Eleanor is the only one 
of the sisters to fi nd a wider life of movement and change that satis-
fi es her. As a child, Rose transgressed most radically against proper 
limits, slipping through the locked door into the street to suffer a 
horrifi c encounter with male sexual violence. As an adult, she returns 
to the spaces of danger and possibility represented by the streets to 
fi ght in the public domain for women’s right to equality. For this fur-
ther transgression, she is incarcerated and subjected to the legalised 
violence of force feeding.
In Eugénie’s house in Browne Street, the windows are thrown wide 
open, while in the garden the daughters of the house, Maggie and 
Sara, are encouraged by their mother to dance around an enormous 
bonfi re of leaping fl ames as Eugénie shouts ‘Make it blaze! Make it 
blaze!’ (p. 110). Unsurprisingly, Sara is the least conforming of the sec-
ond generation of women whilst Maggie’s marriage to a Frenchman 
with a foreign name causes consternation to the more conservative in 
the family. Of the men of that generation, only Morris perpetuates the 
patriarchal order of the house-owning family. But the choices taken 
up by the other two are even more individualistic. Edward remains in 
his elite Oxford college and Martin has a plush bachelor apartment 
in a fashionable part of London. By contrast, Rose, Maggie, Sara and 
Eleanor have only suffi cient fi nancial means to live in small rooms 
or fl ats in the poorer city streets. In that sense, they have moved well 
beyond the proper place, geographically and fi nancially, of middle-
class respectability and out into spaces of possibility as well as threat. 
This, too, was Woolf’s artistic aim for women writers, to move out of 
the private drawing room into a wider sense of the world.
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This anti-individualism is central to Woolf’s attack upon an ide-
alist regime of the perceptible that elevates the realm of the mind 
at the expense of the embodied self as part of the whole material 
world. Woolf recognises that for women, strictly bound in by rules 
of the proper, this expanded sense of self is more diffi cult to acknowl-
edge. The contrast between men’s greater freedom of bodily life and 
women’s circumscribed identity is illustrated comically as Martin 
admires a young girl at Kitty’s dinner party, dressed demurely in vir-
ginal white and pearls, whilst he thinks ‘only an hour ago I was lying 
stark naked in my bath’ (pp. 225–6). There is less insistence upon the 
physical body in The Years than in The Waves. Nevertheless, char-
acters are represented as beings whose experience, even of culture, 
is as much physical as mental. As Edward reads Antigone and sips 
wine, ‘A soft glow spread over his spine at the nape of his neck’ (p. 
46). When Martin looks up at the dome of St Paul’s Cathedral, ‘All 
the weights in his body seemed to shift’ (p. 205). Peggy experiences 
a disturbing confl ict of emotion as a thrill runs ‘down her thigh’ 
(p. 295). When Peggy mentions sanitary towels, a previously taboo 
subject, Eleanor feels that ‘A knife seemed to slice her skin, leaving a 
ripple of unpleasant sensation’ (p. 303). Sara, in some ways the most 
interrogative character in the novel, directly challenges the idealist 
claim: ‘“And he says,” she murmured, “that the world is nothing but 
[. . .] thought” [. . .] Well [. . .] she would let herself be thought [. . .] 
She stretched herself out. Where did thought begin?’ (p. 118). Sara’s 
attempt to be pure thought convinces her that it is an impossible 
endeavour; what she experiences when she tries is an imaginative 
sense of her body.
In Persuasion, Austen draws attention to the embodied nature of 
human life by the recurrent physical accidents and illnesses experi-
enced by the characters. Similarly, in The Years, there are frequent 
references to bodily deformity, mutilation and injury. Like ‘all breath-
ing kind’ human beings are vulnerable to physical necessities and 
harm (p. 43). The story opens with anxiety about damage to crops 
from the wet weather and shoppers putting up umbrellas as shelter 
against the rain. Shortly afterwards a sudden squall sends children 
scudding home. In addition, Eleanor’s housing project is troubled 
by a roof that lets in the rain, while her sister-in-law, Celia, has to 
warn of a shortage of water for washing due to the hot, dry sum-
mer. Crosby, unable to afford transport, struggles against snow and 
mist: ‘She looked so hunched and small that it seemed doubtful if 
she could make her way across the wide open space shrouded in 
white mist’ (p. 273). The most threatening need for physical shelter 
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in the story, however, is not as protection from the weather but from 
enemy bombers. The physical fear experienced by all those in Mag-
gie’s and Renny’s cellar, sitting in breathless silence as a ‘violent crack 
of sound’ explodes right above them would resonate keenly with 
Woolf’s fi rst readers (p. 262). By the mid-1930s, war seemed increas-
ingly inevitable and news of German rearmament proliferated in the 
press; so, too, did public apprehension about the imminent danger 
of air raids and the need to provide what came to be called ‘shelters’. 
The effect of the unemotional pages of the government’s handbook 
on air raids and anti-gas precautions, the New Statesman observed 
in 1935, ‘is to turn what had hitherto been an horrifi c fantasy into a 
close and appalling reality’.18
The Years draws attention to the need of embodied creatures to 
fi nd shelter from the blast of both bombs and weather. Yet the shel-
tering enclosure of middle-class privacy shuts out the possibilities 
of fuller existence. The text equally points to the opposite anti-indi-
vidualist need for reconnection with the larger common life of the 
world. As the fear of the German air raid subsides, Nicholas specu-
lates that human beings need to live more ‘naturally’, that the whole 
being wishes to expand, whereas now ‘we live, screwed up into one 
hard little, tight little – knot’ (p. 267). Delia, cooped up in Abercorn 
Terrace, notes ‘a wildness in the spring evening, even here’. Dropping 
the blind on the scene, she exclaims desperately, ‘Oh my God!’ (p. 17). 
Eleanor feels a similar urge to escape the confi ned world of the Law 
Courts. Once outside, ‘She felt herself expand. It was still daylight 
here; a rush, a stir, a turmoil of variegated life came racing towards 
her. It was as if something had broken loose – in her, in the world 
[. . .] Above was the dazzle of a watery but gleaming sky’ (p. 99). 
When Sara tries to confi ne her being solely to thought, what she 
experiences is a sense of her bodily self extending into the physical 
being of a tree (p. 118). In Kensington Gardens, Martin asks himself 
that recurrent question in Woolf’s texts, ‘What would the world be 
[. . .] without an “I” in it?’ (p. 218). As if in answer, ‘the sun dappling 
the leaves gave everything a curious look of insubstantiality as if it 
were broken into separate points of light. He too, himself, seemed 
dispersed.’
In such passages, Woolf aims to reperceive human life as part of 
the molecular fl ow of shared material existence, the very opposite 
scale to that of the tea-pot regime she associates with English writ-
ing. At times, in The Years, the perceptibility of normally silent and 
invisible forces of vitality strikes into the awareness of the characters 
in the story. Equally there is recognition by the third-person narrator. 
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As Colonel Pargiter makes his way towards the street where his mis-
tress, Mira, lives, he fails to notice that ‘there was a sparkle, an ani-
mation everywhere’ (p. 6). As Martin talks with Maggie in the park, 
everything is ‘full of the stir, the potency, the fecundity of spring’ 
(p. 221). A similar sense of tangible, physical vitality opens the 1914 
section of the novel: ‘Even the air seemed to have a burr in it [. . .] 
it vibrated, it rippled [. . .] The air over London seemed a rough sea 
of sound through which circles travelled’ (p. 202). As this suggests, 
Woolf radically expands the regime of the perceptible so that the 
muteness of the common life of the physical world within which we 
live becomes audible as a voice. Kitty, alone on the Yorkshire moors, 
looks over the billowing land, ‘uncultivated, uninhabited, existing by 
itself, for itself [. . .] A deep murmur sang in her ears – the land itself, 
singing to itself, a chorus’ (p. 251).
Eleanor has a similar experience after the air raid: ‘A broad fan 
of light, like the sail of a windmill, was sweeping slowly across the 
sky. It seemed to take what she was feeling and to express it broadly 
and simply, as if another voice were speaking in another language’ 
(p. 271). Further on in the story, Eleanor looks out from her window 
high over roof tops, squares and gardens to a blue line of hills in 
the distance and the view seems to her ‘like another voice speaking, 
to fi ll up the pause’ (p. 296). These auditory experiences are attrib-
uted to characters, yet in a novel that foregrounds the pauses, the 
incomplete, fractured and interrupted nature of human intercourse, 
the writing seems to intimate the possibility of more inclusive com-
munication across the chalk marks that divide individual and social 
existence from the common life of the universe. This may well be 
a metaphysical proposition but it is not a dream of transcendence. 
It is the physical world to which Woolf seeks to give voice, not the 
spiritual.
Indeed, equally with the natural realm, the text foregrounds 
the social world of city streets. Throughout Woolf’s fi ction, streets 
are represented as spaces of complex, interactive energies. Like 
the shared physical world, the common life of the streets, in The 
Years, contains both threat and possibility. Rose’s childhood expe-
rience evokes an extreme sense of violent sexual otherness. The 
man’s sucking mouth and mewing noises seem to come from a 
non-human form of life. The poorer working-class streets in which 
characters live or visit are frequently represented as sites of squalid 
drunkenness and casual violence. Maggie and Sara can hear the 
‘sound of brawling in the street outside; a scuffl ing and trampling 
as if the police were hauling someone along the street against his 
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will’ (p. 169). Later, they hear the ‘hammer, hammer, hammer’ of 
the drunk husband banging on his door (p. 171). The area, ‘sor-
did’ and ‘dirty’, is scrawled with a swastika, indicative of a more 
endemic will to brutality (pp. 280, 279). Eleanor, driving through 
such a neighbourhood, thinks, ‘here was the vice, the obscenity, the 
reality of London’ (p. 101).
At other points, the narrative voice draws attention to what 
is excluded from the clean and proper realm of the respectable 
and prosperous. The wind scatters along the pavement the disgust-
ing detritus of bodily life: ‘twists of hair, papers already blood 
smeared, yellow smeared’ (p. 131). The effect is of revulsion from, 
rather than any embracing of, the common life of physical being. 
Perhaps the greatest unease in the text is registered by the unde-
fi ned menace of women whom poverty seems to have rendered 
more animal than human. Such is the woman looking out on the 
street where Eleanor has her houses: ‘Her eyes, rapacious, greedy, 
like the eyes of a bird of prey, were also sulky and sleepy, as if 
they had nothing to feed their hunger upon’ (p. 86). The same 
word ‘rapacious’ is used of other women, ‘raking’ the street with a 
‘dissatisfi ed stare’ (p. 102).
Yet this sense of threat and otherness is far from being the whole of 
the life of the streets represented in The Years. Even Maggie, admit-
ting that ‘the night is full of roaring and cursing; of violence and 
unrest’, allows ‘but also of beauty and joy’ (p. 170). Pre-eminently, 
the streets express movement, noise and vitality: the ‘turmoil of var-
iegated life’ that races towards Eleanor as she emerges from the Law 
Courts, or the crowds of travellers, workers and shoppers who swirl 
around the entrance of Charing Cross Station (pp. 99, 100). The 
images of caravans and processions like ‘tribes migrating in search 
of water, driven by enemies to seek new pasturage’ suggest the per-
petual movement of peoples across the spaces of geography and time 
in search of new possibilities of life (p. 115). Europe in the 1930s 
was witnessing mass displacements in those countries threatened by 
Nazi expansionism. The shopping and business streets of London are 
fi lled by the noise of traffi c, but in the poorer districts the ‘swarm of 
sound’ comprises not only ‘the rush of traffi c [but also] the shouts of 
the hawkers, the single cries and the general cries’ (p. 146). Through-
out the text, street musicians, muffi n men with their bells and barrel 
organ players are heard, while from open windows comes the sound 
of singing practice and a trombone player (p. 285). The social life of 
the city, like the life of the natural world, is comprehended as sound, 
its unarticulated complexity given voice.
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During the time that Woolf was writing The Years, a vigorous 
campaign was being waged against street noise. The New States-
man was unsympathetic to the Anti-Noise League which in 1935 
succeeded in outlawing milk-carts during the early morning hours. 
‘There was a kind of joy-bell gaiety in the clanging of can and bottle,’ 
the writer declares, ‘The joy of life expresses itself in a crowded cho-
rus [. . .] With street cries I should never dream of interfering.’19 In an 
earlier defence of street musicians against their detractors among the 
respectable classes, the New Statesman notes that some of the noisi-
est participants on the streets are young boys who seem intuitively to 
know that ‘where there is noise, there is life’.20 In The Years, the sense 
of the streets as embodying a force of unbounded vitality is rein-
forced by the omnipresence of children. Whenever the text mentions 
poorer streets, there are children, playing, skipping, running, always 
curious and responsive to events. When a barrel organ begins to play, 
‘the children all rushed in that direction’ (p. 7). The contrast of the 
children of the poor to those, like Rose, kept within the bounds of 
the proper, is stark. The children, moreover, make chalk marks on 
the pavement and skip in and out of ‘their chalk cages’, suggestive 
of a creative energy with potential to overrun and redraw defi ned 
boundaries (p. 9).
What Woolf does not explicitly indicate, but what her fi rst read-
ers would have known, is that most of the children to be seen in 
city streets would be malnourished. The hungry rapaciousness of 
the working-class women in the text was only too real in the actual 
world beyond. There was, indeed, ‘nothing to feed their hunger 
upon’ (p. 86). The insuffi cient diet of the poor was as much in the 
headlines during the 1930s as was housing. Lack of proper shelter 
and diet were twin faces of poverty and causally related. While there 
was general consensus that slum housing needed to be cleared there 
seemed an unsolvable problem of how to provide new housing at 
rents the working class could afford. As many experts on the subject 
pointed out, increases in rent only had the effect of aggravating ‘the 
evils of malnutrition – to shift the incidence of poverty from housing 
to the food budget’.21 The problem was exacerbated by the govern-
ment’s policy of promoting private sector provision where the drive 
for profi ts also led to jerry building, such as Eleanor is faced with in 
the novel. In an article on ‘The Health of the People’ in 1933, the 
New Statesman commented that despite some improvement ‘slums, 
foul milk supply, inadequate medical services’ still damage the stan-
dard of health for much of the population and ‘evidence of malnutri-
tion in children is widespread’.22
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The government’s decision to cut welfare provision to the unem-
ployed resulted in even poorer diets, to protests from the British 
Medical Association, many individual GPs, nutrition experts and 
other concerned groups as well as trade unions. In 1934, Eleanor 
Rathbone set up a Committee for the Children’s Minimum to cam-
paign publicly for recognition of the minimum standard of nutri-
tion required by children to maintain health as set out by medical 
authorities. One ameliorative measure urged by Rathbone’s Mini-
mum Committee and by many others, was the provision of free 
milk to school children.23 In another of those moves during the 
era that marked a transition from private to public ethos, the Milk 
Marketing Board had been set up to regulate the supply, price 
and quality of the milk produced by the great number of indepen-
dent farmers. For this reason, milk was also a topic prominent in 
the news and public debate. The New Statesman commended the 
Milk Marketing Board in 1933 as a ‘most important experiment’ 
in what it called ‘socialisation’, the expansion of public provision 
and structures for the welfare of the whole population, an implicit 
recognition of the common life.24 In 1935, the journal was point-
ing out that ‘cheap milk for schoolchildren could not have been 
organised on a national scale without the existence of the board’.25 
Even so, in 1936, Sir John Orr revealed shocking evidence that half 
of the country’s population was living on a diet which was below 
the standard required for the maintenance of perfect health and he 
warned that the scandal of actual starvation in the country would 
inevitably result in disease, stunted growth in children, poor phy-
sique in adults.26
In The Years, Colonel Pargiter points to the high seasonal price 
of milk when Eleanor presents him with the household accounts, 
a reference to the unstable fl uctuation of supply and cost in pre-
Milk Marketing Board days. The text also takes repeated note of 
the undersized bodies of many of the working-class characters. 
Crosby’s insect-like physique is frequently commented upon and 
her prominent eyes would also indicate childhood malnutrition. 
When Kitty visits the Robson family she is struck by how short 
they all are, feeling she has to alter the focus of her eyes to suit their 
smallness (p. 63). The exception is their son, Jo, who is tall and 
handsome, a benefi ciary of the improved diet the family enjoys due 
to Mr Robson’s rise in status. Eleanor observes the ‘little underfed 
body’ of Mr Duffus, the builder (p. 89). He is also bandy-legged, 
the common result of childhood rickets, a disease caused by ill-
nourishment. The exigency of physical need that human beings 
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have in common with all living things shapes the actual bodies as 
well as identities of the poor.
Woolf is sometimes thought to avoid class issues in her work. The 
Years, nevertheless, is pervasively concerned with the constitution 
and policing of the boundary, or chalk marks, between working-
class and middle-class worlds, a rigorous disavowal of any common 
life. The text marks a moment of transition in the relations between 
the respectable and the poor; the beginning of a process of conver-
gence between the two. For the fi rst and second generation of the 
extended Pargiter family, however, the two worlds remain distinct 
and separate. In Comfort, Cleanliness and Convenience: The Social 
Organization of Normality, Elizabeth Shove notes that, ‘the social 
order is defi ned and reproduced through rituals of everyday life; 
rituals that in turn confer meaning on goods, artefacts, even infra-
structures [. . .] they are implicated in the management of boundar-
ies between social groups’.27 Woolf is always astute in recognising 
the way artefacts or things provide substance for structures of belief. 
In The Years, Mrs Malone registers her maid’s neglect of duties by 
cushions not shaken suffi ciently. Her daughter Kitty responds to a 
feeling of being snubbed by the Robson family by indicting the infe-
riority of their things. Everything in their house is ugly, she thinks, 
reviewing with disgust the cheap curtains, darned tablecloth and 
‘fl orid’ china (pp. 60–2). Kitty pushes from her mind all the ponder-
ous things in the Lodge that oppress her.
Eleanor has a similar urge to Kitty’s desire to extend her relations 
with the working-class people in her housing project. In particular, 
she is drawn by the glimpse of Mr Duffus’s large family life, always 
‘hoping they might ask her in’ (p. 87). But, suspecting that he is 
swindling her, she ‘adopted the tone of the Colonel’s daughter [. . .] 
She saw him turn sullen before her eyes [. . .] You have to bully them 
or else they despise you’ she thinks (p. 89). Where the two class 
worlds are in intimate daily contact in the middle-class household 
even more drastic social strategies are required to maintain the fi c-
tion of separateness. Although servants inevitably acquire the most 
intimate knowledge of the family they serve, conversation is abruptly 
interrupted in their presence. Celia halts what she is saying to Elea-
nor when the maid comes in to clear away the coffee, turning to 
polite trivia and ‘adapting her voice to the presence of servants’ (p. 
186). Crosby colludes in pretence that she is mute, deaf and invisible, 
stifl ing her laughter at the Colonel’s jokes. Despite her long service 
for the family she remains, even in retirement, unable to speak for 
herself in their presence.
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The most powerful dividing line between the world of respect-
ability and the world of the poor, however, is that written on the 
body. This is not surprising since embodiment constitutes the basis 
for recognition of creaturely communality. Otherness and division 
must therefore start from the body. Not only are the working-class 
physically stunted and malformed, they are also deemed unhygienic. 
The class line cleaves apart what is perceived as clean and proper 
and what is designated dirty, improper and loathsomely other. 
In The Road to Wigan Pier, published in 1937, George Orwell 
declared that the smell of those often termed the ‘great unwashed’ 
was an insuperable barrier between the classes. Even those working-
class people, like family servants, who were known to be clean were 
‘faintly unappetising’.28
In The Years, the respectable characters appear almost eager to 
notice any absence of cleanliness in those perceived as beneath them 
in social status. As one of her tenants waddles in front of her, Eleanor 
notices fastidiously that a ‘wisp of yellow hair hung down behind her 
dirty ears’, the unhealthy, wispy hair adding somehow to the sense 
of unwholesomeness (p. 89). Martin describes the caretaker in the 
basement of the empty house in Browne Street as ‘a dirty old woman’ 
(p. 135). Eleanor’s repulsed response to the estate agent, who comes 
to evaluate the family home after her father’s death, makes quite 
explicit the way notions of cleanliness function viscerally at the inter-
face of class antagonism. Eleanor looks at the man’s neck, ‘washed 
imperfectly in some sink in Wandsworth’; she was annoyed at the 
way he had gone round their house, ‘sniffi ng and peering, he had 
indicted their cleanliness, their humanity [. . .] He was hauling him-
self up into the class above him, she supposed’ (p. 194). Eleanor’s 
class resentment at the man’s lack of deference to the middle-class 
home renders her unaware that she equally indicts his humanity as 
identifi ed with cleanliness. Her disparagement of his need to wash in 
a sink points also to the way material infrastructure, like plumbing, 
perpetuates, exacerbates or can erase class boundaries.
Inevitably, the bathroom, as the site of interface between the 
self as body and the self as individual cultural identity, is a site 
fraught with potential confl ict and tension. For the confi ned mid-
dle-class family the bathroom sanctioned the right to privacy, 
maintaining a disavowal of bodily being, in contrast to the zinc tub 
in the common kitchen or backyard which had to serve as wash-
ing facility for the working class. Even into the 1940s, whether or 
not a house or fl at had its own bathroom was ‘one of the major 
dividing lines’ of social class (Ravetz, The Place of Home, p. 134). 
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For all these reasons, the enforced intimacy of a shared bathroom, 
and even more so the bodily matter exuded there, was source of 
deeply-felt fear and revulsion. Sara’s account of the detritus of 
body hair and grease left in the bath by her Jewish neighbour, 
whom they can hear, while she speaks, coughing and clearing his 
throat, infects North with revulsion and disgust almost as strong 
as Sara’s. ‘North felt a shiver run through him. Hairs in food, hairs 
on basins, other people’s hairs made him feel physically sick’ (p. 
307). This visceral response to a sense of contamination from the 
emissions of unhygienic otherness is not confi ned to middle-class 
fastidiousness. Far from pointing to the commonness of embodied 
life, it fuels the abhorrence and hatred directed at any groups or 
identities deemed unclean and other, whether of race or sexuality 
or appearance. Crosby calls the Belgium Count who spits in the 
bath ‘a dirty foreigner’ and ‘a dirty brute’, not properly human 
in his disgusting habits. Earlier in the story, in Oxford, Edward’s 
friend, Gibbs, who is to marry Milly, expresses the disgust he feels 
for Ashley, a homosexual, by terming him a ‘dirty little swine’ 
(p. 49). The scrawled swastika points to the violence implicated in 
such processes of othering.
Alongside this recognition of social divisions based upon what 
is deemed the clean and proper body, there is an almost comic reit-
eration in the text of middle-class rituals of bodily hygiene. Delia 
admires her father when he comes down for dinner: ‘He looked so 
pink and clean and genial in his dinner jacket’ (p. 32). Whenever a 
middle-class character turns in for the night, the narrative dutifully 
records the ceremony of teeth-cleaning. After dinner at the lodge, 
Kitty in her bedroom ‘began to brush her teeth’, Eleanor decides to 
put off thinking about the poor families she is helping ‘till she was 
brushing her teeth at night’ (pp. 55, 29). Similar attention is given to 
the hot water left in many bedrooms during the story for a fi nal wash 
before sleep, as when Eleanor washes herself ‘methodically but care-
fully’ due to the water shortage (p. 178). Characters make announce-
ments that they are going to take a bath and the Pargiter children 
share a memory of being washed by a slimy cloth in their infancy 
(pp. 29, 140). Eleanor, returning from Spain, notices all the soap in a 
shop window and thinks ‘how thoroughly people wash in England, 
even the air smells of soap’ (p. 175). By the end of the novel, Eleanor 
is proudly showing off her modern shower (p. 278). There is, indeed, 
a reference to washing or cleanliness at least once in every ten pages 
of the story. Whatever else Woolf cut from her original chapters, 
she clearly did not want to omit these multiple details of hygiene 
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rituals. It is hard to think of any other novel that so highlights the 
performance of bodily cleanliness. The textual reiteration seems to 
mimic the habitual everyday practices whereby the proper, hygienic, 
middle-class body is produced.
If Woolf is having fun at the expense of middle-class mores, 
there is, nevertheless, more serious irony involved. The cleanliness 
of the respectable classes is largely dependent upon the labour of 
the unhygienic unwashed. The ‘water-jug [. . .] swaddled up like an 
old woman’ in a guest’s bedroom has been lugged all the way up 
from the basement by a servant and the used, dirty water will be 
carried down again by a servant (p. 53). The same physical effort is 
required for all the other water made available in respectable bed-
rooms throughout the narrative. In addition, the text refers many 
times to the washing of clothes and linen. The child Rose comes 
down in a dirty dress because the laundry has not been returned (p. 
10). Before the arrival of the national grid, which made electrical 
goods available, all dirty washing had to be done by hand. Laun-
dering was one of the most gruelling, physically demanding of all 
women’s work, and for that reason only done by the most impov-
erished. The harsh soap required and the heavy lifting of wet cloth 
took a quick toll on health. Mrs Levy, confi ned to bed, speaks of 
‘when I was left a poor widder woman scrubbing and mangling’, 
and she stretches out her arm ‘which was wrung and white like the 
root of a tree’ (p. 27). Her hard labour that has kept the middle-
class household clean and proper has rendered her an object of 
physical disgust.
Yet Woolf does not represent the poor as pitiable victims. Crosby, 
despite the frailty of her body as she struggles against the weather, 
‘seemed to express an unconquerable determination; she was not 
going to give in; she was bent on surviving’ (pp. 274–5). Deploying 
de Certeau’s concept of the ‘tactic’ it is possible to see the various 
working-class people in the text as actively making use of what pos-
sibilities come their way and creatively producing their own pos-
sibilities. A tactic, de Certeau explains, exists outside the regime 
of the proper, the structures and routines of respectability. Those 
who have to rely upon tactics must always be on the look out for 
opportunities and must constantly manipulate events to turn them 
into opportunities (Practice of Everyday, p. 37). The exploited, of 
necessity, have to be able to exploit. Perhaps the clearest example 
of this in The Years is the waiter who seizes the chance of getting a 
double tip from Martin, a licit and an illicit one (p. 210). Eleanor 
thinks Mr Duffus has taken advantage of her, ‘swindled her’, by 
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passing off shoddy workmanship. Eugénie clearly believes Mr Toye 
has exploited her gullibility, promising that tomorrow she will con-
front him and declare, ‘No, Mr Toye, you have deceived me once 
too often’ (pp. 89, 130). Meanwhile, there is the suggestion that her 
housemaid manipulates Eugénie’s guilt at her untidiness. The maid 
waltzes around with a hat Eugénie has given her to ‘atone for the 
mess in the drawing room’ (p. 104).
Even Crosby seizes upon opportunities that come her way: ‘for 
many years she had been hoarding odds and ends with a view to her 
retirement. Indian elephants, silver vases, the walrus that she had 
found in the waste-paper basket’ (p. 196). Almost certainly the family 
would have given her these things had she asked, but this would have 
underlined her dependence rather than assert a right to ownership as 
the secret hoarding does. As she slowly clears the table and draws the 
curtains the prolonged and irritating creaking of her cheap shoes is 
surely a tactic of self-assertion in defi ance of her muted presence in 
family life. In her early days, Kitty was piqued by the refusal of the 
Robson family to treat her as one of themselves. As Lady Lasswade, 
her maid, Baxter’s, politely impersonal attendance and ‘inscrutable, 
pursed-up’ expression still renders her uncomfortable (p. 241). Bax-
ter is an altogether more modern servant than Crosby, being unafraid 
to draw her own boundaries of where her responsibilities end and of 
pursuing a life of her own quite independent of those who employ 
her. Crosby, herself, comes up against the non-deferential attitude of 
a new generation of working women. ‘It was all take-it-or-leave-it 
now,’ Crosby mutters, addressing in imagination, ‘the red-haired ser-
vant girl who had fl ung out of the house without warning. She could 
easily get another job’ (p. 274).
In a somewhat reverse direction, sections of the middle class, 
especially women, were moving towards what could be termed 
downward class convergence. In The Years, Maggie and Renny man-
age without servants, although Renny admits this necessitates some 
disregard for middle-class mores: ‘we are extremely dirty’, he says 
(p. 255). Eleanor’s fi nal home in the novel had previously been a 
workman’s fl at, and Sara lives in a lodging-house that North calls 
a slum (pp. 296, 283). These rooms would have been rented from 
private landlords whose properties were often inferior to new rented 
housing offered to working-class tenants by local authorities. A cor-
respondent to the New Statesman pointed out that working-class 
fl ats being built in Euston were an improvement on middle-class fl ats 
available in central London.29
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Sara’s outrage and disgust at the habits of the neighbour with 
whom she has to share a bathroom suggests that convergence does 
not necessarily produce community feeling. As electric wiring and 
indoor plumbing became increasingly standardised features of new 
or improved working-class housing during the 1930s, the better-
off of the working class were able to espouse the complex values 
of respectability and privacy that modern convenience allowed. As 
Shove suggests, ‘Cleanliness values bore on all who wished to better 
their lives or felt the sting of invidious class comparisons’ (Comfort, 
p. 100). Whereas, into the beginning of the twentieth century, regular 
washing marked out middle-class status, as it does for the characters 
in The Years, by the 1930s, it had become ‘a basic condition of social 
acceptance’ (Shove, Comfort, p. 102). A condition of respectability 
was beginning to be available to the labouring population and with 
it, perhaps, recognition of a potential common life shared by middle 
and working classes alike and materialised in the national grid and 
piped water supply.
Clearly, housing was the central factor driving this transition 
of life styles and values. The years 1933 to 1938 witnessed a great 
boom in house building so that by 1939 approximately one-third of 
all houses were new. As a result, the possibility of home ownership 
extended down to the lower middle class and to the upper levels 
of working-class occupations. This mass market in home ownership 
was facilitated by a concurrent expansion of building societies. In 
1910, the amount societies advanced was just over £9 million, while 
in 1938 it was £137 million. The result, writes John Burnett, was ‘a 
growing convergence of standards between the established members 
and the new entrants to the class’ (A Social History, p. 245). Not 
only was there a growing standardisation of housing, with ameni-
ties of running water, electricity and gas, but there was also a con-
vergence of the values and ambitions derived from homeownership. 
‘Above all,’ Burnett claims, for those ‘able to buy a house instead 
of merely renting it, and to luxuriate in the sense of security and 
achievement which property-buying brought, [was a] [. . .] predomi-
nant ambition’ (A Social History, p. 245).
Woolf’s precise notation on types of housing throughout the nar-
rative traces this very material process of transition. The need of 
embodied beings for shelter produces a social history given substance 
in houses as well as archives. At the end of the novel, Eleanor thinks, 
‘Always there were rooms [. . .] Always from the beginning of time’ 
(p. 384). The rooms inhabited by the main characters at the beginning 
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of The Years, in Abercorn Terrace, Browne Street and the Lodge, are 
spacious and the houses themselves imposing private family dwell-
ings. As the story progresses these high-status properties move down 
the social scale, to become multiply-rented rooms and lodgings. The 
old houses in Milton Street, where Sara lodges, ‘had seen better days’ 
and the doorway and stairs of the lodging house ‘had once been [part 
of] a gentleman’s residence’ (pp. 280, 281). Meanwhile in Oxford, 
Dr Malone so dislikes the ‘cheap red villas’ that characterise the 
neighbourhood in which the Robson family and Miss Craddock rent 
housing that ‘he would always make a round to avoid them’ (p. 56). 
The Robsons, unlike the very poor, can afford a house that has two 
ground fl oor rooms allowing for the status-enhancing, never to be 
used, front parlour. Dr Malone’s dislike of the new cannot hold back 
the process of time. By the end of the novel, Milly is complaining of 
‘brand-new villas everywhere’ (p. 339). As Eleanor and Peggy drive 
to Delia’s party, the cab takes them down ‘mild respectable little 
streets where every house had its bow window, its strip of garden, its 
private name’ (p. 299). There is suggestion here of both conforming 
sameness and, paradoxically, of aspiring individualism, as asserted in 
private names. Nevertheless, the villas seem more part of the current 
of life than the glimpsed ‘pale pompous beauty’ of the ghostly stucco 
columns of Abercorn Terrace that the two women glimpse from the 
cab window.
What is at stake in this transitional moment materialised in the 
types of building seen on a drive through London? Is it a move-
ment away from the pale pomposity of the middle-class house with 
its geography of vertical hierarchy, its life-restricting codes of pri-
vacy, properness and individualism? Is it a moment of dissensus, 
an opening out into possibilities of a more egalitarian sense of life 
and self as a horizontal continuum with the vitality of the natural 
world and of the social energies of city streets? This would entail a 
dismantling of the traditional vertical regime of perceptibility struc-
tured by idealist individualist values, to be replaced by an inclusive, 
comprehensive regime of the perceptible recognising as worthy of 
notice all domains of human existence – cultural, social and natural. 
It could be argued that the shared physical necessities of human life 
were leading, in the 1930s, to ever-greater degrees of commonality 
as materialised in the infrastructure of utilities and in the movement 
from private to public provision. These are possibilities and ideas 
that preoccupy the characters at the end of The Years. Eleanor, for 
example, recognises that identity comes not from private life but 
from social interaction: ‘My life’s been other people’s lives’ (p. 331). 
5215_Morris.indd   192 30/11/16   10:32 AM
North imagines an extension of self as comprehending a larger real-
ity. He wants ‘at the same time [to] spread out, make a new ripple 
in human consciousness, be the bubble and the stream [. . .] myself 
and the world together’ (p. 369).
On the other hand, does a world of little red villas, each with their 
private name, suggest rather that the individualism and divisiveness 
of the private house are coming to dominate an ever larger section of 
the social world? The Anti-Noise League was campaigning against 
the vitality and noise of the city streets in the name of decency, pri-
vacy and house-owner rights. The house, whatever its size, is pre-
eminently a stage for the performance of possessive individualism. 
There is certainly plenty of egoism on display at Delia’s party. Peggy 
is bored by the ‘I, I, I’ of a young man’s conversation but she com-
pares its heedless persistence to a vacuum cleaner or a telephone bell, 
suggesting such male assertion is as commonplace in the present day 
of domestic technology as in earlier decades (p. 325). North wants 
to shield Maggie from the ‘contamination of family life’ that Milly 
represents, only to realise that Maggie is equally ready to talk ‘about 
her children now’. None of them is interested in other people’s chil-
dren, he thinks, ‘Only in their own; their own property; their own 
fl esh and blood [. . .] How then can we be civilized?’ (p. 341). Yet 
Peggy later thinks that he too ‘would produce little Gibbses, more 
little Gibbses’ (p. 357). The estate-agent advertisements and the talk 
of houses with several bathrooms, moreover, suggest the continued 
dominance of consumer acquisitiveness, of the quest for privacy and 
disavowal of physical necessity.
Delia’s party itself attempts to stage social convergence. She 
has invited people who are commoners and those who are noble; 
there are those in formal evening dress and those who are not; some 
ignore decorum and drink soup out of mugs, some wait for spoons. 
‘That had always been her aim;’ she thinks, ‘to mix people; to do 
away with the absurd conventions of English life’ (p. 359). Eleanor 
can also be seen to further the movement of convergence when she 
asks her brother, Edward, to encourage the son of her porter in his 
desire to go to college. Edward, too, approves of this widening of 
class opportunity. He points approvingly to one of Delia’s guests, 
Chipperfi eld, who is a great railway man and son of a railway porter. 
Yet Chipperfi eld epitomises the equivocal outcome of class mobility. 
He has bought himself a ‘delightful house’ with two or three hun-
dred acres for shooting and ‘old masters’ upon his walls. During the 
1930s, there was public debate, much of it critical, as to the changes 
in life style and modes of speech by those of working-class origin 
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who had risen to prominence as members of the Labour Party and 
trade unions as well as in business.
That Delia’s husband, the arch conservative, Patrick, calls the 
property advertisements ‘a manifesto’ is surely a highly ironic joke. 
Property was indeed the manifesto, not of class revolution, but of 
respectability for those anxious to gain a higher social status; it was 
equally the lynch-pin holding in place vertical social structures and 
individualist values. North looks at his fellow guests and thinks that 
for all Delia’s pride in her promiscuity, ‘where are the Sweeps and the 
Sewer-men, the Seamstresses and the Stevedores?’ (p. 364). Kitty is 
one of the most robust in insisting that she can drink her soup from a 
mug in defi ance of convention. Much earlier in her life she had been 
tempted to throw decorum much more radically to the winds in her 
attraction to working-class young men. Later, as Lady Lasswade, she 
attends the opera Siegfried and as the hero hammers the sword that 
will destroy the old order, she is reminded of the ‘Hammer, hammer, 
hammer’ she heard coming from the garden of the Robsons’ house 
from which a young man, their son, emerged with wood shavings 
in his hair (p. 165). Yet, ambivalently, in the text, this also echoes 
the ‘Hammer, hammer, hammer’ of the drunken working-class man 
beating at the door.
In the 1930s, there was almost universal recognition that the 
older order was giving way to new social and material structures. 
As always, the outcomes of such moments of dissensus were dif-
fi cult to predict. Many hoped for, and possibly even more feared, 
the end of class and gender inequality. In addition, by the late 
1930s, European war seemed almost inevitable. In this respect the 
last section of The Years strikingly echoes the ending of Chekhov’s 
The Three Sisters. In each work, the main characters stand hesitant 
before the future, fearful yet desirous of change. Chekhov’s world 
was about to be irrevocably transformed by the Russian Revolu-
tion and Woolf’s by the Second World War. Characters at the end 
of the novel express yearning for a new order very much in the 
way Chekhov’s characters do. ‘To live differently . . . differently’, 
North thinks (p. 381). Nicholas raises his glass to ‘The human race 
[. . .] now in its infancy, may it grow to maturity’ (p. 383). ‘There 
must be another life,’ Eleanor insists to herself, ‘She felt as if she 
were standing on the edge of a precipice with her hair blown back’ 
(p. 385). As in Chekhov’s plays, there are no concrete proposals, 
no programmes or manifestos for a prescribed new world, only 
the desire for an opening up of the horizons of the possible, for a 
redistribution of the perceptible.
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Woolf’s novels are always highly dialogic, an orchestration of mul-
tiple voices within the social continuum. In the fi nal section of The 
Years perspectives and voices change constantly. The novel, however, 
concludes with two striking images that resonate like alternative 
possibilities. As dawn comes, Eleanor watches as a young man and 
woman get out of a cab before a house. The man fi ts his latch-key 
to the door, and opens it. They stand for a moment on the threshold 
and then the door shuts behind them with a little thud (p. 391). If 
this represents the future, it seems an ominous turning away from the 
fullness of life, a retreat into the sheltered privacy of the house. This 
is the limitation of space that Woolf hoped future women writers 
would escape from. That ‘little thud’ of domestic enclosure is also 
the fate that, one hundred years earlier, Jane Austen had resisted for 
her female protagonists.
Just before Eleanor sees the young couple step out of the cab and 
enter the house, Delia brings up from the basement, where so many 
of the servants in the novel have lived invisibly, the children of the 
caretaker and, like Marie Antoinette, she offers them cake.30 They 
eat hungrily but when asked to sing for their supper, they sweep 
fi erce or frightened eyes over the assembled guests and break into 
a song that is pure sound with no recognisable words. They sing 
harshly, fi ercely and discordantly. ‘As they stood there they looked 
so dignifi ed; yet they made this hideous noise’ (p. 387). This, in 
itself, seems a moment of transition, the mute and invisible newly, 
shockingly perceptible. It stages an aesthetic and political dissen-
sus, at once hilariously carnivalesque, yet equally tender, hopeful 
and terrifying.
Are these the voices of the future? Earlier in the novel Woolf had 
made audible the wider social and physical worlds that are largely 
rendered mute and unseen in regimes of representation structured 
upon individualism and idealism. In The Years, the common life 
of the physical world expresses itself as sound as well as visibil-
ity. The life of the city streets is also materialised as voices, as 
street cries, musicians and children singing as they skip over chalk 
marks. In The Waves, Louis desires to draw a steel ring of pure 
poetry around the physical energies and appetites of common life 
and thereby discipline it into an abstract universal order. Woolf 
resists any imposition of meaning upon the children’s voices. The 
moment resonates without any interpretive screen placed upon it. 
It remains pure possibility.
The Years has been much criticised for its failure to be wholly 
realist or wholly modernist. Yet Woolf’s writing moves well beyond 
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earlier traditions of social and psychological realism. She practises a 
form of worldly realism that emphasises self, not as individual mind, 
but as embodied being and part of a material continuum with social 
structures and processes, with the whole physical universe, and with 
the potent world of things. From a modernist concern with tech-
nology, she produces a radical materialist history. This egalitarian, 
mobile perspective and aesthetics wholly undercuts the idealist, verti-
cal representative regime still dominant within so many political and 
cultural domains today.
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Conclusion
In so many ways, there has been a prising away of life from place, 
an abstraction of experience into different kinds of touchlessness. We 
experience, as no historical period has before, disembodiment and 
dematerialisation [. . .] We have in many ways forgotten what the 
world feels like [. . .] We have come increasingly to forget that our 
minds are shaped by the bodily experience of being in the world – its 
spaces, textures, sounds, smells and habits. (Robert Macfarlane, The 
Wild Places, p. 203)
What Robert Macfarlane describes here can be thought of as a redis-
tribution of the perceptible, a turning away from the tangible experi-
ence of physical existence. Macfarlane’s concern is the very modern 
one of the threat posed by this distancing and abstraction of our 
experience of the world to its ecological survival. Much earlier, at the 
turn of the eighteenth century, Jane Austen is also writing in reaction 
to this same redistributive formation, albeit still in process of emer-
gence and consolidation. In Sense and Sensibility, the term ‘society’ 
retains for her the immediacy of personal interaction and shared feel-
ings, even while its meaning is in process of change as part of the 
shift towards abstraction and aggregation as a way of knowing the 
world.
Struggles of representation as to what is noteworthy, what is above 
or below the horizon of visibility, are equally aesthetic and political. 
I have argued that both Austen and Woolf come to maturity as writ-
ers in periods of radically contested values in the eras respectively of 
the French Revolution and the First World War. In addition, their 
materialist understanding of reality and the writing practices they 
fashion from that understanding draw upon a tradition they share 
of British Enlightenment scepticism. The thinking of David Hume, 
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Adam Smith and David Hartley substantiated a position of dissent 
from what became, increasingly, a consensual aesthetic and political 
regime, an ideology sustaining the hierarchical ordering of the men-
tal above the material. For both Austen and Woolf what is at stake 
in this disembodiment of experience is the pushing out of sight of 
our shared existence as creaturely beings, beings subject to the same 
physical needs and vulnerabilities. It is recognition of this common-
ality that underlies the immediacy of Mrs Jenkins’s response, in Sense 
and Sensibility, to threat of hardship, ‘I must see what I can give 
them’ (p. 241). Yet already, the novel notes, this reactive sympathy is 
giving way to privatised gentility. In Persuasion, the characterisation 
of Anne Elliot charts the harm endured by those regarded literally 
as nobodies, rendered physically and socially invisible and unheard.
For Woolf, too, the common life is that felt upon the pulse and 
not the little individual life of the private drawing room. For Woolf, 
though, writing a hundred years later, embodiment has become a 
problem as well as a means to embrace the universe. In Mrs Dallo-
way and The Waves, the body is the site of conscription into coercive 
and regulatory social and cultural systems, systems that utilise ide-
alist rhetoric to render invisible or contemptuous the material lives 
brought under subjection. In The Years, Woolf explores the force of 
bodily repugnance as a source of hatred and violence to any class 
or race or gender deemed unclean. Does increase in bodily privacy 
exemplifi ed in access to bathrooms intensify feelings of distance and 
abstraction from the bodies of others? Eleanor practises philan-
thropy at a safe remove, providing housing for the poor, but the life 
of her servant Crosby who shares the intimacy of her home remains 
invisible to her. Not until Crosby leaves does Eleanor notice how 
dark and low the basement is; up to that moment class distribution 
of the perceptible has ensured the invisibility of Crosby’s material 
existence.
Disembodiment aids the process of abstraction, whereby real 
lives, in the particularity of their needs, feelings, hopes and fears, 
become depersonalised. They become aggregates to be used as a 
means to achieve ideas, mental systems, the greater good. Harriet is 
exactly the ‘something’ that Hartfi eld needs, Emma thinks. Tenant 
farmers and the poor can be removed from land for its ‘improve-
ment’, progress and civilisation require the ‘working of hands 
and feet’ to one disciplinary will, national well-being is served by 
the removal of ‘superfl uous youth’ and a heterogeneous world is 
taught to see through the unitary vision of Western capitalism. From 
the Olympian perspective of authority, men dying in war are as 
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distanced and disembodied as matchsticks. The process of conver-
sion, as Woolf suggests, renders the fl esh invisible, of no account. It 
is, as Derrida points out, the process of idealisation itself (Derrida, 
Margins of Philosophy, p. 226).
Against the homogenising vision of the scopic drive, Hannah 
Arendt asserts the multiplicity of viewpoints that constitute a public 
world (Arendt, Human Condition, p. 57). Austen and Woolf do like-
wise, experimenting constantly with innovative motility of focalisa-
tion. Above all, they dethrone human exceptionalism, the sovereign 
subject of rationality and interiority. It is this lonely being that pro-
vides the model for and credence to claims of divine, scientifi c, or 
visionary knowledge, elevating that mental totality above any chal-
lenge from empirical experience. In all three novels discussed here, 
Austen opposes the energy and heterogeneity of a shared world of 
horizontal relationships to the static uniformity and hierarchy of 
Olympic privilege and exclusion. Hartfi eld has to be integrated with 
Highbury if it is to become part of the processes of national change. 
The class-bound claustrophobia of Kellynch gives way to the vari-
ety and energy of Bath. ‘So much novelty and beauty!’ Anne Elliot 
cries in appreciation of movement and change (p. 200). She is surely 
speaking for most other women trapped invisible and unheard within 
small regulatory domestic worlds.
In Woolf’s fi ction, moments of shared being lead to dissolution of 
the competitive and individualistic self. Fleeting experiences of the 
world without an ‘I’ in it allow characters like Martin in The Years 
to lose consciousness of the boundaries of self and feel dispersed into 
the physical world around him. In The Waves, Bernard is ‘unmoored’ 
from his sense of ‘I’ to merge into the life of his fellow beings. In 
some ways, Austen’s experimental writing in Persuasion most radi-
cally undoes the notion of the unitary self. Anne Elliot’s conscious-
ness simultaneously comprehends things (doors slamming), other 
people as voices and bodies, socio-cultural attitudes involved, and 
subjective feelings and rationalities experienced as bodily sensation. 
Things, others, culture and embodied self are inseparable within that 
compound experience. From such a full perspective any notion of 
privatised subjectivity seems thin and impoverished.
Things, for both novelists, constitute the shared world. Elinor, 
in Sense and Sensibility, recognises the power of ordinary things to 
challenge with their material tangibility the charm of wishful think-
ing. In Mrs Dalloway, Septimus Warren Smith is released from the 
grip of visions when he realises that things are not symbols of a 
hidden, purer reality but simply the stuff of ordinary shared life. 
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As this suggests, things, imbued with metaphorical meaning, pro-
vide a powerful means of giving spurious substance to abstract ideas 
and value systems, even while these idealist forms of thought dis-
avow the material and fl eshly. Thus, guns in Persuasion are shown 
as constitutive of masculine and class identities. Powerful cars, in 
Mrs Dalloway, make tangible, for Peter Walsh, the ideal of Western 
progress and civilisation. In The Waves, the paraphernalia and ritu-
als of cricket constitute a sense of English identity. Even subjective 
interiority, Austen suggests, depends upon the props of material 
objects. Harriet needs her ‘precious things’ to make tangible her 
romantic dream of Mr Elton; Marianne articulates a broken heart 
by playing the piano.
At a macro level, things produce the lived reality and infrastruc-
ture of national and global existence. Pipes and wires underneath 
our homes, Woolf suggests in The Years, are material testimony to 
our shared needs as fl eshly creatures but equally they facilitate an 
increase in domestic privacy, consumer competitiveness and hence 
a disavowal of the shared life that encourages fellowship. Sanitary 
and toiletry products exported around the world take with them a 
Western distribution of values, converting global variety and dif-
ference into a unitary economic place. More invisibly, technology 
makes a reality of scopic ambition that Emma Woodhouse could not 
even have dreamed of. Cables and telephones already provide Louis, 
in The Waves, with the means to abstract himself from a shared 
world he has always feared as disorderly and perversely fl eshly. He 
becomes disembodied authority, a voice issuing commands, to dis-
cipline the heterogeneity of embodied lives into a regulated con-
formity. By such material means is physical and social existence 
converted into the ideal of abstract schemes and visions.
Neither Austen nor Woolf is a revolutionary. They do not envis-
age or seek a redistribution of wealth or of social order. They articu-
late a redistribution of the perceptible. Sharing a scepticism deriving 
from British Enlightenment’s quarrel with idealism, and from their 
outsider’s view as women, they challenge the pervasive consensual 
orthodoxy that privileges the mental above the material. In particu-
lar, they reject the rhetorical elevation of abstract systems and beliefs 
that veil over fl eshly needs and vulnerability and the shared life such 
recognition fosters. As such, their critique is not of any one particu-
lar vested interest or class or location of power. What they recog-
nise is the danger inherent in one of the most basic impulses shaping 
human thought: idealism. The capacity to look beyond the restric-
tive codes of the actual and probable is vital. Without the power to 
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imagine, both writers show, human life would be enclosed and mean. 
Their fi ction is energised by their worldly vision of the wide possi-
bilities of human existence. Yet any vision or system of belief needs 
the constant challenge of empirical realities lest it convert ‘all this 
fever of living’ into a depersonalised abstraction. It is the enduring 
temptation and danger of rendering the stuff of material existence 
imperceptible that makes the critiques of Austen and Woolf so con-
tinuously relevant and never more so than at present.
The experimental writing practices they develop to convey their 
oppositional views, I have termed worldly realism. As opposed to the 
idealist sanctioning of individualism in much psychological realism 
and the restrictive actualism of social realism, worldly realism evokes 
horizontal, interactive, mutually determining relationships between 
embodied people, things, social world and physical universe, an egali-
tarian writerly space in which potentially nothing is mute or invisible. 
It is an approach to Austen’s fi ction that recognises the grounds and 
the achievement of her artistic radicalness. Am I also suggesting that 
Woolf is a realist rather than a modernist? These are not mutually 
exclusive aesthetics. As Brecht said, we do not have to position them 
as binary oppositions. Literary criticism should perhaps heed Woolf’s 
condemnation of the adversarial mentality of the public school ‘where 
there are “sides”, and it is necessary for one side to beat the other’ 
(Room of One’s Own, p. 80). Far from adversaries, Woolf and Aus-
ten share an experimental energy that produces new representational 
regimes that expand the perceptibility of all aspects – hair, dirt, tides, 
clouds, laughter and poetry – of material existence. Against coercive 
orthodoxy, they demonstrate the liberating blasphemy of mocking 
irreverence.
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